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Abstract
Doctor of Philosophy
Autonomic Overload Management for Large-Scale Virtualized Network Functions
by Stefano ROSIELLO
The explosion of data traffic in telecommunication networks has been im-
pressive in the last few years. To keep up with the high demand and staying
profitable, Telcos are embracing the Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
paradigm by shifting from hardware network appliances to software virtual
network functions, which are expected to support extremely large scale archi-
tectures, providing both high performance and high reliability.
The main objective of this dissertation is to provide frameworks and tech-
niques to enable proper overload detection and mitigation for the emerging vir-
tualized software-based network services. The thesis contribution is threefold.
First, it proposes a novel approach to quickly detect performance anomalies
in complex and large-scale VNF services. Second, it presents NFV-Throttle,
an autonomic overload control framework to protect NFV services from over-
load within a short period of time, allowing to preserve the QoS of traffic flows
admitted by network services in response to both traffic spikes (up to 10x
the available capacity) and capacity reduction due to infrastructure problems
(such as CPU contention). Third, it proposes DRACO, to manage overload
problems arising in novel large-scale multi-tier applications, such as complex
stateful network functions in which the state is spread across modern key-
value stores to achieve both scalability and performance. DRACO performs a
fine-grained admission control, by tuning the amount and type of traffic ac-
cording to datastore node dependencies among the tiers (which are dynami-
cally discovered at run-time), and to the current capacity of individual nodes,
in order to mitigate overloads and preventing hot-spots.
This thesis presents the implementation details and an extensive experi-
mental evaluation for all the above overload management solutions, by means
of a virtualized IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), which provides modern mul-
timedia services for Telco operators, such as Videoconferencing and VoLTE,
and which is one of the top use-cases of the NFV technology.
Contents
Abstract ii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 The need of autonomic overload management . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Overload management: Threats and challenges . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Thesis contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Related Work 11
2.1 Overload concepts in NFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Detection of performance anomalies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Cloud elasticity and autonomic capacity scaling . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4 Physical resource contention management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5 Admission control and traffic throttling strategies . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6 Unbalanced load control in stateful architectures . . . . . . . . . 29
3 On-line detection of performance bottlenecks 31
3.1 Fault correlation approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 The IMS Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 Experimental evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.1 Sudden workload surges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.2 Component failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.3 Anomaly-free, long-running workload . . . . . . . . . . . 54
iii
CONTENTS iv
4 Managing the overload of network functions in the Cloud 56
4.1 The problem of overload control in NFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 The proposed overload control solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2.1 VNF-level design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2.2 Host-level design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2.3 Network-level design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Experimental evaluation on an NFV IMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.1 Testbed and technical implementation . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.2 Experimental plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.3 Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4 Managing the threats of the physical CPU contention at guest-level 89
4.4.1 Overview of CPU overloads and CPU utilization metrics . 89
4.4.2 Mitigation strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4.3 Experimental evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.4.4 Basic feedback control-based overload control . . . . . . 101
4.4.5 Enhanced feedback control-based overload control . . . 104
4.4.6 Performance evaluation under different contention pat-
terns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5 Managing the overload of stateful multi-tier network functions 112
5.1 The problem of unbalanced overloads in multi-tier systems . . . 113
5.2 The proposed solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.2.1 The Distributed Memory component . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.2.2 The Distributed Capacity Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.2.3 The Distributed Admission Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.3 The Distributed Fileserver Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.3.1 Integration of the overload control solution . . . . . . . . 134
5.3.2 Experimental evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.4 The IP Multimedia Subsystem Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.4.1 Integration of the overload control solution . . . . . . . . 143
5.4.2 Experimental evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.5 Overhead and scalability of the overload control solution . . . . 153
5.5.1 Sizing the Distributed Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.5.2 Example: scaling the solution up to 10K nodes . . . . . . . 156
5.5.3 Further optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6 Conclusion 161
CONTENTS v
Bibliography 166
List of Acronyms
The following acronyms are used throughout this text.
CAPS Call Attempts per Second
COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf components
DNS Domain Name System
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
HSS Home Subscriber Server
IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem
IoT Internet of Things
NFV Network Function Virtualization
NFVI Network Function Virtualization Infrastructure
OS Operating System
P-CSCF Proxy Call Session Control Function
QoS Quality of Service
RAPS Register Attempts per Second
S-CSCF Serving Call Session Control Function
vi
CONTENTS vii
SLA Service Level Agreement
VIM Virtualization Infrastructure Manager
VM Virtual Machine
VNF Virtual Network Function
List of Tables
2.1 Service Availability classification levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 Examples of Grades of Service under Different Network Conditions 19
3.1 Clearwater VMs deployment configuration. . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Factors and levels for studying the impact of workload surges. . 47
3.3 Detection outcomes and latency under workload surges. . . . . 50
3.4 Factors and levels for studying the impact of failure events. . . . 52
3.5 Results for detection based on running correlation for overload
conditions due to failures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.1 Workloads used to evaluate the overload control solution. . . . . 80
5.1 Configuration of the experimental Fileserver testbed . . . . . . . 137
5.2 Configuration of the experimental IMS testbed . . . . . . . . . . 146
viii
List of Figures
2.1 NFV architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 IMS S-CSCF transparent failover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Distributed resiliency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1 A pipeline of network functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 Running correlation between two VNFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3 Coefficient of variation filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4 Architecture of the Clearwater IMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.5 Experimental testbed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.6 Example of negative running correlation between P-CSCF and
S-CSCF CPU utilization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.7 VNF graph representing the chain of services’ utilization. . . . . 46
3.8 Registration attempts per minute and registrations completed
per minute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.9 Registration attempts and registrations completed per minute,
under component failures (due to faults injected at minute 20). 51
3.10 Variable workload below the engineered capacity. . . . . . . . . . 55
3.11 Variable workload that saturates the engineered capacity. . . . . 55
4.1 Network throughput under overload conditions. . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2 Overview of the overload control solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3 Architecture of VNF-level detection and mitigation. . . . . . . . . 63
4.4 Architecture of host-level detection and mitigation. . . . . . . . . 67
ix
LIST OF FIGURES x
4.5 Architecture of network-level detection and mitigation. . . . . . 72
4.6 Registration and Call Throughput for each overload level (i.e.,
120%, 250% and 1000%) at Node Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.7 Registration and Call Throughput for each overload level (i.e.,
120%, 250% and 1000%) at Network Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.8 Mitigation performance at different operational levels (i.e., node,
host and network level) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.9 Overload control results at Host level for pCPU contention. . . . 87
4.10 CPU Consumption of the UDP mitigation proxy . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.11 CPU Consumption of the TCP mitigation proxy . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.12 CPU utilization metrics under three scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.13 Chain of events caused by physical CPU contention. . . . . . . . 95
4.14 CPU utilization metrics under physical contention, with virtual
CPU placeholder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.15 Performance of the IMS registrations during a 2.5x traffic spike
(450-900s), using the basic feedback control loop. . . . . . . . . . 102
4.16 Performance of the IMS registrations during CPU contention
(300-600s), using the basic feedback control loop. . . . . . . . . . 103
4.17 Virtual CPU utilization during CPU contention (300-600s), using
the basic feedback control loop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.18 Performance of the IMS registrations during a 2.5x workload spike
(450-900s), using the enhanced feedback control enabled. . . . . 105
4.19 Performance of the IMS registrations during CPU contention
(300-600s), using the enhanced feedback control loop. . . . . . . 106
4.20 Virtual CPU utilization during CPU contention (300-600s), using
the enhanced feedback control enabled. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.21 IMS Registration (4.21a) and IMS Call-setup (4.21b) throughput
during CPU contention, with the basic and the enhanced feed-
back control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.22 Cumulative distribution of registration latency, with the basic
(red line) and the enhanced (blue line) feedback control. . . . . 107
4.23 IMS Throughput (4.23b) and IMS Latency (4.23a) under differ-
ent CPU contention patterns, with the basic and the enhanced
feedback control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.1 The typical multi-cluster architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
LIST OF FIGURES xi
5.2 Distribution of the request rate and the CPU utilization across
the data-tier nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.3 The overload scenario caused by hot-spot resources . . . . . . . 117
5.4 The overload scenario caused by unequal node configurations. . 118
5.5 The overload scenario caused by a transient reduced capacity . 119
5.6 Overview of DRACO architecture (red blocks). . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.7 The Capacity Monitoring block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.8 The Admission Control process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.9 The location function maps application requests to their loca-
tion in the storage tier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.10 The architecture of the distributed fileserver casestudy . . . . . . 133
5.11 Resource Location Discovery logic for the distributed fileserver
case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.12 Phases of the evaluation experiments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.13 Fileserver performance at the engineered capacity (1x) . . . . . . 139
5.14 Fileserver performance at 10x engineered capacity . . . . . . . . 141
5.15 Summary of the results on the distributed fileserver, with and
without the overload control solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.16 Clearwater IMS Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.17 Resource Location Discovery logic for the IMS case study . . . . 144
5.18 Phases of the evaluation experiments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.19 Timeseries IMS at the engeenered capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.20 Timeseries IMS at 10x the engeenered capacity . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.21 Summary of the results with and without the overload control
solution, during unbalanced datastore overload . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.22 Overhead of the mitigation agent at each load level for the IMS
Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.23 Overhead of the mitigation agent at each hotspot scenario for
the Fileserver Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.24 Performance of a Distributed Memory server at increasing level
of concurrent connections (up to 50K) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.25 Minimum number of Distributed Memory nodes required by the
solution, for different scale of application servers (NA), by vary-
ing the average number of storage operations per each user re-
quest (R) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Chapter1
Introduction
1.1 The need of autonomic overload management
The explosion of data traffic in telecommunication networks has been
impressive in the last few years. The networks of today connect computers,
phones, cars, TV and IoT devices and provide us billion of different services,
such as VoIP and instant messaging, gaming and VR, maps, IPTV and video-
streaming up to Ultra HD definition. Moreover, pervasive services provided
by the giants of the Internet as Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Netflix
are increasing the competition among Telecom operators: customers are con-
stantly pushing for more innovative services and expect them to be provided
with a high quality of experience, in their offices, in their homes as well as in
mobility through their smartphones and other smart devices.
As result, if in the past telecommunication networks where challenged by
exceptional events like a new year or a natural catastrophe (such as an earth-
quake), nowadays mass events are more frequents: we can think of a viral post
on the social networks, the release of a new version of a popular app or an up-
date of the Operating System, a new episode of a TV series, the live streaming
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of a sport match. The above are only a few examples of challenges for today
networks and they cannot be considered exceptional events anymore.
In this context, traditional network architectures, which are complex and
hard to scale and to manage, become a real bottleneck for the innovation
due to higher maintenance costs and unacceptable higher roll-out times for
new services. To keep up with the demand and staying profitable, Telcos
are embracing the Network Function Virtualization (NFV) paradigm by shift-
ing from hardware network appliances to virtual network functions, imple-
mented in software. NFV aims to leverage standard IT virtualization tech-
nology to consolidate network functions in industry-standard high volume
servers, switches, and storage; and to take advantage of orchestration and
monitoring solutions used for cloud computing [1, 2].
Being a cloud-based solution, NFV inevitably inherits the threats coming
from this domains. A major cause of cloud service failures is represented by
overload conditions [3] which occur when the incoming traffic exceeds the
available capacity (e.g., by tens, or even hundreds of times). However, over-
loads are not only due to traffic spikes (e.g., due to mass events): an important
class of problems in this area is represented by faults that restrict the capac-
ity causing overload, such as faults that can occur in commodity hardware
and software components [4, 5, 6, 7], physical resource contention inside the
cloud infrastructure [8, 9] and, even more frequently, misconfigurations due
to human intervention.
Despite the above threats, the NFV solutions are expected to support ex-
tremely large scale architectures, providing high performance and high de-
pendability. Indeed, telecom regulation imposes carrier-grade requirements
in term of high packet processing and availability (99.999% or even higher).
For this reason, the main consortia behind NFV, including the ETSI and OP-
NFV, pointed out the need for solutions capable of:
• optimizing the performance at very large scale without human inter-
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vention in response to both service configuration and workload varia-
tions [10];
• detecting the occurrences of network problems and mitigating their
symptoms within few seconds [11, 12];
The problem of managing the overload conditions touches both these as-
pects: First, the overload management is responsible to dynamically optimize
the resource usage (such as Compute, Memory, Network), in order to prevent
both the exhaustion and the under-utilization of physical infrastructure re-
sources, in response to workload changes. Second, it is responsible to guar-
antee an acceptable QoS by masking or mitigating the effects of faults affect-
ing the service capacity. Moreover, an overload management solution needs
to reconfigure itself without human intervention in response to changes in
both service workload and scale. Therefore, an effective overload manage-
ment framework for NFV should be an autonomic solution, in order to react
timely to bottlenecks undermining the performance and the availability of the
network services.
This dissertation faces the problem of autonomic overload management for
virtual network functions, with a case study of a virtualized IP Multimedia Sub-
system (IMS), which is, today, according to ETSI [13], one of the network services
that will benefit the most from the NFV paradigm.
1.2 Overload management: Threats and challenges
An overload condition occurs when a system has insufficient resources to
serve the incoming requests. This condition happens when the current work-
load hits a bottleneck in one of its components, which limits the capacity of
the whole system. A performance bottleneck can arise as a consequence of
causes both external and internal to the system. The external ones are due to
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workload changes both in intensity, such as traffic surges causing an incom-
ing traffic exceeding the system capacity, and type, such as changes in users
behavior causing a bottleneck shift to a lower capacity component of the sys-
tem. Internal causes are due to factors reducing the available capacity, such
as hardware or software failures or misconfigurations, background and main-
tenance tasks, and contention/interference with other services co-located on
the same infrastructures.
When one of the above conditions occurs, the "useful throughput" of the
system (i.e., the rate of successfully processed traffic) can significantly de-
grade; high-priority requests may experience failures; user sessions that were
already admitted in the system may be disrupted, causing avalanche restarts
and cascade failures due to retries and traffic handover; and handling too
much traffic at the same time increases the likelihood of software failures such
as failed resource allocations, timeouts, and race conditions. Thus, to achieve
an effective overload management in NFV, there are several challenging issues
that need to be addressed, both for overload detection and for overload miti-
gation.
By looking at the existing literature, the classical approach to detect per-
formance bottlenecks in cloud infrastructures is based on anomaly detection
[14]. However, these techniques suffer from limited flexibility, as they require
to train classification algorithms with data obtained from extensive test cam-
paigns or with historical data [15, 16, 17]. Although there are few recent studies
that adopted these approaches in the context of NFV systems [18, 19, 20], the
need for data training could be unattainable for the following reasons. First,
since new service function chains have to be delivered in a short time, it is
very difficult to perform test campaigns to get training data. Second, his-
torical data cannot be used because each service has different characteristics,
thus it is very difficult to tailor previous datasets to new contexts. Further-
more, other studies on anomaly detection used threshold-based classifiers,
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which are easier to deploy. Even in this case, such approaches still need to be
calibrated for the specific service, which is very difficult to achieve.
In principle, virtual network functions could take advantage of cloud elas-
ticity by scaling-out network services with on-demand resource allocation to
face overload conditions. Unfortunately, cloud elasticity alone is not sufficient
to meet the strict high-availability requirements of “carrier-grade” telecom
services, which often can only afford few tens of seconds of outage per month
[21, 22]. As a matter of fact, scaling-out can require up to several minutes to al-
locate new VM replica [23, 24]; moreover, in the case of extreme overload con-
ditions, an individual cloud datacenter may lack resources for scaling, thus
requiring coordinated actions across several datacenters [25, 26]. For these
reasons, NFV requires additional solutions for mitigating overloads in the
short-term (i.e., within few tens of seconds), by rejecting or dropping the traf-
fic in excess with respect to the capacity of the network.
Overload management must also take into account the limited observ-
ability and the limited controllability imposed by the “as-a-service” model
of cloud computing, for both Virtual Network Function (VNF) and NFV In-
frastructure (NFVI) providers. On the one hand, providers of VNFaaS must
face the lack of control of the underlying public cloud infrastructures, limiting
the opportunities to introduce overload control solutions at the infrastructure
level. On the other hand, NFVI providers have little visibility and control on
VNF software, since it will be distributed and deployed as black-box VM im-
ages on their NFVIaaS [27]. In this case, overload control should not rely on
the cooperation of VNF software.
Another important, and often underestimated, cause of overload condi-
tions is the resource contention inside the cloud infrastructure, whose effect
is to decrease the available capacity for serving the incoming traffic. The re-
source contention has severe side effects on time-critical applications that run
at the guest level (i.e., inside VMs, such a VNFs). As the first effect, the ap-
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plication receives less virtual resources (e.g., less virtual CPU time) than the
resource quota agreed with the cloud infrastructure provider, which leads to
performance degradation and service failures. The second (and more sub-
tle) effect is that guest OS resource utilization metrics (in particular the virtual
CPU utilization) can mislead load control mechanisms inside the guest, such
as real-time rate adaptation [28], graceful performance degradation through
brown-out [29] and traffic shaping [30, 31]. Thus, overload management solu-
tions should be aware of the contention phenomena and provide mitigation
both at infrastructure and at service level.
Moreover, complex network functions are typically implemented as multi-
tier systems. Traditionally, this division enforces low coupling between tiers,
high cohesion within them, and agnosticism of consumers [32]. More recently,
these principles of transparency and decoupling have been challenged by the
extremely large scale reached computing systems. Highly scalable network
function implementations, such as the vIMS, are organized as a set of stateless
microservices keeping the state of the application nodes, in one or more sepa-
rate storage tiers. This approach is enabled by new highly-distributed NoSQL
datastores, such as Cassandra and Memcached [33], which can balance the
storage load across thousand of nodes using techniques such as consistent
hashing [34] and key-range topologies [35].
The above picture hide new threats for the overload management since
bottlenecks can shift from one tier to another as workload pattern changes.
Moreover, in large clusters, bottlenecks can arise because of a small group
of nodes, forming an unbalanced load condition within the same tier called
"hot-spot" [36, 37, 38]. When this occurs, even if there is still available ca-
pacity in each tier, the system is exposed to the risk of overload. Therefore,
overload control solution in large multi-tier systems must face two additional
challenges:
1. Traffic can only be throttled by the application tier. Typically, an ap-
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plication session involves a series of requests to several storage nodes.
In order to assure data consistency, the storage tier should not drop any
traffic in the middle of an application session; or, application transac-
tions should be rolled-back, resulting in a waste of resources and in ad-
ditional application complexity. Therefore, the traffic in excess should
only be filtered in the outer tier even if the bottleneck is in an inner tier.
2. Traffic throttling must account for data location dependencies. Since
key-value stores distribute and retrieve resources using consistent hash-
ing, the storage tier can experience a unbalanced overload condition
that affects a subset of storage nodes, for example in the case of “hot-
spot” resources that are requested at an unexpectedly-high rate. More-
over, it is possible that only specific nodes in the persistence tier are af-
fected by unbalanced overload conditions, because of resource exhaus-
tion or competition against other services due to a software bug, a failed
update, wrong configuration, or over-commitment.
Unfortunately, as discussed in the Chapter 2, the existing solutions, such
as limiting the incoming traffic according to the available capacity of a tier [39,
40, 41] or adding new resources by scaling up the tier [42, 43], do not consider
resource dependencies between the tiers, leading to severe inefficiencies in
the case of unbalanced overloads, since the capacity of even large multi-tier
system may be limited by the capacity of few nodes.
1.3 Thesis contributions
The main objective of this dissertation is to provide frameworks and tech-
niques to enable proper overload detection and mitigation for the emerging
virtualized software-based network services.
Chapter 3 presents a novel approach to identify performance anomalies in
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NFV services composed as a chain of network functions. The key feature is
that the approach neither requires to train a model nor to calibrate a thresh-
old to identify performance anomalies inside the VNF chain. Instead, the pro-
posed approach takes advantage from the fact that the VNF chain can be seen
as a multistage pipeline, where the output of a network function is the input of
the next one. Therefore, the resource utilization metrics of VNFs in a service
chain have a strong dependency (e.g., the outgoing network traffic from the
first stage is related to the CPU load on the second stage of the chain). Thus,
the approach collects metrics from connected VNF stages, as they are natu-
rally correlated. Then, it analyzes their co-variation over time to infer poten-
tial performance anomaly at each stage of the chain. The approach can also
be adopted in large-scale NFV systems with the presence of load-balancing
and replication.
Chapter 4 presents a novel overload control framework for NFV (NFV-
Throttle) to protect NFV services from overloads within a short period of time,
by tuning the incoming traffic towards VNFs in order to make the best use of
the available capacity, and to preserve the QoS of traffic flows admitted by the
network services. The framework consists of a set of modular agents, which
detect an overload condition (either of individual VNFs and hosts, or of the
NFV network as a whole), and mitigate it by dropping or rejecting the traffic
in excess, and by tuning resource allocation to VNFs according to their pri-
ority, in order to relieve physical resource contention. The agents can be in-
stalled either at VNF-level (for VNFaaS providers) or at NFVI-level (for NFVI-
aaS providers), without requiring changes to VNF software, and fitting into
the as-a-service model. The key idea of the proposed solution is to protect
the application at the guest-level (i.e., by running inside a VM), and to be
complementary to recovery mechanisms at the infrastructure-level. Such
an approach is especially relevant in the case of infrastructures-as-a-service
(IaaS), where a time-critical application (e.g., a VNF) has little visibility and
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control on the underlying physical resources (e.g., on scheduling priorities at
the physical CPU level). To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has
addressed the problem of physical contention from this perspective. More-
over, the (NFV-Throttle) framework studies the overloads due to physical CPU
contention, by showing that it can cause unpredictable side effects on the
QoS of time-critical applications. Chapter 4 presents a generalized overload
control solution, based on traffic-throttling, which includes overload condi-
tions caused by physical CPU contention. The contention-aware feedback-
loop based throttling solution, checks at run-time the resources that are cur-
rently available for the VM, and only accepts a portion of the traffic that can
be served with an adequate quality of service [31, 44, 45].
In Chapter 5, the thesis proposes a solution to the overload control prob-
lems arising in virtual network function implemented as large-scale multi-tier
applications. It presents DRACO (Distributed Resource-aware Admission COn-
trol), a novel autonomic solution that addresses overload problems arising in
any tier of the system. It performs a fine-grained admission control, by tun-
ing the amount and type of traffic according to resource dependencies among
the tiers (which are dynamically discovered at run-time), and to the current
capacity of individual nodes, in order to mitigate overloads while achieving a
high resource utilization. Moreover, the solution acts solely at the application
service interface, in order not to impact on data consistency and to preserve
the highly distributed and scalable architecture of multi-tier systems.
This thesis presents an extensive experimental evaluation for all the above
overload management solutions, including the anomaly detection framework,
NFV-Throttle and DRACO, by means of the Project Clearwater [46], an open-
source implementation of a Virtualized IMS, also commercially supported by
Metaswitch Networks Inc. This thesis also benefits from the fruitful collab-
oration with industry: the experimental evaluations are performed at differ-
ent scale (up to hundreds nodes) and with different service configurations
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in order to reproduce overload conditions which are representative of prob-
lems occurring in real-world NFV infrastructures, or to emphasize pathologi-
cal conditions of the NFV software stack.
The work includes material from the following research papers, already ac-
cepted or published in peer-reviewed conferences and international journals:
• D. Cotroneo, R. Natella, S. Rosiello. "A fault correlation approach to de-
tect performance anomalies in Virtual Network Function chains", Soft-
ware Reliability Engineering (ISSRE), 2017 IEEE 28th International Sym-
posium on. IEEE, 2017.
• D. Cotroneo, R. Natella, S. Rosiello. "NFV-Throttle: An Overload Control
Framework for Network Function Virtualization", IEEE Transactions on
Network and Service Management 14.4 (2017): 949-963.
Chapter2
Related Work
2.1 Overload concepts in NFV
In traditional network functions (NF), the levels of performance and reli-
ability are well-known and understood. In NFV, traditional (hardware-based)
network functions will be superseded by network functions implemented in
software and leveraging virtualization technologies. NFV promises to reduce
costs, improve manageability, reduce time-to-market, and provide more ad-
vanced services [47].
Figure 2.1 shows the architecture of an NFV system. It is characterized by three
main components.
• Virtualized Network Functions (VNFs) are the software-implemented
network functions used to process the network traffic (according to some
network protocol and network topology). They use both virtual and
physical resources.
• NFV Infrastructure (NFVI) abstracts and manages access to physical re-
sources. It includes the hardware resources, a virtualization layer to cre-
11
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Figure 2.1. NFV architecture.
ate virtual resources on the available hardware, and the virtual resources
themselves.
• NFV Management and Orchestration (MANO) acts as coordinator/orche-
strator of the overall NFV system. It includes three types of sub-compone-
nts. An orchestrator, which allocates and releases resources of the NFVI
to the VNFs, by using the VIM, and manages the lifecycle of network
services (NS) (creation, scaling, configuration, upgrading, termination).
VNF managers are used to manage the lifecycle of VNFs. Each VNF is
linked to a VNF manager. Virtualised Infrastructure Managers (VIMs)
are controlled by the NFV Orchestrator and VNF Managers to manage
physical and virtual resources in the NFVI. A VIM is not aware of VNFs
executed in the VM.
A possible issue of the NFV approach is that virtualization adds more com-
plexity and new risks, which will threaten the performance and reliability of
the whole network infrastructure. Indeed, Telecom services are expected to
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be always available and, as soon as a failure or an outage occur, they must be
recovered within a short period of time (e.g., milliseconds), using automatic
recovery means.
If we think about legacy networks, overload can occur both in a physical node
(i.e., network function) and in a physical link. Commonly, network functions
(e.g., firewalls, load balancers, routers, switches, etc.) are considered as over-
loaded when their limited capacity, seen as the set of hardware (e.g., cpu,
memory) and software resources, is exceeded due to huge number of requests.
Furthermore, overload may occur also at physical links in the network when
the incoming traffic exceeds the link bandwidth. [48]
In general, we have to consider network congestion that occurs when an high
number of requests are submitted to the network infrastructure. Such a sit-
uation overcomes the total capacity of the infrastructure, and it may lead to
an overall degradation of the network as a whole; for instance, the through-
put may decrease, and the latency and jitter increase. Thus, shifting from
hardware-based network function to software-based network function is a big
challenge.
In NFV, the problem of overload is discussed by ETSI within the more gen-
eral problem of resiliency1.
ETSI GS NFV-REL (2015) [50] identifies use cases, requirements and architec-
tures that will serve as a reference for the emerging NFV technologies, includ-
ing resiliency requirements that the emerging NFV architectures will have to
meet. In the document, ETSI addresses the NFV resiliency problem by impos-
ing the following design criteria:
• Service continuity and failure containment;
• Automate recovery from failures;
1In general, resiliency is the capability of a system to adapt itself properly when facing faults
or changes in the environment [49]
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Figure 2.2. IMS S-CSCF transparent failover
• Prevent single point of failure in the underlying architecture;
• Multi-vendor environment;
• Hybrid Infrastructure.
The document also introduces the service continuity as the capability of
assuring quality of service goals when anomaly conditions, such as the over-
load ones, occur. The NFV will have to provide a continuous service even if a
component fails, or incoming service requests are much more than the norm.
For example, in the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) use case identified by
the ETSI NFVI Industry Specification Group (ISG) [51], a critical scenario that
can lead to an overload condition of the IMS is when a crucial component
(such as the S-CSCF registrar server) fails; this situation may cause a poten-
tial (re)connection or signalling storm that overloads the whole infrastructure.
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Figure 2.3. Distributed resiliency
Figure 2.2 shows that a Virtualized Network Function (VNF) failure should be
recovered in a transparent way. Figure 2.3 shows that it is very critical to bal-
ance, in a seamless way, the traffic of requests from overloaded/failed VNF to
other VNFs, residing on different hosts.
Another aspect of resiliency is the service availability level of NFs. The vir-
tualized NFs must guarantee that the provided quality of service is the same
as hardware-based NFs (i.e., legacy networks). In order to meet these objec-
tives, the ETSI NFV architecture will include resiliency mechanisms both at
the VNF layer and at the NFV-MANO (Management and Orchestration) layer
[52]. The ETSI NFV scenarios envision the emergence of both stateless and
stateful VNFs. In the former case, VNF instances can be scaled to accommo-
date high volumes of traffic, and to recover from failures. As for stateful VNFs,
they will require mechanisms for storing and recovering the state of network
sessions and connections in a reliable way.
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In detail, ETSI identifies two main conditions that can cause a service to
deviate from normal operation: congestion conditions and failure condi-
tions. Congestion conditions occur when an unusual volume of traffic sat-
urates VNFs’ resources. This situation may result from special events (e.g.,
Chinese New Year festival, TV shows, etc.) or from a cyber-attack (e.g., DDoS
attack). In failure conditions, a service may be interrupted or it becomes un-
available due to faulty components. In that situation, two key factors play
a crucial role: priority of restoration and failure recovery time. Priority of
restoration level denotes which is the service that has the main impact on the
NFVI availability as a whole. Thus, restoring a service with a high priority in-
creases the overall service availability. Failure recovery time is the time needed
to recovery from failures, instead, and it depends on the amount of redundant
resources available. Furthermore, it is worth noting the real-time nature of
network functions: a latency-sensitive service need to be recovered as fast as
possible, rather than a lower priority service in which the availability level is
not stringent.
According to the NFV resiliency requirements [50], in such situations, the NFV
will need to assure the availability of deployed services according to well-
defined service availability levels, which are agreed with customers and/or
imposed by regulations. An availability level specifies the importance of a ser-
vice and the redundancy that will need to be provided for that service. For
instance, Table 2.1, adapted from [50], describes three availability levels, and
the services under each availability level: Level 1 includes the services with
the most stringent requirements (such as emergency telecommunication) and
prescribes the use of the highest level of redundancy (1+1 with instantaneous
switchover); Level 3 includes the less critical services (such as general data
traffic) and the less stringent requirements (e.g., best effort service with M+1
redundancy).
Given the varying resiliency needs, the NFV is expected to give priority to the
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most critical services in the case of overload conditions. The ETSI resiliency
requirements document provides an example of this behavior. Table 2.2 pro-
vides a list of services (Video call, gaming, financial transaction) and their
service availability levels; moreover, the table describes the grades of service
of the NFV infrastructure in the presence of different network conditions, in-
cluding: normal condition, overloaded condition, heavily overloaded condi-
tion, and emergency situation.
In normal conditions, a video call service can provide both video and audio fa-
cilities. When overload conditions arise, the video call service is downgraded
to a voice call service with static image only, since resources become scarce.
Furthermore, if the overload conditions worsen, the NFV must address an
emergency situation, in which it is necessary to keep available the most criti-
cal service (call service) with at least voice call capability. In the example, the
video call service is further downgraded to a voice call service only.
Beyond the NFV resiliency requirements document [50], the reader might
guess that in NFV we have to consider the same overload definitions as in
legacy networks. Currently, there is no precise definition of overload in NFV
standard documents. In providing a definition, we have to consider the differ-
ent layers of the NFV architecture (see [53]). Specifically,
NFV is overloaded when it has to process a high demand of resources that
exceed its limited capacity. Such a demand may saturate processing resources
within the VNF layer (i.e., the set of VNFs that provide the specific service), vir-
tual resources within the VM/Hypervisor layer (i.e., the virtual environment
that hosts VNF, and allows the sharing of the underlying physical resources
among the VNFs), resources within the NFV Management and Orchestration
layer (i.e., the components that orchestrate the NFV infrastructure and software
resources), or physical resources within the Physical layer (e.g., physical com-
pute, storage, and network resources).
Overload management approaches are specialized for NFV as follows:
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Table 2.1. Service Availability classification levels
Availability
Level
Customer Type Service/Function Type Notes
Level 1
• Network Operator Control Traf-
fic
• Government/Regulatory Emer-
gency Services
• Intra-carrier engineering traffic
• Emergency tele- communi-
cation service (emergency
response, emergency dispatch)
• Critical Network Infra- struc-
ture Functions (e.g. VoLTE
functions, DNS Servers, etc.)
Sub-levels within Level 1 may be cre-
ated by the Network Operator de-
pending on Customer demands. E.g.:
• 1A - Control
• 1B - Real-time
• 1C - Data
May require 1+1 Redundancy with In-
stantaneous Switchover
Level 2
• Enterprise and/or large- scale
customers (e.g. Corporations,
University)
• Network Operators (Tier 1/2/3)
service traffic
• VPN
• Real-time traffic (Voice and
video)
• Network Infrastructure Func-
tions supporting Level 2 ser-
vices (e.g. VPN servers, Corpo-
rate Web/Mail servers)
Sub-levels within Level 2 may be cre-
ated by the Network Operator de-
pending on Customer demands. E.g.:
• 2A - VPN
• 2B - Real-time
• 2C - Data
May require 1:1 Redundancy with Fast
(maybe Instantaneous) Switchover
Level 3 General Consumer Public and ISP
Traffic
• Data traffic (including voice
and video traffic provided by
OTT)
• Network Infrastructure Func-
tions supporting Level 3 ser-
vices
While this is typically considered to
be "Best Effort" traffic, it is expected
that Network Operators will devote
sufficient resources to assure "sat-
isfactory" levels of availability. This
level of service may be pre-empted
by those with higher levels of Service
Availability.
May require M+1 Redundancy with
Fast Switchover; where M > 1 and
the value of M to be determined by
further study
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Table 2.2. Examples of Grades of Service under Different Network Conditions
Service name [default SA level] Normal Overloaded Heavily Over-
loaded
Emergency Situa-
tion [dedicated SA
level]
Video call service
Video [2] available [2-I] available [2-I] Degraded to
Image service
[2-II]*
Not available (pre-
empted) [2-III]*
Voice [1] (regis-
tered a ETS)
available available available available
Gaming [3] available Not available
(pre-empted)
Not available
(pre-empted)
Not available (pre-
empted)
Financial Transac-
tion [1]
available available available Not available (pre-
empted) [3]
NOTE: * indicates that the Grade of Service is changed/reduced due to changes in the network status.
• Prevention mechanisms, with the aim to prevent the occurrence of con-
gestion situations, which may be due to VNF’s resources saturations,
and result in the reduction of the work performed per time unit (through-
put) and in the slowing down in responding to service requests (re-
sponse time).
• Detection mechanisms, which monitor the NFV to detect the overload
condition. Such mechanisms can be hardware- or software-implemented,
and monitoring can be local or distributed among VNFs and the overall
NFVI. Furthermore, such mechanisms can act at different granularity,
that is at service level, or at infrastructure level. The latency of the de-
tection, i.e. the time from the occurrence of an overload situation to
its handling, clearly is an important characteristic of the mechanisms.
There could be services for which availability requirements are stringent
and require to be recovered as fast as possible.
• Control mechanisms, with the aim to handle congestion problems. Mit-
igation means that even though the capacity of the NFV is exceeded,
the service QoS can be decreased but not beyond a certain threshold.
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For example, control mechanisms allow dropping some incoming re-
quests or lowering the bit rate of the communication. Once an over-
load condition is detected, control mechanisms try to limit the perfor-
mance degradation by executing actions with the goals to keep the net-
work performance (e.g., throughput, latency) within a specific opera-
tional range.
Overload management mechanisms have to consider specific goals, for
example which are the minimum thresholds of latency or throughput to be
kept during overload conditions. To achieve such goals several actions can be
performed, including:
• Reconfiguration actions, that is migrate (relocating and restoring its state)
a specific VNF, in order to keep the service continuity;
• Scalability actions, in order to distribute the load. Such mechanisms
consist in the provision of additional resources for a specific VNF. These
resources could be taken from idle resource within a different VNF or
even a different geo-located NFVI;
• Filtering actions that allow the management of incoming traffic that
may lead to network congestion.
Overload conditions in NFV need to be addressed both at VNF and NFVI
level, and both on virtual and physical resources. For example, overload con-
ditions can lead to virtual or physical CPU overload, connection loss, network
latency increase, memory leaks, and deadlock. Parameters that indicates over-
load situations are both related to VNF/VM load, and the hypervisor load that
may impact on VNFs.
At first glance, elastic cloud management techniques appear to solve the
overload problem, but differing from the IT domain, network traffic in tele-
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com domain is highly dynamic and too difficult to predict. Thus, elastic re-
source mechanisms are good to prevent overload situations only when traffic
increment does not exceed a specific threshold; otherwise, such mechanisms
are not effective, since can not handle network VNFs will experience traffic
volumes that suddenly increase in a short period of time. However, elastic re-
configuration mechanisms are not suitable, and not meant, for providing very
high availability and performance levels (e.g., availability of 99.99% or more,
and response times in the order of milliseconds). Such objectives require very
quick reconfiguration mechanisms, which should be aware of the priority of
VNFs and services. This is the case of a failed VNF that maintains connection
state within million of users. When it is replaced as a result of elastic mecha-
nisms with an new VNF, a non-negligible number of VNFs may need to recon-
nect within the new VNF, but such reconnection process lead to traffic storm,
both at VNF level and at Hypervisor level. Another mechanism that can ex-
acerbate the problem of overload is traffic migration: if traffic is migrated to
an already-overload VNF, such migration process may lead to create new over-
load conditions to other VNFs.
Concurrently to this work, besides the ETSI recomendation, the research
projects H2020 Next Generation Platform-as-a-Service (NGPaaS) [54] and SONATA
[55] aim to fill the gap between the cloud computing models and the net-
work function virtualization framework, towards “telco-grade” quality for vir-
tual network services in the context of the next 5G communication services.
While these projects focus more on the architectural problems, proposing
solutions to ease the put in operation and the management of large-scale
services and new development processes such as Dev-for-Operations [56],
this thesis has a focus on service level reliability and service quality man-
agement. However, there are many points in common with the work in this
thesis. Chapter 4 discusses some architectural limitations of the cloud mod-
els in the context of NFV (such as NFVaaS and NFVIaaS), such as the limited
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observability and controllability of system parts in case of the separation of
infrastructure providers, service providers and network function service de-
velopers. The NGPaaS is a new service model which enforce the separation
between these entities but extends the management and orchestration com-
ponents with specialized APIs to overcome the observability and controllabil-
ity problems. However future virtual network function software needs to be
designed and developed according to this framework. On the contrary, this
thesis proposes a framework (NFV-Throttle), which adds monitoring/control-
ling agents in specific points of the NFV architecture (i.e., guest-vnf, host-nfvi
and vnf-tenant levels) and these agents communicate by using standard host-
guest interfaces (such as hypercalls or vmci-sockets). The advantage is that
this approach does not require changes both to the cloud infrastructure nor
to the virtual network function software. The same principles inspired also
the DRACO framework, presented in Chapter 5.
As discussed in this section, the problem of overload in NFV is still open,
and it includes research challenges and problems related to reliability, perfor-
mance and more in general to resiliency.
In the following sections, there are presented studies proposing approaches
that may be exploited to address the problem of overload in NFV.
2.2 Detection of performance anomalies
Continuous, online monitoring and analysis is a key component for man-
aging cloud infrastructures. The analysis of performance metrics and resource
utilization enables a better understanding of application and system behaviour,
helps to tune configurations to meet application SLA requirements, and pro-
vides insights for troubleshooting.
The most common cloud monitoring and dashboards systems, such as
Amazon CloudWatch [57] and Google StackDriver [58] monitor the system on
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per-VM basis and allow to setup and customize simple detection rules (e.g.,
thresholds on monitored metrics) and trigger maintenance task (e.g., scaling,
rebooting). More advanced commercial products, such as Datadog [59], also
implement simple data mining features, using seasonal auto regression, trend
detection, online adaptive learning, and statistical distribution models. How-
ever, since the products focus on symptoms on individual VM instances, they
are prone to false alarms: for instance, without any knowledge about the spe-
cific applications, they cannot discern if a drop in the load of a VM is caused
by a sudden workload decrease in the whole system or by an undetected fault
in some component. As discussed later, our approach takes into account the
nature of NFV applications (based on pipeline processing of high-volumes of
packet streams) to detect these scenarios: it analyzes the correlation of met-
rics from neighbour VMs in the VNF service chain, to distinguish licit work-
load variations from faulty conditions that affect the quality of service.
In general, anomaly detection systems aim to automate the discovery and
classification of problems by analyzing these data, and checking whether the
system behaves accordingly to what is expected. In order to characterize such
behaviors, classical approaches use machine learning techniques, such as
random forests classifiers [60], neural networks [16], automatic rule learning
and fuzzy logic [15], unsupervised clustering [61, 62]. Most of the anomaly
detection research has applications in intrusion and misuse detection.
More recently, these approaches have been applied in the context of NFV
applications. Miyazawa et al. [18] proposed a distributed architecture to per-
form fault detection using unsupervised data clustering techniques and self-
organizing maps. In [20], Sauvanaud et al. suggest a supervised learning ap-
proach. They perform fault injection experiments in a NFV testbed to col-
lect labeled monitoring data, from both hypervisors and virtual machines in-
stances. Then, they build a classifier using the random forest algorithm, show-
ing high detection accuracy and low false positive. However, both approaches
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require retraining the models in case of changes in the hardware or software
configuration, workload patterns or other influencing factors. A recent study
assessed these problems by proposing the StepWise framework [], which is
able to detect significant changes in data distribution (i.e., concept drifts) that
are not anomalies but due to changes in the system configuration on the user
behaviour. This approach, could be used in context of NFV to prevent false
alarms during common scaling-in or scaling-out operations.
Unfortunately, all the previous techniques require training models with
data coming from extensive test campaign or historical data. However, in the
context of NFV, the needed training data may be unattainable, since service
function chains must be delivered in a short time (thus limiting the amount
of tests for getting training data) and are tailored for each specific service
(thus limiting the usefulness of historical data). For the same reasons, most
anomaly detection systems used in practice are threshold-based classifiers,
which are ease to deploy and provide an acceptable quality of detection (in
terms of accuracy and latency), but they still need to be calibrated for the spe-
cific service.
Contemporary to this work, Schmidt et al. [63] proposed an unsupervised
anomaly detection framework tailored for NFV services, which is based on
on-line monitoring data and dynamic threshold learning. The approach has
been experimentally evaluated by means of anomaly injection experiments
and show high accuracy and a low false alarm rate.
In the field of classical (i.e., non-virtualized) network management sys-
tems, alarm correlation [64] between multiple distributed entities is widely
used to detect faults and isolate the causes across a big number of network
appliances interconnected [65, 66]. In [67], Kliger et al. defined the network-
ing graph as a causality graph on which nodes can be marked as problems
or symptoms, and use event correlation to find causal relations among the
events. They demonstrate that this approach is resilient to high rates of symp-
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tom loss (i.e., false negatives) and false alarms. Similarly, this thesis show that
it is possible to identify causal relationships in the VNF service chaining model
between the VNF instances in the network. We apply the correlation analysis
to the monitoring data to recognize symptoms of problems in the network.
2.3 Cloud elasticity and autonomic capacity scaling
One opportunity to face overload conditions in cloud computing is scaling
up the architecture, either in a proactive or a reactive way. Autoscale [42] is an
autonomic solution for modern multi-tier architectures that goes in this direc-
tion: application nodes are automatically scaled out in response to workload
pattern changes. However, this framework focuses on stateless bottlenecks
only. Indeed, scaling stateful datastore tiers can require complex data redis-
tribution and the time taken by a new instance for joining an existing cluster
increases during an existing overload condition. Recent work proposed new
techniques for scaling out datastores. PAX [43] is an approach to scale-out a
distributed datastore (i.e., Cassandra) that accelerates the distribution of hot-
spot data partitions on newly added nodes by performing workload profiling
to detect resources that are accessed more frequently. However, these capac-
ity optimization solutions designed for cloud computing are not enough to
protect virtual network functions for two reasons: the first is that scaling out
requires time, during which the system is exposed to a degraded quality of ser-
vice, cascading component failures due to resource exhaustion. In this time-
frame our solution can cooperate with scaling solutions to preserve the qual-
ity of service of already established sessions up to the system capacity, while
more capacity is added in background to pick up workload variations; the sec-
ond reason is that overload is not only caused by external workload surges but
can be a consequence of software bugs, misconfigurations, poor load balanc-
ing or transient management tasks running within the same infrastructure.
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In these cases, scaling up can be ineffective or even exacerbate the overload
problems. Moreover, scaling out is not always possible since it is constrained
by costs and resource availability.
2.4 Physical resource contention management
CPU contention and, more in general, resource contention are typical
problems happening in virtualization infrastructures and suffered by guest
VMs. Nikounia et al. [68] characterized the performance degradation due
to resource overcommittment in virtualized environments. Their study iden-
tified the CPU resource as the one that impacts the most on service perfor-
mance during contention with noisy neighbors VMs, and found a major case
of execution time slowdown in the hypervisor CPU scheduler.
Since the problem is widespread in virtualized environments, there have
been many studies on ensuring performance isolation at infrastructure level,
in order to avoid side-effects from CPU contention. In general, these solu-
tions either prevent or mitigate contention by enhancing the placement and
scheduling of VMs on the physical infrastructure. Q-Clouds [69] is a represen-
tative solution of this kind, which is a QoS-aware framework aiming to enforce
performance isolation by opportunistically provisioning additional resources
to alleviate contention. Caglar et al. [70] proposed HALT, a performance-
interference aware placement strategy based on on-line monitoring and ma-
chine learning. To avoid the side effects of the contention for time-sensitive
services, HALT proposes a VM migration plan to a different host, based on the
learned workload behavior. More recently, in the context of NFV, Kulkarni et
al. [71] presented NFVnice, a framework to dynamically adjust the scheduling
behavior according to the relative priority of the running services and the esti-
mated load. This approach uses cgroups to optimize the scheduling behavior
and traffic throttling at host level to prevent overloads in the guest.
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It is important to note that these solutions require full control of the un-
derlying infrastructure (e.g., they are meant for system administrators and in-
frastructure management products). However, as discussed in this this thesis,
contention issues at infrastructure level cannot be avoided completely, due to
faults, unexpected maintenance tasks, and misconfigurations. Thus, services
with very high-availability requirements need to include cautionary mecha-
nisms to mitigate such scenarios. Moreover, in the case of NFV Infrastructures
as a Service (NFVIaaS), the VNFs do not have control on the underlying infras-
tructure, where the infrastructure provider may adopt an over-commitment
policy that increases the risk of physical CPU contention, at the expense of
the VNFs.
At guest level, the steal time metric is a well-known indicator of physi-
cal CPU contention. This indicator is typically exposed by hypervisors to the
guest OSes. Ayodele et al. [72] demonstrated the impact of the steal time on
cloud applications performance under physical CPU contention. Moreover,
other studies focus on quantifying the effect of the steal time on CPU time
metrics at process- and thread-level [73, 74], provided by the guest OS. Unfor-
tunately, this metric is often adopted in unsound heuristics, such as to trig-
ger VM migration when the steal time is very high for a prolonged period [75].
However, a high steal time is not a sufficient condition for a physical CPU con-
tention. Indeed, a VM which is voluntary suspending to perform I/O activity
can be subject to high wait time due to the contention with other VMs (e.g.,
running a CPU-bound workload). In this case, the guest OS metrics will report
a lower CPU utilization and low steal time. VMware, for example, suggests not
to trust CPU consumption metrics provided by the guest OS as they can be
inaccurate in case of physical CPU contention [76] due to time accounting is-
sues. Additionally, even in case of CPU-bound workloads, the steal time can
also be inaccurate in case of hyper-threading enabled at host level [77]. Thus,
the percentage of steal time is dependent by the workload running in the guest
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VM. Moreover, a steal time quota can be the consequence of CPU quotas and
CPU credits imposed by the infrastructure providers [78].
2.5 Admission control and traffic throttling strategies
Admission control and traffic throttling solutions have been frequently
used in IT and telecom systems to promptly react to overload conditions.
In general, these approaches monitor service performance (e.g., in terms of
throughput and latency at the application layer) and resource consumption
(e.g., CPU utilization), and throttle the traffic according to a dynamic feed-
back on the available capacity. For example, Welsh et al. [31] proposed an
adaptive overload control approach using a token bucket and a closed control
loop to dynamically tune the traffic according to the service latency. Kasera et
al. [30] analyzed throttling algorithms in the context of carrier-grade telecom
switches: the Random Early Discard (RED [79]) throttles traffic according to
the request queue size, while the Occupancy algorithm ensures a target CPU
utilization by throttling the traffic according to the CPU utilization and the
rate of accepted calls. A similar algorithm has also been applied in the con-
text of virtual network functions by NFV-Throttle [80]. Hong et al. [45] present
a broad overview of these schemes for overload control for the SIP protocol.
Lately, these admission control systems have been applied in the context of
traditional three-tier web server applications with strict Service Level Objec-
tives, such as e-commerce platforms. Liu et al. [39] propose an admission
control technique based on the combination of queuing theory models and
feedback control loop to perform adaptive load control in these architectures.
In case of degraded quality, such as increased latency, the solution discards a
percentage of incoming requests. Unfortunately, a solution of this kind suffers
from poor performance in newly highly distributed architectures. Indeed, in
case of an unbalanced overload in few nodes of a large architecture, rejecting a
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percentage of random traffic causes the filtering of many requests that would
require not overloaded nodes and does not imply filtering requests directed
to overloaded ones. CoSAC [41] is a different approach to perform Session
Based Admission Control [40] in context of multi-tier web applications. CoSAC
considers that a different incoming request mix (e.g., due to users behaviors)
causes the shift from a bottleneck tier to another during the time, and uses a
Bayesian network to correlate the state of the application tiers, to perform an
admission decision. However, also this approach suffers from similar prob-
lems, since it considers the tiers as a whole, it cannot be applied in modern
large scale architecture in which a single node can become a bottleneck for an
underutilized tier of thousand nodes.
2.6 Unbalanced load control in stateful architectures
In addition to scaling solutions, other studies focus on the load balancing
optimization in the datastore tiers to prevent unbalanced overload conditions.
These solutions aim to solve the problem within the datastore tier, by mitigat-
ing load unbalance with dynamic replication and data migration strategies.
SPORE [37] is a solution to hot-spot problems due to a highly skewed work-
load. SPORE modifies the traditional Memcached behavior implementing ad-
vanced data replication strategies based on key popularity. Zhang et al. [81]
propose a solution to load imbalance due to a hot-spot workload and server
heterogeneity. They designed a middleware component that modifies the way
in which data is accessed and distributed in key-value stores (such as Mem-
cached). This component includes a hot-spot detector which takes account of
key request frequencies, and a key redirector module that can either replicate
the key on multiple servers (e.g., proportionally to its request frequency, sim-
ilarly to SPORE), or select some keys to be forwarded to servers less loaded or
more powerful. NetKV [82], is an accelerated proxy to inspect key requests and
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analyze the datastore workload to replicate hot-spot keys on multiple servers,
in order to limit the load unbalancing due to the workload skewness. MBal
[83] is a novel in-memory datastore architecture aiming to resolve load unbal-
ancing problems within the datastore tier itself. This architecture includes a
centralized coordinator that monitor the system state and applies data repli-
cation and migration strategies among not only the distributed instances but
also at thread level among the CPU cores within each node. However, none of
the previous solutions act at system level, by preventing an excess of unbal-
anced traffic from entering into the system. Dynamic replication and migra-
tions can cause an additional unpredictable amount of load among datastore
nodes, and they require additional space and time to handle consistency that
could be not available in some circumstances.
Chapter3
On-line detection of performance
bottlenecks
Network Function Virtualization is an emerging paradigm to allow the cre-
ation, at software level, of complex network services by composing simpler
ones. However, this paradigm shift exposes network services to faults and
bottlenecks in the complex software virtualization infrastructure they rely on.
Thus, NFV services require effective anomaly detection systems to detect the
occurrence of network problems. This chapter proposes a novel approach to
ease the adoption of anomaly detection in production NFV services, by avoid-
ing the need to train a model or to calibrate a threshold. The approach in-
fers the service health status by collecting metrics from multiple elements in
the NFV service chain, and by analyzing their (lack of) correlation over the
time. The approach has been validated on an NFV-oriented Interactive Multi-
media System, to detect problems affecting the quality of service, such as the
overload, component crashes, avalanche restarts and physical resource con-
tention.
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3.1 Fault correlation approach
Our approach is based on the idea that a network packet or request follows
a chain of VNFs, as shown by the VNF graph in Figure 3.1. Each VNF in the
graph can have a different number of replicas, that are scaled according to
a preliminary capacity planning or to cloud elasticity. The load is balanced
across all the replicas of the VNF.
Figure 3.1. A pipeline of network functions
In this architecture, there are metrics from multiple stages that are nat-
urally correlated (e.g., the outgoing network traffic of the first stage and the
CPU load of the second stage). If resource utilization (e.g., CPU, memory, ...)
increases in a VM hosting a network function, an increase should also occur
in VMs hosting the subsequent VNF in the service chain. If this is not the case,
a VM is obstructing the network flow, causing a performance anomaly. Thus,
we analyze the correlation in the time between metrics from two distinct net-
work functions to infer the service health status. Figure 3.2 shows the vCPU
load of two connected network functions (i.e., the output traffic of VNF(A) is
processed by VNF(B)). When VNF(A) uses all the available CPU time (e.g., due
to an overload condition or a software fault), its throughput start decreasing.
As a consequence, the VNF(B) receives less traffic to process and the CPU load
on this VNF decreases. This condition can be detected noting that there is a
window of time in which the CPU load on VNF(A) increases and the CPU load
on VNF(B) decreases. In correspondence of that window, the two time series
become negatively correlated. We consider this condition a symptom of a per-
formance anomaly.
The algorithm 1 raises an alarm when an anomaly is detected between a
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pair of connected VNF stages, namely VNF(A) and VNF(B), with VNF(A) pre-
ceding VNF(B) in the chain.
The algorithm takes a window ∆t of n samples of a time series describing
a resource utilization in the time (e.g., the CPU usage) from both the VNF(A)
and the VNF(B) and computes the correlation according to the Pearson’s index
ρ (i.e., equation 3.1) as the covariance σX ,Y of the two variables divided by the
product of their standard deviations σX and σY . Then, it ranks the correlation
by computing a discrete score, namely D-score, according to equation 3.2.
ρ(X ,Y )= σX ,Y
σX ·σY
(3.1)
Figure 3.2. Running correlation between two VNFs
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Algorithm 1: Fault correlation algorithm
Data: n: sampling window size
Data: ∆t : (t −n,. . . ,t ) time window
Set: counter=0
begin
foreach replica h of V N F (A) do
foreach replica k of V N F (B) do
ρh,k = pear son(V N F (A)h (∆t ),V N F (B)k (∆t )) Dk =D(ρh,k )
D =mean(Dk )
if D > 0.5 then
counter ++
if counter > |V N F (A)|/2 then
raise alarm
D(ρ)=

1, if −1.0≤ ρ ≤−0.7
0.75 if −0.7< ρ <−0.3
0.50 if −0.3≤ ρ ≤+0.3
0.25 if +0.3< ρ <+0.7
0 otherwise
(3.2)
A zero D-score indicates a strong positive correlation between the two
metrics considered, while a D-score equal to 1 indicates a strong negative cor-
relation among them. Intermediate D-score values indicate weak correlations
(i.e., D = 0.75, D = 0.25) or absence of linear correlation (D = 0.5). The values
used in this equation are widely used in statistics to evaluate the strength of
the correlation [84, 85], and do not depend on the specific system to be moni-
tored.
Since each VNF in the chain can have multiple active replicas, the Algo-
rithm 1 processes windows of samples gathered from each replica, and raises
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an alarm if more than half of the spare nodes exhibit a correlation anomaly.
More precisely, for each replica h of the VNF(A) the algorithm computes the
D-score with all the replicas k of the VNF(B). If the average D-score is greater
than 0.5 (indicating a negative correlation) we account a possible anomaly by
increasing the counter variable. When all the D-scores are evaluated, if the
counter is greater than the half of the number of VNF(A) replicas, a majority
of VNF instances exhibits a correlation anomaly and an alarm is raised.
The choice to wait for a feedback from a majority of nodes prevents false
alarms that may be due to sporadic variations of load balancing across repli-
cas in the same VNF stage. However, it is important to note that the algorithm
is not limited to detect problems caused by multiple nodes; it is still able to
detect performance anomalies caused by a single node. In the case of a single
faulty node, the algorithm will detect an anomaly for the correlations between
the faulty node (for example, VNF(B)3 ) and all the replicas of the previous VNF
stage (for example, VNF(A)1 . . . VNF
(A)
n ) that access the faulty node. In general,
the algorithm is designed to detect performance anomalies that have an im-
pact on the capacity of a VNF stage, which can be either caused by single or
multiple failures.
By executing the Algorithm 1 on sliding windows of n samples, at time t ,
we compute the correlation between the samples from time t −n, t − (n−1),
t − (n−2), . . . , t −1. Samples are collected periodically every p seconds.
The configuration of the window, i.e., the size n and the period of sampling
p, is driven by the speed at which performance anomalies are expected to hap-
pen. In our context, according to the empirical experience of industries in
the ETSI consortium, performance anomalies such as avalanche restarts and
overloads are expected to develop within less than 30 seconds [11]. Therefore,
the n and p should be chosen such that n · p ≤ 30, as this represents a lower
bound on the detection latency. For example, to have an high enough resolu-
tion to notice variations of the resource utilization metrics, and enough values
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to compute the correlation, the period p should be in the order of few seconds
(e.g., p = 2s).
Of course, the need to configure an high sampling frequency may expose
our approach to false alarms, that may be caused by random fluctuations of
measurements. To make the approach robust to the high sampling frequency
and to the choice of these parameters, we discuss two strategies to mitigate
the downside of this choice:
1. use of smoothing functions on the time series to reduce the noise in the
data;
2. filtering the negative correlation events according to the variance con-
tained in the sampling window.
The first strategy requires to pre-process the sliding window with a smooth-
ing function. Multiple algorithms can be adopted to this purpose. In Sec-
tion 3.3 we compare the detection accuracy and the detection latency using
three different types of smooth: (1) Running Moving Average (RMA) to lower
the impact of values too distant from the average, (2) Running Moving Median
(RMM) to lower the impact of values too distant from the median, and (3) Ex-
ponential Moving Average (EMA) to lower the impact of older samples in the
current sampling window.
The second technique prevents spurious alarms that may occur when
there is a negative correlation, but the variability of the measurements is very
small and has been likely caused by random fluctuations (e.g., by chance, one
of the time series may slightly increase due to random fluctuations, and at the
same time the other time series may decrease). Thus, we detect a “represen-
tative” anomaly if both there is a negative correlation, and the variations of
the measurements is large enough to reflect some event that may be occurred
in the VNF (e.g., a fault or a workload change). To this purpose, we compute
the coefficient of variation (cv) on a window of samples W , as the the ratio
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between its standard deviation σW and its mean µW , according to the equa-
tion 3.3. Then, a correlation between the time series is taken into account
only if the cv is non-negligible, i.e., the variation exceeds the average value of
the metric (typically, a coefficient of variation below 10% denotes that varia-
tions are very small [86] and could be considered random). This filter has also
the advantage to exclude the sampling windows in which the chosen metric
remains constant; in this specific case, the correlation index is undefined.
cv(W )= σW
µW
(3.3)
Figure 3.3 shows an example of this second approach, by considering the
vCPU consumption of two consecutive VNF in the pipeline. Before t = 200s
there are small variations in the vCPU utilization that are not representative
of a change in the workload. After t = 200s an increase in the load brings the
VNFx in overload, while reducing the load on VNFy by 23% as a side effect
(which is a consequence of resource saturation at VNFx). In correspondence
of this negative correlation, there is a peak in the coefficient of variation of
vCPU utilizations in both the VNFs. Thus, we consider this correlation an
anomaly.
3.2 The IMS Case Study
The Clearwater IMS [46] is an open-source implementation of the IMS
core standard [87]. IMS functions are implemented in software and pack-
aged in VMs, and are designed to take full advantage of virtualization and
cloud computing technology. All components can scale out horizontally using
simple, stateless load-balancing based on DNS. Moreover, Clearwater follows
common design patterns for scalable and reliable web services, by keeping
most components largely stateless, and by storing long-lived state in clustered
data stores. Clearwater is a large software project, mostly written in C++ and
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Figure 3.3. Coefficient of variation filter
Java, and including several subsystems. The architecture of Clearwater core is
showed in Figure 3.4, and includes the following components:
• Bono (P-CSCF): The Bono nodes are the first point of contact for an UE
(User Equipment), and they represent the edge proxy providing P-CSCF
standard interfaces to IMS clients.
• Sprout (S-CSCF and TAS): The Sprout nodes are SIP registrars and au-
thoritative routing proxies. These nodes implement the S-CSCF and I-
CSCF interfaces of the IMS standard. Furthermore, they implement a
distributed cache, using Memcached [88], for storing registration data
and other short-lived information.
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• Homestead: The Homestead nodes are redundant mirrors for the HSS
(Home Subscriber Server) data store, using Apache Cassandra [89], for
retrieving authentication credentials and user profile information. HSS
mirrors are part of both the S-CSCF and I-CSCF interfaces, and provide
Web services (over HTTP) to the Sprout layer.
• Homer: A Homer node is a XML Document Management Server (XDMS)
to store service settings documents for each user of the system, using
Apache Cassandra as the data store.
• Ralf (Rf-CTF): The Ralf nodes provide charging and billing functions,
used by Bono, Sprout and Homestead nodes to report events occurring
when the CSCF chain is traversed.
Figure 3.4. Architecture of the Clearwater IMS.
The experimental testbed (Figure 3.5) consists of four host machines: three
Dell PowerEdge R520 servers, equipped with two 8-Core 2.2 GHz Intel Xeon
CPU, 64GB DDR3 RAM, two 500GB SATA HDD, two 1-Gbps Ethernet NICs,
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8-Gbps Fiber Channel HBA; one Dell PowerEdge R320 server with a 4-Core
2.8 GHz Intel Xeon CPU, 8GB DDR3 RAM, two 500GB SATA HDD, two 1-Gbps
Ethernet NICs, 8-Gbps Fiber Channel HBA; A PowerVault MD3620F disk array
with 4TB of network storage with a 8-Gbps Fiber Channel link.
Figure 3.5. Experimental testbed.
The hosts are connected to a 1-Gbps Ethernet network for general-purpose
traffic, and another 1-Gbps Ethernet network for management traffic. The vir-
tual disks of VMs are stored on three distinct GlusterFS partitions of the Pow-
erVault SAN, which are mounted on the hosts through the Fiber Channel link.
The hosts are configured with CentOS Linux 7 and the KVM hypervisor.
The testbed is managed using the OpenStack virtualization platform, version
Juno [90]. The Dell PowerEdge R320 serves as OpenStack Controller and Net-
work node; the three Dell PowerEdge R520 servers represent the OpenStack
Compute and Storage nodes, and run the VMs of the Clearwater IMS. The
OpenStack services include: Nova, which manages the compute domain; Neu-
tron, which manages virtual networks among VMs; Cinder, which controls the
lifecycle of VM volumes; Glance, which manages the cloud images of VMs;
Heat, which orchestrates, through a native REST API, the virtual IMS deploy-
ment; Horizon, which supports the Web-based management dashboard.
To determine the number of VMs that had to host specific network ser-
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Table 3.1. Clearwater VMs deployment configuration.
Service Clearwater
Node
Name
# of
VMs
Flavor Details
Edge Proxy
(P-CSCF)
Bono 10 VCPUs: 1
RAM: 2GB
Disk Size: 5GB
SIP Router
(I/S-CSCF)
Sprout 10 VCPUs: 1
RAM: 2GB
Disk Size: 5GB
HSS Mirror Homestead 5 VCPUs: 1
RAM: 4GB
Disk Size: 80GB
Rf CTF Ralf 4 VCPUs: 1
RAM: 2GB
Disk Size: 5GB
XDMS
(MMtel ser-
vices)
Homer 2 VCPUs: 1
RAM: 4GB
Disk Size:
100GB
Name service
(DNS)
- 1 VCPUs: 1
RAM: 2GB
Disk Size: 5GB
Workload
generator
(SIPp)
- 10-40 VCPUs: 1
RAM: 2GB
Disk Size:
100GB
vices, we made some preliminary capacity tests. We defined a deployment
configuration capable to handle 500,000 subscribers (i.e. the engineered ca-
pacity) corresponding to (i) 90,000 registration attempts per minute, and (ii)
8,000 call attempts per minute. At this level the average CPU utilization is 80%
in all the Clearwater VMs and all the requests are correctly served by the sys-
tem. The number and type of VMs hosting services is detailed in Table 3.1.
Each VM hosts a single VNF.
Other VMs are used to generate the IMS workload. Such machines run
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the SIPp traffic generator. Each SIPp instance generates SIP traffic towards a
specific P-CSCF instance. Each couple of subscribers will attempt to register
or renew the registration every 5 minutes, on average. After a successful regis-
tration, one can attempt to setup a call to the other (with 16% of probability) or
remain idle until the next registration renewal (with 84% of probability). The
call hold time is, by default, 60 seconds. 10 SIPp are used for generating the
initial load of 500,000 subscribers in 10 minutes (Initial Ramp-up period). To
generate the overload conditions in our test scenarios, we run 40 additional
SIPp VMs.
3.3 Experimental evaluation
In our experimentation, we study the ability of the detection algorithm to
identify performance anomalies, and to avoid false positives. In the context
of the IMS case study, such anomalies cause the failure of some user registra-
tions and/or some call setup requests. On the opposite, when there are no
faults affecting the quality of service, all the registrations and the call setups
are correctly processed by the system. Thus, we use the SIPp workload gener-
ator to check at client-side the success of such requests, in order to evaluate
the outcome of the detection algorithm.
In our evaluation, we consider test scenarios that involve service failures
of the IMS system. To have meaningful test scenarios, we induce performance
anomalies that cause service failures, that is, the quality of service experienced
by clients degrades, either in terms of throughput (i.e., there should be a gap
between the request rate from the client, and the throughput of traffic served
by the IMS) and latency (i.e., there is a long delay between a request and the
corresponding results). In quantitative terms, we cause service failures where
the throughput is less than 90% of the request rate for more than 5 seconds,
and the 90th-percentile of the request latency is lower than 250ms. The re-
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quests that violate the latency requirements are signalled either by the system
(i.e., with SIP 500 messages) or by the client (i.e., in case of timeout events).
In both cases, these requests are marked as failed and are not accounted in
the overall throughput. Thus, in our discussion, we focus on presenting the
throughput metric, as in all tests the latency violations were always accompa-
nied by throughput violations during the same periods.
To assess the detection algorithm, we consider a set of overload scenarios
(caused by workload surges and faults), and perform r repeated experiments
for each scenario, where we evaluate the number of times the algorithm is able
to detect the overload. The following Detection Outcomes are considered:
• Overload not detected: the algorithm detected the overload no more
than in 20% of the experiments;
• Overload detected: in at least 80% of the experiments, the algorithm was
able to detect the overload;
• Unreliable detection: in the other cases.
To summarize the detection outcomes across different scenarios, we com-
pute the Overall Detection Coverage, which we define as the percentage of the
scenarios where the detection outcome is overload detected.
Another requirement of NFV services is that anomalous conditions have to
be detected as soon as possible, so that mitigation mechanisms can be quickly
activated, and the impact on the quality of service can be reduced. Thus, as a
further metric for the assessment of the detection algorithm, we consider the
Detection Latency, which is defined as the time between the occurrence of an
overload condition (i.e., the moment at which users’ registrations and/or calls
start failing) and the detection of such condition by the algorithm.
Finally, we consider the rate of false alarms that are raised by the detection
algorithm. To this aim, we perform experiments without anomalies, and keep
track of any (false) alarms raised by the algorithm during the experiment.
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Ideally, to be deployed in production environments according to the feed-
back from our industrial partners, our proposed algorithm should have a quick
detection latency and no false positives, and a reasonably high detection cov-
erage; this can be a challenging goal considering that we do not rely on any
preliminary calibration of thresholds (e.g., we do not fix a minimum or maxi-
mum value for CPU or bandwidth utilization in our algorithm).
We applied the proposed approach by correlating the CPU utilization of
VNFs in the service chain. One of the reasons why we focus on this metric
is that, in NFV services, the network consumption is highly correlated to the
CPU utilization, since NFV is intended to use standard COTS CPUs to process
high volumes of network traffic.
Figure 3.6 shows an example of correlation, in the presence of a perfor-
mance anomaly, between the first two components of the Clearwater VNF
chain, the P-CSCF CPU % (Bono) and S-CSCF CPU % (Sprout). The figure
shows the time series for vCPU utilization of two instances of these network
functions, and the Pearson correlation index (the yellow line) computed be-
tween these two, by using a sliding window. A workload surge is generated at
minute 10. After minute 10, the Bono node starts dropping new connection
attempts due to the overload, thus causing a reduced load on the subsequent
Sprout node. When this happens, the correlation index drops close to−1, and
our algorithm considers this as a symptom of fault (a performance anomaly).
Analogue conditions occur in all the other failure scenarios that we consider
in the experimental evaluation.
In summary, we consider the following sets of experiments:
1. Sudden workload surges: the workload of the system rapidly grows, ex-
ceeding the engineered level of the IMS. In such a case, the available
resources of the system may not suffice to manage the incoming load.
2. Component failure: the failure of a component of the system reduces
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Figure 3.6. Example of negative running correlation between P-CSCF and S-
CSCF CPU utilization.
available resources to satisfy all user requests, thus, causing an overload
condition.
3. Anomaly-free, long-running workload: we consider long-running tests,
with both constant and variable workloads, within the engineered level
of the IMS and without any fault, to check whether any normal variation
of the workload may trigger false positives.
In each scenario, we apply the fault correlation approach to the main ser-
vice chain of the Clearwater IMS, including Bono, Sprout and Homestead, as
shown in Figure 3.7. More precisely, we apply the fault correlation algorithm to
both the Bono-Sprout and Sprout-Homestead VNF pairs. We do not consider
the Sprout-Ralf VNF pair since the external billing function (required by Ralf)
is not included in Clearwater. Moreover, we do not consider homer, since it
only provides a secondary functionality (a database service for the Telephony
Application Server) that is not included in the IMS standard.
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Figure 3.7. VNF graph representing the chain of services’ utilization.
3.3.1 Sudden workload surges
We study the impact of different types of workload surges on the QoS of
the IMS and on the effectiveness of our detection approach. In each test with
workload surges, we consider a different combination of the following three
factors:
• The number of subscribers, as the user volume affects the severity of re-
source contention and of the saturation of the IMS capacity;
• The duration of the ramp-up period, that is, the time for the workload
to increase from the engineered level to the selected level (the shorter
is the ramp-up, the quicker is the workload surge and the on-set of the
overload condition);
• The call hold time, which affects the the type and frequency of requests
to the IMS, and consequently lead to different workload patterns.
Table 3.2 reports in the detail the possible values that we selected for the
three factors (four possible numbers of subscribers, three possible ramp-up
periods, and two possible call hold times). In particular, the number of sub-
scribers is expressed in relative terms with respect to the engineered level,
that is, the users are 20,100,640,1000% more numerous than normal (denoted
with X%-MTN). We adopted a full factorial design, with 4× 3× 2 = 24 test
configurations in total. In these experiments, workload surges are introduced
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Table 3.2. Factors and levels for studying the impact of workload surges.
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
# subscribers 600k
20%-
MTN
1M
100%-
MTN
3.2M
640%-
MTN
5.5M
1000%-
MTN
Ramp-up 10 min 6 min 3 min
Call hold
time
2 min 1 min
starting at minute 10 since the beginning of the experiment; the time required
to reach the peak of subscribers depends on the ramp-up period.
We found that covering boundary conditions (e.g., relatively high and rela-
tively low volumes of users) highlights different behaviors of the IMS: in these
extreme cases, either just few registrations and calls fail (but have still a no-
ticeable effect on the perceived QoS), or almost all registrations and calls fail
(as the resource competition is too strong to allow any request to get a suf-
ficient amount). These differences also reflected on the performance of the
detection algorithm. Instead, we found that the ramp-up period and the call
hold time have a limited influence on the performance of detection; thus, we
present detailed results only to a specific ramp-up period (i.e. 10 minutes) and
call hold time (i.e. 60 seconds).
We performed 5 repeated experiments for each test configuration (r = 5).
A performance anomaly condition occurs when a non-negligible percentage
(≥10%) of user registrations and/or call setups are not successful, either be-
cause the request is not served within a time limit (10 seconds), or the IMS
explicitly refuses the request and returns an error message to the client. The
anomaly condition is considered detected if the algorithm raises an alarm
within 60 seconds from the occurrence of registration and/or call failures.
Figure 3.8 presents two examples of overload due to the increase of the
number of subscribers. Figure 3.8a shows, respectively, the number of incom-
ing registration requests per minute, and the number of completed registra-
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(a) Load 20% larger than the engineered level (20%-MTN)
(b) Load 1000% larger than the engineered level (1000%-MTN)
Figure 3.8. Registration attempts per minute and registrations completed per
minute
tions per minute, when the workload is 20% larger than the nominal capacity.
The difference between the two curves represents the amount of requests that
could not be service due to resource contention and saturation. Similarly, Fig-
ure 3.8b shows the case where the number of subscribers increases by 1000%.
In the former case (20%-MTN), the workload peak affected the quality of ser-
vice for a small share of users, while the others were still serviced. Instead,
in the latter case (1000%-MTN), not only the users in excess could not be ser-
viced; but the workload surge caused a failure of the IMS software (which was
unable to allocate resources, such as memory), thus leading to the unavailabil-
ity of the IMS. Clearly, the larger the increase of the number of subscribers, the
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larger the number of registrations that are not correctly completed.
To evaluate the detection algorithm based on the running correlation, we
consider several values of sample window size, i.e., we vary the number of
samples from the time series that are correlated. Also, we evaluate detec-
tion performance when using different smoothing algorithms. Specifically,
we consider to use (i) 10, (ii) 20 or (iii) 30 samples; and, as a smoothing al-
gorithm, we test (i) Running Moving Median (RMM), (ii) Running Moving Av-
erage (RMA), and (iii) Exponential Moving Average (EMA).
The results for the detection algorithm under workload surges are reported
in Table 3.3. Clearly, the size of the sampling window and the smoothing func-
tion have a big impact on the detection performance. In all the considered
overload conditions, the RMM and RMA smoothing functions perform better
than EMA. This result is probably due to the fact that giving less importance
to older samples in EMA, makes the algorithm more sensitive to noisy peeks
revealing trends that are not representative. Moreover, the RMM algorithm ap-
pears more robust than RMA regarding the size of the sampling window due
to the fact that the mean is more sensitive to outliers than the median. This
results in lower detection latencies. In general, the average detection latency
varies between 30 and 60 seconds and increases when using bigger sampling
windows. Collecting a sample every 2 seconds, a sampling window of 10 sam-
ples requires at least 20 seconds to be filled. Longer windows (e.g, 30 samples)
result in worst coverage and longer detection latencies, especially with small
overload conditions. For this reasons we recommend to use small sampling
windows and the more robust RMM smoothing algorithm to achieve good re-
sults. With this configuration, we obtain 100% of detection coverage and an
average detection latency of 32 seconds.
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Table 3.3. Detection outcomes and latency under workload surges.
Overload
Window Smooth
Detection
Outcome
Detection
Latency
(seconds)
Subs.
(MTN)
20%
10
RMM
Detected (4/5) 29.0
20 Detected (4/5) 45.6
30 Not Det. (1/5) 28.0
10
RMA
Unrel. Det. (2/5) 37.0
20 Non Det. (1/5) 48.0
30 Not Det. (0/5) -
10
EMA
Unrel. Det. (3/5) 46.0
20 Non Det. (0/5) -
30 Not Det. (0/5) -
100%
10
RMM
Detected (4/5) 29.0
20 Detected (4/5) 44.0
30 Unrel. Det. (2/5) 57.0
10
RMA
Detected (4/5) 33.2
20 Detected (4/5) 47.2
30 Not Det. (0/5) -
10
EMA
Detected (4/5) 36.5
20 Detected (4/5) 42.0
30 Not Det. (0/5) -
640%
10
RMM
Detected (5/5) 42.4
20 Detected (5/5) 58.0
30 Detected (5/5) 46.2
10
RMA
Detected (5/5) 49.3
20 Non Det. (1/5) 58.0
30 Non Det. (0/5) -
10
EMA
Detected (5/5) 46.0
20 Non Det. (0/5) -
30 Non Det. (0/5) -
1000%
10
RMM
Detected (5/5) 29.4
20 Detected (5/5) 49.4
30 Detected (5/5) 46.2
10
RMA
Detected (5/5) 38.0
20 Detected (4/5) 57.0
30 Non Det. (0/5) -
10
EMA
Detected (5/5) 36.0
20 Non Det. (2/5) 57.0
30 Non Det. (0/5) -
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(a) the failure of 28 CPU cores over 32 (b) the failure of 8 S-CSCF nodes over 10
(c) the failover of 8 P-CSCF nodes over 10
Figure 3.9. Registration attempts and registrations completed per minute, under
component failures (due to faults injected at minute 20).
3.3.2 Component failure
We here analyze how component failure inside the NFV infrastructure
(and thus, the variation of the capacity of the service chain) impacts on the
QoS and on the effectiveness of the detection algorithm. We consider the fol-
lowing potential failure events:
1. The failure of physical CPU cores of a machine that hosts VNFs, which is
emulated by deliberately turning off a subset of CPU cores, thus forcing
the hypervisor and the VNFs to run on fewer CPU cores and causing
physical CPU contention.
2. The crash of VMs that run VNF software, which is emulated by deliber-
ately terminating a VM, thus forcing the IMS traffic to be load-balanced
on the remaining replicas of the VNF.
3. The restart of VMs that triggers the migration and restart of IMS ses-
sions. In the telecom domain, this phenomenon is often referred to
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as the avalanche effect, and is regarded as a problematic event due to
the need to quickly restart a high number of connections in a limited
time, and to force state migration in the case of stateful network func-
tions [11].
Table 3.4 reports in the detail the levels for experimenting with component
failures. In total, we consider 4 test configurations, with r = 5 repetitions for
each configuration.
Table 3.4. Factors and levels for studying the impact of failure events.
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Failure 16 out of
32 pCPU
failure
28 out of
32 pCPU
failure
8 out
of 10
S-CSCF
failure
8 out
of 10
P-CSCF
failover
We apply the first type of failure on one of the three physical nodes that
run the IMS; the second type of failure on S-CSCF services, by killing 8 VMs
running the Clearwater Sprout service; and the third type of failure on P-CSCF
services, by restarting 8 VMs running Bono, thus triggering the P-CSCF recov-
ery. All the injections are performed 20 minutes after the start of the experi-
ment.
Figure 3.9 shows examples of the impact caused by the failures on the IMS.
For three out of four failure events (the levels 2, 3, and 4 in Table 3.4), the in-
jected faults indeed caused an overload of the IMS system, since many users
were affected by failures due to unsuccessful registrations. Instead, in the re-
maining case (the level 1 in Table 3.4), the CPU failure were not enough to
cause an overload condition, as the IMS client did not perceive any service
degradation. The IMS components tolerate small a amount of physical CPU
contention (e.g., the loss of 10% of CPU time, spent in involuntary wait state)
with no effects on the throughput and the latency. Therefore, we decided
to consider this experiment as anomaly-free (the remaining CPUs were able
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to tolerate the component failure and to serve the workload, so no anomaly
should be detected for this case). This case is further analyzed in the next sec-
tion.
To analyze the detection algorithm under component failures, we focus
the discussion on the case with a workload below the engineered capacity
(i.e. 400k subscribers), sampling window size of 10 samples and a sampling
period of 2s (i.e., the window length is equal to 20s), and we apply the Run-
ning Moving Median (RMM) as smoothing function; these choices for the win-
dow size and smoothing were the best ones according to the previous analysis
with workload surges. Again, we have a performance anomaly when a notice-
able amount of user registrations and/or call setups are not successful. The
anomaly is considered detected if the algorithm raises an alarm within 60 sec-
onds from the occurrence of registration and/or call failures.
Results from these injection experiments, reported in Table 3.5, reveal a
high detection coverage. The mean detection latency (i.e., 18 seconds) is ap-
proximately equal to the time required to fill the window (i.e., 20 seconds) with
samples collected after the injected fault. The detection of this kind of issues
is faster than the case with workload surges, because the injection of the faults
caused quicker variations of the CPU utilization in a majority of the VMs, all
at the same time. In the case of CPU contention (e.g., caused by the CPU fail-
ures), all the VMs deployed on the same injection target experienced involun-
tary waits due to the hypervisor scheduler. In the case of a reduced number
of VMs (e.g., due to the crash of S-CSCF instances) the algorithm required less
feedback to reach the majority before raising an alarm, resulting in lower de-
tection latency. In case of avalanche restarts (e.g., due to the failover of P-CSCF
nodes) all the newly started instances immediately experienced overload and
the algorithm got a quick feedback from a majority of the nodes.
3.3. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 54
Table 3.5. Results for detection based on running correlation for overload con-
ditions due to failures.
Failures Window Smooth
Detection
Outcome
Detection
Latency
(seconds)
physical
CPU
contention
10 RMM Detected (4/5) 13.0
S-CSCF
crash
10 RMM Detected (5/5) 24.0
P-CSCF
failover
10 RMM Detected (5/5) 18.0
3.3.3 Anomaly-free, long-running workload
To test for the occurrence of any false alarms under anomaly-free condi-
tions, we carry out a set of experiments that are within the engineered capacity
of the IMS system. We consider both the case of a stable workload at the en-
gineered capacity, and two scenarios with variable workload (still within the
limits of the engineered capacity). Finally, we consider the case of a failure
event that reduces the available physical CPU cores (16-out-of-32) while still
providing enough capacity for serving the workload (see also the discussion
in the previous section). In these conditions, the algorithm should not detect
any failure, thus any alarm is considered a false positive.
In the case of stable workload, we exercise the IMS with a constant num-
ber of subscribers (500k users). In the case of variable workload, we vary the
number of subscribers over time. Periodically (every 20 minutes on average)
the number of subscribers is reduced or increased, according to two patterns:
in the first pattern (Figure 3.10) the workload varies between three levels be-
low the engineered capacity; in the second pattern (Figure 3.11), the workload
varies between five levels, up to the engineered capacity of the IMS.
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100k  
subs
200k  
subs
350k  
subs
Figure 3.10. Variable workload below the engineered capacity.
100k  
subs
200k  
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350k  
subs
400k  
subs
500k  
subs
Figure 3.11. Variable workload that saturates the engineered capacity.
In all these experiments, the detector provided an encouraging result: no
false alarms were raised, for all test configurations. This result is motivated
by the robust criteria that we adopt in the algorithm, as we require that (i) the
CPU utilization should not simply vary on individual nodes, but the variations
should be correlated at different pairs of VNFs; (ii) the correlation should show
a high strength; (iii) a majority of the replicas in a VNF tier should be involved
in the variation. Indeed, it is very unlikely that a false positive may occur, as
confirmed by our anomaly-free experiments.
Chapter4
Managing the overload of
network functions in the Cloud
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) aims to provide high-performance
network services through cloud computing and virtualization technologies.
However, network overloads represent a major challenge. While elastic cloud
computing can partially address overloads by scaling on-demand, this mech-
anism is not quick enough to meet the strict high-availability requirements of
“carrier-grade” telecom services. Thus, this Chapter presents a novel overload
control framework (NFV-Throttle) to protect NFV services within a short pe-
riod of time, by filtering the incoming traffic towards VNFs in order to make
the best use of the available capacity, and to preserve the QoS of traffic flows
admitted in the network. Moreover, the framework has been designed to fit
the service models of NFV, including VNFaaS and NFVIaaS. Moreover, this
chapter presents an extensive experimental evaluation on the NFV-oriented
Clearwater IMS, showing that the solution is robust and able to sustain severe
overload conditions with a very small performance overhead.
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4.1 The problem of overload control in NFV
When a network element becomes overloaded, a large amount of traffic
can be lost very quickly. The overload may cause the disruption of already-
established connections and the unavailability of high-priority services, thus
violating SLAs. Moreover, overloads may expose network services to cascad-
ing failures due to user retries, traffic handover, and avalanche restarts. The
objective of overload control is to guarantee that the network is still able to
serve a high number of traffic flows by fully utilizing its capacity, and to as-
sure that an adequate QoS (for example, in terms of latency, packet loss, and
“goodput”) is provided to flows that are admitted in the network.
This problem is exemplified in Figure 4.1. Typically, the network capacity
is designed according to technical and economical considerations, in order to
support some “Reference load” (point C1), for example in terms of amount of
traffic per second. Under this load level, the network can perform well, and as-
sures an “engineered throughput”. However, when a mass event or a cascade
failure occurs, the network becomes overloaded (“Overload condition”, point
C2 in the figure). The network does not have enough resources to process all
the incoming flows. Thus, if the overload condition is not managed, the net-
work throughput can significantly degrade (dashed curve in the figure). Ide-
ally, using overload control, the network should maintain a steady throughput
(for example, no lower than 90% of the engineered throughput, the contin-
uous curve in the figure) even under an overload condition, by dropping or
rejecting the traffic in excess, in order to accept only few traffic flows in the
network, and by efficiently using its resources.
According to this view, the NFV overload control solution should consider
the following requirements:
1. The NFV network should achieve an acceptable level of service (for ex-
ample, not less than 90% of its engineered throughput) during severe overload
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Figure 4.1. Network throughput under overload conditions.
conditions (such as 10 times the reference load).
2. The overload control solution should quickly react to an overload con-
dition, in order to prevent violations of SLAs during the transition between a
normal load and the overload condition. Since carrier-grade services can af-
ford only few minutes of downtime per year, it is important to react to overloads
within few tens of seconds at most.
3. The overload control solution should be integrated with the use cases
and scenarios of NFV, including VNF providers, and NFVI providers. For VNF
providers, it is desirable that the solution is transparent to VNF software, which
can be developed by third-party vendors and whose source code may not be
available. Moreover, the solution should allow NFVI providers to perform over-
load control at the infrastructure-level, without relying on cooperation of the
VNF layer.
4. The overload control solution should introduce minimal overhead, and
must not degrade the quality of service under normal load conditions (for ex-
ample, it should not filter traffic when processing resources are available).
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4.2 The proposed overload control solution
In the following, I describe an overload control solution aimed at fulfilling
high-availability and performance requirements of Telecom services, and at
complying with the service models of NFV and cloud computing. In particular,
we consider two main use-case scenarios:
1. A telecom operator designs a network service (e.g., to offer it as a service,
VNFaaS), by assembling VNFs and composing them into a VNF service
chain (see Figure 4.2a). The VNFs can run VNF software developed in-
house or provided by third-party NFV software vendors. The VNFs are
deployed on an NFVI managed by a third-party NFVI provider (NFVI-
aaS). In this scenario, the telecom operator can customize the VNFs and
deploy VMs on the NFVI, but it cannot change the underlying NFVI.
2. An NFVI provider manages an infrastructure (e.g., to offer it as a service,
NFVIaaS) to host VNFs from telecom operators (see Figure 4.2b). In this
scenario, it is desirable (or even mandatory, if the VNFs are provided
as black-boxes) to address overloads at the infrastructure level, without
making changes to VMs.
The proposed solution is an overload control framework based on a set
of overload detection agents and overload mitigation agents. These agents are
software modules to be deployed inside the NFV network, and transparent to
VNF software (Figure 4.2):
• Overload detection agents check whether the incoming traffic towards
the VNF exceeds its capacity, either due to a workload peak, or due to
contention on physical resources of the NFVI. If an overload condition
occurs, the detection agent triggers an overload mitigation agent.
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Figure 4.2. Overview of the overload control solution.
• Overload mitigation agents protect the VNF from incoming traffic in
excess, by dropping it, or by only admitting a subset of users to the ser-
vice, and it allows again the traffic once the overload condition disap-
pears. Moreover, overload mitigation agent interact with the virtualiza-
tion infrastructure manager (VIM) to reserve physical resources to crit-
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ical VNFs, in order to mitigate physical resource contention.
Overload detection and mitigation agents are further divided in three com-
plementary types. The VNF-level agents protect individual VNFs, and react to
overload conditions by dropping traffic in excess. The host-level agents pro-
tect groups of VNFs that share the same physical host, with respect to overload
conditions that arise from physical resource contention. Finally, network-level
agents protect the NFV network from overload condition that affect the whole
network (i.e., overloads spread across several VNFs), and react by rejecting
traffic and notifying the clients about the overload condition.
The agents can be deployed across the NFV network to support any of the
two use-case scenarios mentioned before:
1. A telecom operator can install the detection and mitigation agents both
in the same VMs of VNFs, and in dedicated VMs (Figure 4.2a). The VNF-
level agents collect resource utilization metrics from VMs, and forward
traffic to VNF software through a transparent network tunnel, which
drops traffic in excess in the case of an overload. Moreover, the telecom
operator can deploy host-level agents on dedicated VMs, which detect
physical resource contention impacting on the VNFs, and mitigate it by
re-configuring VMs. Finally, network-level agents are deployed on ded-
icated VMs, and are interposed between the NFV network and exter-
nal networks. They detect overload conditions that are spread across
several VNFs, and use a transparent network tunnel in order to forward
network traffic and to reject traffic in excess.
2. An NFVI provider may not be allowed to install agents inside the VMs
of VNFs, but has the opportunity to install agents in the physical hosts
of the NFV infrastructure (Figure 4.2b). Host-level detection and mit-
igation agents are deployed as processes or services running on the
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physical hosts. The host-level agents use a transparent network tun-
nel towards each VNF, by leveraging virtual networking mechanisms
provided by the infrastructure, in order to protect an overloaded VNF
from ingoing traffic in excess. In a similar way, network-level agents
can be deployed on physical hosts and can be interposed between the
NFV network and external networks. Moreover, host-level agents can be
adopted to mitigate physical resource contention on the host.
The proposed overload control framework is designed to react to overload
in the short term (e.g., few tens of seconds), and is complementary to elastic
cloud computing mechanisms that expand the capacity of VNFs. The frame-
work does not require to change VNF software and virtualization software, and
can be transparently installed into NFV networks with third-party VNF soft-
ware and virtualization technologies. The overload detection agents only rely
on metrics that are widespread across guest OSs and hypervisors, and that are
easily collectible through APIs or IPC channels exposed by the guest OSs and
hypervisors, without modifying their internals. Moreover, the solution gives
to NFV designers and administrators the ability to install agents only for spe-
cific VNFs, where overload control is most needed; reuse the overload control
framework across different types of network functions; to address overload ei-
ther at VNF- or at host-level, and/or globally at the NFV network level.
4.2.1 VNF-level design
The architecture of the overload control solution at VNF level is showed in
Figure 4.3, which includes a detection agent and a mitigation agent.
VNF-level Detection Agent
The VNF-level Detection Agent is a component deployed by a VNF provider
inside a VM, in order to address overloads of an individual VNF (Figure 4.2a).
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Figure 4.3. Architecture of VNF-level detection and mitigation.
It collects resource utilization metrics from the VM, by using interfaces ex-
posed by the guest OS (such as the procfs virtual filesystem of the Linux OS).
Specifically, it collects metrics about the utilization of virtual CPU by the VM.
These metrics include the busy virtual CPU ticks, consumed both by user-
space applications (including VNF software) and by the guest OS (including
system calls and interrupt service), and the idle CPU ticks of the VM. More-
over, to relate overload conditions to the workload of the VNF, the VNF-level
Detection Agent measures the ingoing and outgoing traffic throughput of the
VNF. Network traffic metrics are collected from the VNF-level Mitigation Agent
(discussed later in this section), which tunnels network traffic to the VNF soft-
ware.
The VNF-level Detection Agent must quickly react to an overload condi-
tion within a short time frame (e.g., 10 seconds for critical NFV networks).
Therefore, the VNF-level Detection Agent periodically samples resource uti-
lization metrics, and continuously updates a traffic drop rate in near real-time,
using a simple and robust update rule, which is defined as:
capacity= MEAN[accepted_traffic[1. . . N ]]
MAX[cpu_usage[1...N ]]
reference_cpu_usage
(4.1)
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drop_rate= 100 ·
(
1− capacity
incoming_traffic[N ]
)
[%] (4.2)
where cpu_usage is a sliding window of the latest N samples of the percentage
of busy virtual CPU ticks (up to 100%); incoming_traffic is the volume of traf-
fic in input to the VNF-level Mitigation Agent; and the accepted_traffic is the
volume of traffic that is actually passed to VNF software by the agent. In these
equations, MAX[cpu_usage[1. . . N ]]> 0, and incoming_traffic[N ]> capacity>
0; otherwise, if capacity> incoming_traffic[N ], then the traffic drop rate is set
to zero. The traffic drop rate is capped between 0% and 100%.
The drop_rate for VNF traffic is updated following Alg. 2. The VNF-level
Detection Agent periodically collects a new sample of resource utilization
metrics (cpu_usage, incoming_traffic, and accepted_traffic) at a high frequency
(later in this study, we configure the agent to collect one sample every 2 sec-
onds). Moreover, the VNF-level Detection Agent analyzes the most recent N
samples (e.g., we consider the last N = 5 samples when sampling every 2 sec-
onds) of virtual CPU utilization and of the network traffic throughput. The
VNF-level Detection Agent first identifies the highest virtual CPU utilization
sample among the recent samples, and compares it to a reference virtual CPU
utilization. The reference virtual CPU utilization is chosen by NFV designers
or administrators: it represents a "factor of safety" for virtual CPU utilization,
under which the VNF is designed to perform well (e.g., no service disruptions),
as discussed in section 4.1. For example, the VNF software and configura-
tion can be designed (e.g., through capacity planning of virtual and physical
resources) to have a virtual CPU utilization below 90% and to provide good
performance under a reference workload.
If the virtual CPU utilization exceeds the reference virtual CPU utilization,
the traffic allowed into the VNF (capacity) is reduced by the update rule (eq.
(4.1)). The new value is obtained by scaling down the average of the most re-
cent N samples of traffic volume accepted into the VNF; the scaling is propor-
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tional to the gap between the reference virtual CPU utilization and the actual
virtual CPU utilization. Thus, the larger the gap, the lower the capacity, and
the higher the traffic drop rate.
This computation is periodically repeated for each new sample of resource
utilization. If the overload condition persists (i.e., the CPU utilization is still
higher than the reference value), the accepted_traffic and the capacity will
keep reducing, and the drop_rate will further increase. Instead, when the VNF
leaves the overload condition (i.e., the virtual CPU utilization is below the ref-
erence value), the VNF-level Detection Agent will gradually increase the ca-
pacity and reduce the traffic drop rate, until it becomes zero (that is, all the in-
put network traffic is again allowed in the VNF software). At each update, the
traffic drop rate is sent to the VNF-level Mitigation Agent. Finally, the VNF-
level Detection Agent sends periodic updates on virtual CPU utilization to the
Host-level Detection Agent, in order to detect physical resource contention,
as discussed later in this section.
This approach is robust to false positives, since a sporadic increase of the
virtual CPU (e.g., transient peaks in the samples that are not due to an over-
load condition, but are due to random effects) is quickly discarded since we
adopt a relatively small window of samples (e.g., N = 5), which only causes to
drop a small amount of traffic and a negligible impact on the quality of service.
In the case of a larger window, the update rule can be changed by replacing the
MAX[·] function with a percentile (such as the 90th percentile among the N
samples). Moreover, the VNF-level Detection Agent applies a moving-average
filter to the samples of network traffic throughput, which lessens the effect of
sporadic out-of-norm samples from network measurements.
VNF-level Mitigation Agent
The VNF-level Mitigation Agent acts as a network tunnel between the VNF
software and other VNFs in the NFV network. The network traffic towards
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Algorithm 2: VNF-level detection and mitigation
Data: SP : sampling period
Data: N : size of the vector of samples
Data: reference_cpu_usage: "factor of safety" for virtual CPU usage
Result: dr op_r ate for incoming VNF traffic
begin
while True do
collect cpu_ticks, incoming_traffic and accepted_traffic
measurements;
update capacity and drop_rate;
send cpu_ticks to the Host-level Detection Agent;
send the updated drop_rate to VNF-level Mitigation Agent;
wait SP seconds;
the VNF software is forwarded to the VNF-level Mitigation Agent. In turn, the
VNF-level Mitigation Agent connects to the VNF software, and it forwards the
traffic to the VNF software.
This forwarding is accomplished by using network traffic forwarding mech-
anisms that are provided by the guest OS. For example, in the case of the Linux
OS, the iptables network utility can be used to introduce a forwarding rule in-
side the guest OS, to redirect VNF traffic, according to the destination port, to
a different network port that is exposed by the VNF-level Mitigation Agent.
The VNF-level Mitigation Agent is transparent to the VNF software. More-
over, the VNF-level Mitigation Agent has only a small impact on network la-
tency and throughput, since it does not perform any traffic analysis or manip-
ulation. The VNF-level Mitigation Agent only computes metrics on network
throughput, and sends these metrics to the VNF-level Detection Agent.
When an overload condition occurs, the VNF-level Mitigation Agent fil-
ters out part of the input network traffic, in order to protect the VNF software
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Figure 4.4. Architecture of host-level detection and mitigation.
from the traffic in excess. The traffic in excess is dropped and is not forwarded
to the VNF software. The traffic is dropped according to the traffic drop rate
configured by the VNF-level Detection Agent.
The VNF-level Mitigation Agent applies a traffic-matching rule on the con-
tents of network traffic (such as, to a "type" field in the header), in order to
identify which network traffic it should drop. For example, in the case of the
SIP protocol, it is preferable to only drop "REGISTER" and "INVITE" requests
in excess, and not to drop other types of messages. In this way, new users are
prevented from registering, and the VNF software is protected from the over-
load caused by new users that try to enter in the network. Moreover, the users
that are already registered are not affected by the traffic drop, and do not ex-
perience any degradation of the quality of service.
4.2.2 Host-level design
The architecture of the overload control solution for this level is showed in
Figure 4.4, which includes a detection agent and a mitigation agent.
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Host-level Detection Agent
The Host-level Detection Agent is a multi-threaded application, which can
be deployed by the VNF provider in a dedicated VM, in the same cloud infras-
tructure running the VNFs (Figure 4.2a). An alternative approach, which is
viable for the provider of the NFVI, is to run the Host-level Detection Agent on
the hypervisor as a privileged process (Figure 4.2b). In both cases, this agent
is adopted to detect physical resource contention; in the latter approach, the
agent also replaces the VNF-level Detection Agent, in order to protect a VNF
from traffic in excess. The Host-level Detection Agent monitors one or more
VNFs in the NFV network. It is possible to deploy more than one Host-level
Detection Agents on the same cloud infrastructure, where each Host-level De-
tection Agent monitors a subset of VNFs in the NFV network.
The Host-level Detection Agent receives data on virtual CPU utilization,
either from VNF-level Detection Agents (if it is deployed by the VNF provider),
through a shared ring buffer or other inter-VM communication channels, or
from the hypervisor (if it is deployed by the NFVI provider), using APIs pro-
vided by the hypervisor.
The Host-level Detection Agent can detect the traffic in excess towards a
VNF, by using the same algorithm of the VNF-level Detection Agent (Alg. 2,
and eq. (4.1) and (4.2) in section 4.2.1). It periodically samples the virtual CPU
usage of the VM, and the network throughput from the Host-level Mitigation
Agent; then, it tunes the traffic drop ratio of individual VNFs to drop traffic. In
addition, the Host-level Detection Agent can identify overload conditions that
are due to physical resource contention. These conditions may occur when
the NFVI experiences a fault (such as, a broken CPU that must be turned off),
which reduces the resources available to the VNFs, and which causes com-
petition among them for the remaining resources (but may be insufficient to
sustain the current workload). Moreover, physical resource contention can
occur due to bad capacity planning and oversubscription of the NFVI [8, 9].
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In the case of physical resource contention, it may not suffice to drop traf-
fic, since a VNF would free physical resources that could be consumed by
neighbour VMs, causing a vicious circle and worsening the performance of
the VNF. In this scenario, the most appropriate course of action is to detect
that overload is caused by physical resource contention, and to mitigate the
contention by disabling part of the VNFs and by reserving resources for the
most critical ones. According to the ETSI NFV resiliency requirements [21,
sec. 7.3], NFV is expected to support multiple levels of service availability and,
under overload conditions, it should be able to downgrade low priority ser-
vices and to preempt resources from them (e.g., a video call service should be
downgraded or preempted in favor of voice calls).
Under physical CPU contention, a virtual CPU reaches full utilization (i.e.,
there are no idle CPU ticks) even if the workload is below the virtual CPU
quota. For example, if two VMs have both a 1 GHz CPU quota, but they both
run on an oversubscribed physical CPU (e.g., a 1 GHz physical CPU, with a
2:1 vCPU-to-pCPU ratio), then the hypervisor may be unable to honour the
quota, and each VM will actually get up to 0.5 GHz CPU cycles. However, de-
tecting physical CPU contention is problematic for a telecom provider that
uses an NFVIaaS, since it has no visibility of the underlying physical host.
Moreover, physical CPU contention cannot be detected within the VM using
traditional CPU monitoring tools: both in the case of CPU contention and of
workload peaks, CPU monitoring tools would report a 100% consumption of
the virtual CPU, since they compute the ratio between busy and idle CPU ticks,
and thus would not be able to discriminate between the two cases.
In order to discriminate between physical CPU contention and other over-
load conditions, and to perform special actions against contention, we con-
sider the absolute number of busy CPU ticks (including ticks spent executing
both in user-space and kernel-space) that are actually executed by the virtual
CPU per unit of time. If there is physical CPU contention, the hypervisor CPU
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scheduler gives to the virtual CPU less physical CPU cycles than its expected
CPU quota. Thus, we detect physical CPU contention by monitoring the num-
ber of actual busy CPU ticks of the virtual CPU, and comparing it to the maxi-
mum number allowed by its CPU quota:
pCPU contention ⇔ idle ticks≈ 0
∧ busy ticks 6≈maximum busy ticks
where the maximum for busy ticks is calibrated by running on the virtual
CPU a CPU-intensive load under no physical CPU contention. The count of
busy ticks can be obtained from the VNF-level Detection Agent inside a VM
(section 4.2.1), or from the virtualization infrastructure using hypervisor APIs.
The Host-level Detection Agent periodically samples the number of busy ticks
since the previous sample, and estimates the physical CPU share allotted to
the virtual CPU, by computing the ratio between busy ticks and the amount of
“wall-clock” time that has been elapsed. The wall-clock time can be collected
by the VNF-level Detection Agent inside a VM (using a paravirtualized clock
provided by the hypervisor [91, 92]) and from the virtualization infrastructure.
The Host-level Detection Agent notifies the Host-level Mitigation when phys-
ical CPU contention arises or disappears.
Finally, the Host-level Detection Agent aggregates the information about
the overload state of VNFs that it monitors (either caused by excess traffic,
or by physical CPU contention), and sends periodic update messages to the
Network-level Detection Agent, as discussed later in this section.
Host-level Mitigation Agent
The Host-level Mitigation Agent is an application that executes in the same
environment of the Host-level Detection Agent. It interacts with the Virtu-
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alization Infrastructure Manager (VIM) in order to alleviate the contention
on physical CPUs, by pre-empting resources from the less important ("non-
critical") VMs. The relative importance of VMs is configured according to per-
formance and availability requirements of NFV services (e.g., the ETSI NFV
resiliency requirements provide examples of service availability levels, where
emergency telecommunications have priority over video streaming and other
internet traffic [21, sec. 7]).
The Host-level Mitigation Agent periodically checks the presence of phys-
ical CPU contention: if this is the case, it selects the VMs with the lowest crit-
icality, and decreases their scheduling priority in order to free CPU time for
the highest-criticality VMs. If the scheduling priority is already at the lowest
priority, the VM is suspended. These steps are repeated until the physical CPU
contention persists, and reverted when CPU resources are available. This ap-
proach can be easily deployed on existing virtualization technologies, such as
the KVM hypervisor and OpenStack, using their APIs to change the execution
state of VMs.
Optionally, in the case of NFVI providers, such as in NFVIaaS (Figure 4.2b),
the Host-level Mitigation Agent can be used to drop the traffic in excess to-
wards individual VNFs, in a similar way to the VNF-level Mitigation Agent
(section 4.2.1). This objective is achieved by configuring network traffic for-
warding mechanisms of the virtualization infrastructure to establish a net-
work tunnel. When the Host-level Detection Agent detects an overload con-
dition, it can trigger the Host-level Mitigation Agent to drop the traffic in ex-
cess. The amount and the type of traffic to drop is configured by the Host-level
Detection Agent as described in section 4.2.1: the Host-level Detection Agent
updates the traffic drop ratio according to a rule that uses resource utilization
metrics, and it applied traffic-matching rules to identify which traffic should
be dropped.
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Figure 4.5. Architecture of network-level detection and mitigation.
4.2.3 Network-level design
The architecture of the overload control solution for this level is showed in
Figure 4.5, which includes a detection agent and a mitigation agent.
Network-level Detection Agent
The Network-level Detection Agent is a multi-threaded application, which
executes in a dedicated VM in the same cloud infrastructure of the VMs run-
ning VNF software. Alternatively, it can execute as a privileged process on a
physical machine of the NFVI.
The Network-level Detection Agent collects the status of all VNFs in the
NFV network, and checks the presence of an overload condition (Alg. 3), ac-
cording to overload notifications coming from several Host-level Detection
Agents. The criteria for detecting a network-level overload condition can be
configured by the administrators of the NFV network: a simple criterion is
to count the number of VNFs affected by overload, and detect an overload
state when overloaded VNFs are the majority. Another possible criterion is to
compute a weighted count of the number of overloaded VNFs, by taking into
account the relative importance of VNFs in the NFV network.
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In a similar way to the VNF-level, the Network-level Detection and Mitiga-
tion Agents protect the NFV network from the input network traffic in excess.
Since these agents are deployed at the boundary of the VNF network, they can
prevent new users from entering the VNF network by explicitly rejecting them,
which differs from traffic drops inside individual VNFs or hosts, where traffic is
dropped without notifying the user. The traffic is rejected according to a traffic
rejection rate, which is controlled by the Network-level Detection Agent.
The traffic rejection rate is gradually increased when the VNFs are in an
overload condition, and it is decreased otherwise. It is periodically updated
according to a configurable, multiplicative function:
capacity=
capacity/(α+γ) if overloadedcapacity · (β−γ) otherwise (4.3)
reject_rate= 100 ·
(
1− capacity
incoming_traffic[N ]
)
[%] (4.4)
in which the reject_rate is capped between 0% and 100%. The incoming_traffic
is the volume of traffic in input, and α and β are constants, with α> 1 and β>
2. The γ coefficient is a variable factor, which tunes the reject rate according
to the persistence of the overload condition. It is defined as:
γ= dropped_traffic[N ]
incoming_traffic[N ]
(4.5)
that is, γ represents the fraction of traffic that has been rejected during the
last sampling period. This coefficient has been introduced to keep the reject
rate low if the overload condition lasts for a short amount of time, in order to
soften the impact of sporadic false positives in overload detection; and, at the
same time, this coefficient serves to keep the reject rate high if the overload
condition is severe and persists over time. When the current fraction γ of re-
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jected traffic is null or low, α+γ is closer to 1, thus the capacity decreases with
a smaller step, and increases with a larger step. Thus, the approach avoids to
reject too much traffic when the overload condition is short and sporadic. In-
stead, when theγ is high (which happens when the overload condition already
lasted for a relatively long time), the capacity decreases with a larger step, and
increases with a smaller step. In this way, if the overload condition disappears
only for a small amount of time, the reject rate is still kept high; the full capac-
ity is restored only once the network becomes stable and non-overloaded.
Algorithm 3: Network-level detection and mitigation
Data: SP : sampling period
Data: VNF[1 . . . M ]: overload state of monitored VNFs
Result: reject_rate for incoming VNF Network traffic
begin
while True do
forall monitored VNFs do
collect overload state for VNF[k]
if majority of VNFs is overloaded then
decrease capacity;
else
increase capacity;
update and send the reject_rate to the Network-level
Mitigation Agent;
wait SP seconds;
Network-level Mitigation Agent
The Network-level Mitigation Agent acts as a network tunnel at the bound-
ary of the NFV network. The Network-level Mitigation Agent receives the traf-
fic that was originally intended for the NFV network, and forwards it to the
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VNFs.
This forwarding is accomplished by installing the Network-level Mitiga-
tion Agent into a load balancer, placed at the boundaries of the NFV network,
either in a dedicated VM, or on a physical machine. Therefore, the Network-
level Mitigation Agent is transparent to the VNFs. Moreover, the Network-level
Mitigation Agent has only a small impact on network latency and throughput,
since it does not perform any traffic analysis or manipulation. The traffic in
excess is dropped and not forwarded to VNFs. Moreover, the Network-level
Mitigation Agent can reject input traffic by replying with an overload notifica-
tion to clients, in order to prevent them to generate more network traffic. For
example, in the case of the SIP protocol, the Network-level Mitigation Agent
can reply with a “503 Service Unavailable” response in order to notify clients
about the overload state. Moreover, the Network-level Mitigation Agent ap-
plies a traffic-matching rule on the contents of network traffic (such as, to a
“type” field in a packet header), in order to identify which network traffic it
should drop (such as, session initiation requests).
4.3 Experimental evaluation on an NFV IMS
To evaluate the overload control framework, we performed an experimen-
tal analysis on the NFV-oriented IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), Clearwater.
This analysis is aimed at evaluating the ability of the overload control frame-
work in the context of a real NFV software, in terms of performance under
overload conditions, overhead of the framework, and failures of NFV software.
4.3.1 Testbed and technical implementation
The experimental testbed consists of four host machines: three Dell Pow-
erEdge R520 servers, equipped with two 8-Core 2.2 GHz Intel Xeon CPU, 64GB
DDR3 RAM, two 500GB SATA HDD, two 1-Gbps Ethernet NICs, 8-Gbps Fiber
4.3. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION ON AN NFV IMS 76
Channel HBA; one Dell PowerEdge R320 server equipped with a 4-Core 2.8
GHz Intel Xeon CPU, 8GB DDR3 RAM, two 500GB SATA HDD, two 1-Gbps
Ethernet NICs, 8-Gbps Fiber Channel HBA; A PowerVault MD3620F disk ar-
ray with 4TB of network storage with a 8-Gbps Fiber Channel link.
The hosts are connected to a 1-Gbps Ethernet network for general-purpose
traffic, and another 1-Gbps Ethernet network for management traffic. The vir-
tual disks of VMs are stored on three distinct GlusterFS partitions of the Pow-
erVault SAN, which are mounted on the hosts through the Fiber Channel link.
The hosts are configured with CentOS Linux 7 and the KVM hypervisor.
The testbed is managed using the OpenStack virtualization platform, version
Juno [90]. The Dell PowerEdge R320 serves as OpenStack Controller and Net-
work node; the three Dell PowerEdge R520 servers represent the OpenStack
Compute and Storage nodes, and run the VMs of the Clearwater IMS. The
OpenStack services include: Nova, which manages the compute domain; Neu-
tron, which manages virtual networks among VMs; Cinder, which controls the
lifecycle of VM volumes; Glance, which manages the cloud images of VMs;
Heat, which orchestrates, through a native REST API, the virtual IMS deploy-
ment; Horizon, which supports the Web-based management dashboard.
The agents of the NFV-Throttle framework are deployed both on the VMs
(VNF-level agents) and on the hosts (Host-level and Network-level agents).
The agents have been developed in C, respectively as background daemons
at VNF-level and Host-level, and as extensions of the OpenSIPS [93] proxy at
Network-level. The VNF-level and Host-level detection agents collect CPU uti-
lization metrics from the proc FS, and network utilization metrics from the
mitigation agents. The mitigation agents, both at VNF-level and at Host-level,
act as a filtering proxy for all the network traffic destined to a specific VNF, us-
ing iptables NAT rules. The network traffic accepted by the agent is forwarded
to the VNF, on behalf of the originator. In the case of UDP traffic (such as in the
case of SIP clients and P-CSCF VNF instances), UDP datagrams are forwarded
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by the agent on behalf of the source, by replacing the source IP and port with
the ones of the SIP client; thus, the destination (e.g., P-CSCF) can directly reply
to the source. In the case of TCP traffic (such as between a P-CSCF VNF and
a S-CSCF VNF), during the TCP handshake phase, the mitigation agents es-
tablishes two connections, respectively with the source (e.g., P-CSCF) and the
destination (e.g., S-CSCF). Then, the agent reads and writes data from both
the two streams, acting as a man-in-the-middle. Note that, for both UDP and
TCP, only a fixed set of iptables rules is required, regardless of the number of
clients and connections.
4.3.2 Experimental plan
We evaluate the proposed overload control framework in the context of the
Clearwater IMS case study, by performing experiments with stressful work-
loads and resource contention. In particular, we evaluate:
• The ability of the framework to assure a high throughput (up to the max-
imum capacity of the system), in terms of RAPS (register attempts per
second) and CAPS (call attempts per second) that are successfully han-
dled with no failures (i.e., requests that are neither timed-out nor re-
jected).
• The resource overhead introduced by the framework, in terms of CPU
and memory footprint consumed by the agents of the overload control
framework.
The experiments use a mix of SIP registrations and call setup requests. The
workload is generated using the SIPp traffic generator [94] to emulate SIP sub-
scribers. Each couple of subscribers will attempt to register or renew the regis-
tration every 5 minutes on average. After a successful registration, a subscriber
can either attempt to setup a call to the other (with 16% of probability), or re-
main idle until the next registration renewal (with 84% of probability). The call
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hold time is configured to 60s. We calibrate the number of VNF instances with
a preliminary capacity planning using 400k subscribers. These numbers have
been suggested by our industrial partners as a realistic baseline for testing an
IMS service, and on which we impose overload conditions.
We tuned the number of VNF instances to have at most 80% virtual CPU
utilization (which is measured by sampling the average CPU utilization every
minute), and no failures. The IMS can handle this workload with 10 replicas of
Bono, Sprout, and Homestead, 4 replicas of Ralf, and 1 replica of Homer and
DNS. Each replica runs on a distinct VM with 1 virtual CPU. In this experimen-
tal setup, 400k subscribers represent the engineered capacity of the IMS (see
also Figure 4.1). The IMS experiences an overload condition when the number
of subscribers exceeds this engineered capacity (À 400k subscribers). In these
cases, the CPU becomes the performance bottleneck. Moreover, an overload
condition happens when the IMS compete for resources with other services
that are deployed on the same physical infrastructure.
We consider three high-workload scenarios to evaluate the performance
of overload control under a peak of subscribers. Every scenario is executed
four times, respectively with: the plain Clearwater IMS; the VNF-level over-
load control; the Host-level overload control; and the Network-level overload
control. In total, we perform 12 high-workload experiments. We adopt the
following workloads (Table 4.1):
• Small overload (480K subscribers): the load is at 120% with respect
to the engineered level, and saturates the maximum capacity of the
testbed. At this load level, the overload control solution should throttle
a small part of service requests, in order to preserve the QoS for sub-
scribers that are already registered in the IMS before the overload.
• Medium overload (1M subscribers): the load is 250% with respect to
the engineered level, and above the maximum capacity of the testbed.
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At this load level, the overload control solution should throttle a large
amount of requests to prevent a significant throughput degradation.
• High overload (4M subscribers): the load is ten times higher (1000%)
than the engineered level. At this load level, there is a significant re-
source pressure since a considerable amount of connections must be
handled, thus exposing the IMS software to potential crashes due to re-
source exhaustion.
Each experiment lasts 1 hour, and is divided in three phases:
• Load generation (Ramp-up): When the experiment starts, 400k sub-
scribers are created in the initial 15 minutes (Initial ramp-up period).
The system can handle this load without failures. This load is generated
by a set of 10 SIPp instances, for all the duration of the experiment. This
phase is common to all the experiments.
• Overload generation: This phase starts at the 20th minute, and lasts
for 30 minutes. In this phase, additional subscribers, over the engi-
neered level (Table 4.1), are introduced in a short amount of time (Over-
load Ramp-up period). Then, all the subscribers constantly generate
requests for call setup and registration renewal.
• Overload termination (Ramp down): This phase starts at the 50th minute,
and lasts until the end of the run. In this phase, each subscriber that
fails to register or make a call, will not attempt to retry and will leave the
system.
Moreover, we consider an additional experimental scenario, in which the
overload condition is caused by resource contention between the IMS and
other services deployed on the same physical infrastructure. In this scenario,
the Host-level agents have to shield the IMS from resource contention, by
throttling other services. Thus, we perform this additional experiment:
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Table 4.1. Workloads used to evaluate the overload control solution.
# Subscribers Load Level RAPS CAPS
400k
(Engineered Level)
100% 1,379 111
480k
(Small Overload)
120% 1,655 133
1M
(Medium Overload)
250% 3,448 278
4M
(High Overload)
1000% 13,793 1,111
• Resource contention: At the steady state, the load level is 350k sub-
scribers, close to the engineered level. After 20 minutes, we run a “CPU
hog” on one of the three physical hosts (using the cpuburn tool [95]),
causing CPU contention between the processes and VMs running on
that physical host.
4.3.3 Experimental results
Node level
We first consider the case in which overload control is performed only
at the VNF-level (i.e., by installing an agent inside VMs, as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2.1). Figure 4.6 shows the performance of the Clearwater IMS at varying
levels of overload, respectively at 120%, 250% and 1000% load with respect to
the engineered capacity.
The graphs of Figure 4.6 show the registration throughput on the left side,
and the call throughput on the right side. Each graph shows three curves:
the input load, in terms of registration and call requests per second, and the
throughput of successful requests, respectively without and with overload
control at VNF-level.
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(a) Registration Throughput 120% (b) Call Throughput 120%
(c) Registration Throughput 250% (d) Call Throughput 250%
(e) Registration Throughput 1000% (f ) Call Throughput 1000%
Figure 4.6. Registration and Call Throughput for each overload level (i.e., 120%,
250% and 1000%) at Node Level.
With an overload level of 120% (Figure 4.6a and 4.6b) the registration and
call throughput are close to the input request rate, both with and without the
proposed overload control framework. In both cases, the capacity of the IMS
has been saturated. However, in the case without our overload control frame-
work, the call throughput exhibits a significant variability, and tends to be
lower than the input rate of requests. This behavior is a consequence of the
problem discussed in Section 4.1: even if resources are fully utilized, they do
not necessarily produce useful work, since the system attempts to manage too
many users but cannot provide an acceptable QoS to any of them. Instead, the
overload control solution has been able to avoid service failures for already-
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established sessions, by rejecting the requests in excess during the overload
phase.
With higher overload levels (Figure 4.6c – 4.6d at 150% load, and Figure 4.6e
– 4.6f at 1000% load), and without our overload control framework, the im-
pact of overload is even more severe. We observed that most of the nodes
exhibit failures due to resource exhaustion, causing the crash of VNFs and
performance degradation of the IMS. This results in a significant performance
degradation, with registration throughput lower than 200 RAPS and call through-
put lower than 1 CAPS in the worst case.
In the same scenarios, with the overload control framework, the registra-
tion and call throughput are stable around the engineered level, which is the
maximal throughput attainable by the IMS. Moreover, there are no failures of
the VNFs, since the overload control framework is implemented outside VNF
software and is more robust to huge overload conditions. In particular:
• Load level of 250%: (1) the registration throughput reaches on average
1664.9 RAPS, which is 137% more than the case without the mitigation
and 20% more than the engineered level; (2) the call throughput reaches
on average 114.60 CAPS, which is 194% more than the case without the
mitigation and close to the engineered level.
• Load level of 1000%: (1) the registration throughput is 1439.5 RAPS,
which is 152% more than the case without the mitigation and 4% higher
than the engineered level; the call throughput reaches on average 97.17
CAPS, which is 200% more than the case without the mitigation and
close to the engineered level.
Host level
We performed the same experiments using the Host-level overload detec-
tion and mitigation, which replace their VNF-level counterparts. The results
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obtained with Host-Level overload control are comparable to VNF-level over-
load control in Figure 4.6, thus they are not showed here for the sake of brevity.
In summary, the overload control framework, under an overload level of 250%,
can achieve a registration throughput 136% higher than the case without the
mitigation, and 18% more than the engineered level. Similar results were also
obtained under an overload level of 1000%. Again, overload control prevented
IMS failures due to resource exhaustion.
Network Level
(a) Registration Throughput 120% (b) Call Throughput 120%
(c) Registration Throughput 250% (d) Call Throughput 250%
(e) Registration Throughput 1000% (f ) Call Throughput 1000%
Figure 4.7. Registration and Call Throughput for each overload level (i.e., 120%,
250% and 1000%) at Network Level.
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Figure 4.7 show the performance measurements obtained with Network-
level overload control. As for the previous cases (VNF-level and Host-level),
the overload control at Network-level is able to sustain a high throughput in all
overload scenarios. Moreover, with a load level of 250% and 1000%, the control
solution is able to avoid resource exhaustion and crashes of IMS components.
These experiments point out an additional benefit of Network-level over-
load control. During the overload, the Network-level mitigation agent rejects
the registration requests in excess by replying to the clients. During the first
10 minutes of overload (in the period 1200s-1800s in the graphs), the rate of
incoming registration requests gradually decreases due to rejections, and sta-
bilizes again around the engineered capacity.
Figure 4.8 summarizes the results, by providing aggregated statistics (me-
dian, upper and lower quartiles, minimum and maximum) obtained respec-
tively with overload control at VNF-level, Host-level, and Network-level. Fig-
ure 4.8a shows the performance of the IMS in terms of registration throughput
at different loads (from 400k to 4M subscribers), while Figure 4.8b shows the
performance of the IMS in terms of call throughput.
At the engineered level (400k subscribers), there are no significant differ-
ences between the three cases and the engineered capacity (Table 4.1). In all
cases, during the first 20 minutes of the experiments, when the load is within
the engineered level, the performance with and without overload control are
closely matching. Thus, the overload control does not have negative side ef-
fects on the IMS when there is no overload condition.
In overload conditions, the Host-level overload control provides the best
average registration and call throughput compared to VNF-level and Network-
level control. The performance gap between VNF-level and Host-level can be
explained by observing that the VNF-level control incurs in the overhead of
transmitting all of the traffic to VMs, and to discard the traffic in excess in
the VM. The Host-level solution acts in the hypervisor rather than the VM,
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thus avoiding this additional overhead. Thus, when feasible, the Host-level
solution should be preferred to the VNF-level one. The Host-level solution
can be adopted in the case of NFVIaaS providers, which have access to the
infrastructure, while it may not be feasible for NFVIaaS consumers, which can
only deploy VNF-level solutions.
The Network-level overload control also exhibits lower performance than
the Host-level one, in particular with respect to the registration throughput.
The performance of Network-level overload control is mainly affected by the
detection mechanism. The main factor is that detection is distributed and
uses a longer sampling period compared to the Host-level solution (which
are respectively 30s and 10s), since the Network-level solution needs to col-
lect information from several nodes. Thus, the Network-level solution has a
slightly higher detection latency, and it is thus more exposed to oscillations
of the workload. Moreover, there are sporadic cases in which the workload is
not uniformly balanced across the replicas. Since the Network-level solution
detects an overload when a majority of nodes is overloaded, these cases lead
to sporadic delays in overload detection.
Resource contention
To complete the evaluation of the Host-level overload control solution, we
performed an experiment in which the overload is caused by an additional
workload that shares the physical infrastructure with the IMS.
Figure 4.9 shows the registration attempt rate (which is approximately
constant for most of the experiment), and the registration and call throughput,
both without mitigation (red lines) and with the Host-level mitigation (yel-
low lines). Without mitigation, the overload condition (starting after 1200s)
halves the registration throughput, and significantly reduces the call through-
put. With Host-level mitigation, the CPU contention is relieved by reducing
the priority of the “CPU hog”, until the throughput of the IMS stabilizes again
4.3. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION ON AN NFV IMS 86
(a) Registration Throughput
(b) Call Throughput
Figure 4.8. Mitigation performance at different operational levels (i.e., node,
host and network level)
around the engineered capacity.
Overhead Evaluation
The mitigation agents act as a lightweight filtering proxy for the network
traffic destined to VNFs. Since all the traffic, both TCP and UDP, will be pro-
cessed by the mitigation agent, we analyze the performance overhead of this
critical component. Moreover, since the implementation of the proxy agent
is different between the UDP and the TCP transport protocols, we separately
analyze both of them.
We performed experiments with the High Overload scenario (that is, 1000%
the engineered level), as discussed in Section 4.3.2. This scenario is the most
stressful among our experiments, and thus represents a worst-case for our
overload control framework.
The plot in Figure 4.10 shows the CPU consumption of the mitigation
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(a) Registration Throughput
(b) Call Setup Throughput
Figure 4.9. Overload control results at Host level for pCPU contention.
agent during the experiments when processing UDP datagrams. When the
workload is within the engineered level of traffic (900s-1200s), the CPU con-
sumption is very little (≈ 1.5%). When the workload reaches ten times the
engineered level, the mitigation agents drops the UDP traffic in excess, and
its overhead is less than 4%. The memory consumption during the whole ex-
periment is fixed at 3.5MB, since the agent does not allocate any dynamic
memory.
We repeated the same experiment, at maximum level of overload (i.e.,
1000% the engineered level), by analyzing the overhead under TCP traffic. The
plot in Figure 4.11 shows the CPU consumption of the mitigation agent during
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Figure 4.10. CPU Consumption of the UDP mitigation proxy
the experiment. At the engineered level of traffic (900s-1200s), the overhead
is again very little (≈ 1.5%). At ten times the engineered level, when dropping
the TCP traffic in excess, the overhead of the mitigation agent is less than 3%.
In the case of TCP, the memory consumption is dependant of the number of
TCP connections that are currently active. Even during the peak of the traffic,
the maximum memory consumption was only 16MB.
Figure 4.11. CPU Consumption of the TCP mitigation proxy
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4.4 Managing the threats of the physical CPU contention
at guest-level
This section analyzes the problem of overloads caused by physical CPU
contention in cloud infrastructures, from the perspective of time-critical ap-
plications (such as Virtual Network Functions) running at guest level. In this
particular scenario, overload control solutions to counteract traffic spikes (e.g.,
traffic throttling) are counterproductive against overloads caused by CPU con-
tention. Then I propose a general guest-level solution to protect applications
from overloads also in the case of CPU contention. We reproduced the phe-
nomena on the Clearwater IMS testbed. The results show that the approach
can dynamically adapt the service throughput to the actual system capacity in
both cases of traffic spikes and CPU contention, by guaranteeing at the same
time the IMS latency requirements.
4.4.1 Overview of CPU overloads and CPU utilization metrics
In this section, we expose the problem of overload conditions, how to in-
terpret CPU utilization metrics, and the pitfalls for overload control strategies
when using these metrics.
Ideally, the input traffic for a service should not exceed its engineered ca-
pacity, that is, the maximum amount of input traffic that can be served while
achieving SLAs. SLAs typically require a low probability of failures (such as,
traffic loss or processing errors) and low latency (such as, the time to process
or respond to an individual traffic unit). These requirements are especially de-
manding in the case of the telecom domain [22, 96], where the engineered ca-
pacity is carefully planned at design time, by allocating computing resources
according both to cost considerations, and to the expected reference work-
load: for example, according to the expected rate of busy-hour call attempts
(BHCA) in the case of a VoIP service.
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In the context of IaaS, the designers of VNFs need to plan in advance
the flavor and the expected amount of VMs; for example, a common rule-of-
thumb is to plan for VMs such that each VM consumes at most 90%, or some
other threshold (the engineered level), of the available virtual CPUs under the
reference workload, leaving a small amount of residual capacity as a factor of
safety [3, 97]. Overload conditions saturate the capacity of virtual CPUs; in
these cases, the VNFs should throttle the input traffic (i.e., rate-limit by drop-
ping or rejecting requests) in order to assure that the traffic processed by the
VNFs is within the engineered capacity and can meet the SLAs. This strategy
is further discussed in Section 4.4.2.
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Figure 4.12. CPU utilization metrics under three scenarios.
Physical resource contention is a special case of overload condition, in
which the available capacity of the VNFs is reduced due to competition. How-
ever, the behavior of the system is different than the case of traffic spikes. To
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illustrate the problem, we consider thorough the paper a generic example (in
Figure 4.12) of a VNF with a 1-GHz virtual CPU, deployed on a 2-GHz physi-
cal CPU. Therefore, the CPU quota of the VM is 50% of the physical CPU. In
this example, we assume that the engineered capacity of the VNF uses 75%
of the virtual CPU under the reference workload. From inside the VM (Fig-
ure 4.12, CASE 1), the OS measures the virtual CPU utilization by counting
the virtual CPU cycles that have been spent busy at executing applications
or the OS kernel, and idle at waiting for I/O or without any workload (i.e.,
vCPU utilization = busy/busy+idle). When the input traffic overloads the VNF
(Figure 4.12, CASE 2), the virtual CPU utilization raises to 100% to serve all of
the traffic, and hits the CPU quota at 1 GHz enforced by the hypervisor.
In addition to these metrics, we also consider the CPU steal time metric,
which is also influenced by overload conditions, but can be mistakenly con-
sidered as an indicator of physical CPU contention. We use the name “CPU
steal” in reference to the metric available in Linux and in the KVM and IBM
z/VM hypervisors [98, 99, 100]; an equivalent metric is also available in other
hypervisors such as VMware ESXi, Xen and Microsoft Hyper-V, respectively
under the name “CPU Stolen Time” [101, 102] and “CPU Wait Time Per Dis-
patch” [103]. This metric is provided by hypervisors to VMs, e.g., through hy-
pervisor calls. In all these systems, this metric is technically defined as the
time that a virtual CPU is ready to execute, but it is waiting to execute on the
physical CPU. In other terms, the metric represents the time spent by the vir-
tual CPU on the hypervisor’s scheduling queue. The term “steal” refers to CPU
cycles that a VM spends waiting because either the hypervisor or other VMs
are using the physical CPU (for example, the hypervisor is using CPU cycles
to emulate an I/O device). However, in most situations no CPU cycle is actu-
ally “stolen” from the VM, as the hypervisor still assures the CPU quota for the
VM, and that the VM is eventually scheduled; it would be better understood
as an “involuntary wait” time. For example, in the CASE 2 of Figure 4.12, the
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VM is put on hold after that it consumes its virtual CPU quota; thus, the rest
of the physical CPU time is accounted as “steal time” from the perspective of
the VM, since it is waiting on the scheduling queue. Even in the case of low
workload, it is still possible that a moderate share of CPU time is accounted as
stolen, e.g., when two VMs are sporadically ready to execute at the same time.
Thus, steal time is not a sufficient condition for an overload condition.
The third scenario involves physical CPU contention (Figure 4.12, CASE
3). In this case, we are assuming that 3 VMs with equal priority are scheduled
on the same physical CPU (e.g., because of overcommitment, bug or miscon-
figuration of the infrastructure). The 3 VMs all have a CPU quota set to 1 GHz,
and an engineered capacity that uses 75% of the virtual CPU (as in the pre-
vious two scenarios). Since the total CPU demand (0.75 ·3 GHz) exceeds the
capacity of the physical CPU (2 GHz), the hypervisor equally divides the CPU
bandwidth among the VMs, where each virtual CPU actually gets a slice (fair
share) of 0.66 GHz (i.e., 33% of the physical CPU time). Since the VNF is ready
to execute even after consuming this slice (as the workload exceeds the virtual
CPU capacity), the rest of the physical CPU time (66%) is accounted as steal
time for the VM.
Both in CASE 2 and CASE 3 of Figure 4.12, the VNF is in an overload con-
dition. However, if the VNF is deployed on IaaS, it cannot easily distinguish
between the two cases, since the VNF cannot inspect or control the under-
lying infrastructure. From the perspective of the VNF, only looking for high
virtual CPU consumption or for high CPU steal time does not suffice to dis-
criminate between a traffic spike or physical resource contention. The only
difference between the two cases is that the actual CPU share of the VM (0.66
GHz) is lower than the original CPU quota (1 GHz). Therefore, to address both
these cases, the proposed overload control approach throttles the workload by
adapting to the CPU share (either the quota or the fair share) that is actually
available to the VNF.
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4.4.2 Mitigation strategy
To recover from overload conditions, the long term solution would be
to meet the high demand by scaling up the computing resources, or to re-
lieve physical resource contention by shutting down other services that have
a lower priority or that are hogging the resources. However, these recovery
actions can take several minutes, even in an optimistic case. During this tran-
sient period, VNFs are still exposed to the risk of outages. If the VNFs attempts
to serve much more traffic than their capacity, then each traffic unit will not be
served with enough computing resources to meet SLA requirements. As a re-
sult, the useful throughput of the VNFs (i.e., the rate of successfully processed
traffic) can significantly degrade [104, 45]. Moreover, handling too much traf-
fic at the same time increases the likelihood of VNF software failures such as
failed resource allocations, timeouts, and race conditions [105, 106].
Therefore, long-term recovery actions should combined with short-term
solutions for throttling the traffic, in order to let in the system only the traffic
that can be processed with the currently available capacity [30, 107, 31, 44]. In
the case of traffic spikes in VNFs (the CASE 2 in Figure 4.12), the throttling al-
gorithm should reject part of the traffic, in order to reduce the virtual CPU uti-
lization to the engineered capacity (i.e., to return to the CASE 1 in Figure 4.12).
For example, increase/decrease algorithms are a popular solution to tune the
amount of traffic to be accepted (e.g., the window size for packet flow control)
[108, 109, 110] by decreasing the traffic when the network is overloaded (e.g.,
by a constant or multiplicative factor), or by increasing the traffic otherwise.
This approach has been recently applied in the context of NFV [111], using a
heuristic criterion to tune the traffic that a VNF can serve (capacity):
capacity= processed_traffic
current_vcpu_usage
· reference_vcpu_usage (4.6)
where the first factor estimates the cost per traffic unit (in terms of virtual CPU
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cycles), which is multiplied by the reference virtual CPU budget (i.e., the en-
gineered level) to get the total amount of traffic that can be correctly served.
When the virtual CPU utilization exceeds the engineered level, the heuristic
drops a percentage of the incoming traffic (drop rate):
drop_rate= 100 ·
(
1− capacity
incoming_traffic
)
(4.7)
in which the higher the gap between capacity and the incoming traffic, the
higher the drop rate. The drop rate is periodically updated every few seconds,
and is capped between 0% and 100%. In the case of a traffic spike, the virtual
CPU utilization increases, thus the heuristic lowers the capacity and increases
the drop rate; as result, the virtual CPU utilization settles again around the
engineered level.
Nevertheless, this heuristic may not work correctly in the case of physical
CPU contention. We consider again the example of Section 4.4.1, where the
physical CPU contention leads to the following chain of events (see also the
Figure 4.13):
1. Due to the contention, the hypervisor allocates less physical CPU time
to the VM (0.66 GHz, as in the CASE 3 in Figure 4.12). As a result, the
current workload saturates the VNF, and the virtual CPU utilization be-
comes 100% (i.e., the ratio busy/busy+idle), which is higher than the refer-
ence CPU utilization (e.g., 75% in the example).
2. The heuristic increases the drop rate to reduce the load. The virtual CPU
utilization then settles around 75%. It is important to note that the 75%
of the virtual CPU is equal to 0.66 ·75%= 0.5 GHz of physical CPU. The
residual 25% of the virtual CPU (i.e., 0.66 ·25% = 0.166 GHz of physical
CPU) becomes idle.
3. Due to the physical CPU contention, the hypervisor opportunistically
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schedules these idle CPU cycles for the demand of other VMs or pro-
cesses on the host machine. Thus, the virtual CPU is not anymore idle,
and virtual CPU utilization becomes again 100%.
4. The heuristic further increases the drop rate, to reduce again the virtual
CPU utilization down to 75% (as in the previous step 2). The virtual CPU
now consumes 0.66 ·75% ·75%= 0.375 GHz of physical CPU.
5. The hypervisor preempts again the idle CPU time. The heuristic enters
a vicious cycle where the virtual CPU utilization is reduced more and
more.
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Figure 4.13. Chain of events caused by physical CPU contention.
The vicious cycle is caused by the work-conserving behavior of hypervi-
sor schedulers (i.e., they ensure that the CPU is never idle if there is at least
one VM ready for execution) [112, 113, 114]. The VNF yields to the hypervi-
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sor part of its virtual CPU time, by dropping part of the incoming traffic. In
the case of physical CPU contention, in which several VMs or processes on
the host machine are demanding more CPU time than the available physical
CPU, the hypervisor scheduler uses the freed CPU cycles to meet these de-
mands. Then, the virtual CPU shrinks again and causes the vicious cycle. In
general, the feedback control loop approach (not limited to the heuristics of
eqs. (4.6) and (4.7), but any other control rule based on virtual CPU utiliza-
tion) can be vulnerable to physical CPU contention, due to the distortion of
virtual CPU utilization metrics.
To address the problem of overload control under physical CPU contention,
we extend the feedback control loop approach with an additional mechanism
to break the vicious cycle. The design goal of the approach is to assure that the
VNF gets no less than its fair share of the physical CPU even under contention
(e.g., 0.66 GHz in the previous example); and, at the same time, that the vir-
tual CPU utilization inside the VNF settles at the engineered level (e.g., 75% of
the virtual CPU in the example). This condition is showed in Figure 4.14: the
available virtual CPU under physical contention reduces to 0.66 GHz; since
this virtual CPU is not sufficient to reach the original engineered level (0.75
GHz), we still apply the feedback control loop to reduce the virtual CPU uti-
lization down to 75% of the available virtual CPU (i.e., 0.5 GHz of physical
CPU). This is the same condition of the step 3 of the vicious cycle; we break
the cycle at this point, using the following approach.
We introduce a mechanism into the VNF to avoid the preemption of idle
virtual CPU cycles under physical CPU contention. This effect can be obtained
in different ways depending on the guest OS used in the VNF. The most generic
approach is to add a placeholder process (one process per virtual CPU of the
VM) that actively consumes virtual CPU cycles to avoid preemption by the
hypervisor; it executes a CPU-bound task for the sake of consuming virtual
CPU cycles. The placeholder process should execute at minimal priority on
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Figure 4.14. CPU utilization metrics under physical contention, with virtual CPU
placeholder.
the guest OS of the VNF; moreover, it should be configured as a batch task in
order not to take away any virtual CPU cycle from the VNF software (i.e., the
placeholder only uses the virtual CPU when the VNF is not executing). For
example, this effect can be obtained on Linux by setting the SCHED_BATCH or
SCHED_IDLE scheduler class for the task [115], and on Windows by setting an
idle trigger [116]. Yet another approach is to configure or to modify the idle
loop of the guest OS [117]. As a result, the placeholder takes the place of the
idle time of the virtual CPU, as in Figure 4.14: at any given time, the virtual
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CPU is either executing the VNF or the placeholder process, and the virtual
CPU consumes the residual physical CPU cycles granted by the hypervisor
scheduler. This behavior breaks the vicious cycle, since the hypervisor cannot
preempt the virtual CPU cycles that are freed by the feedback control loop.
Moreover, settling the virtual CPU utilization at the engineered level provides
a “margin of safety" (e.g., to compensate for small random workload fluctua-
tions) as in the case of the original engineered level, since the VNF software
can preempt the placeholder process at anytime.
We enable the placeholder process on the condition that the CPU steal
time spans all the physical CPU not used by the VM. This condition occurs
when the VNF consumes its available virtual CPU, either because of a traffic
spike that saturates the virtual CPU quota (CASE 2 in Figure 4.12), or because
of physical CPU contention that reduces the available virtual CPU (CASE 3 in
Figure 4.12). We apply the same solution regardless of which one of these two
cases is causing the saturation of the virtual CPU. The solution still applies the
feedback control loop, but excluding the CPU consumption of the placeholder
process from the virtual CPU utilization metric, that is:
vCPU utilization=
busyall−busyplaceholder
busyall+ idle
. (4.8)
For example, in Figure 4.14, the virtual CPU utilization is 75% if the utiliza-
tion of the placeholder is not included. The virtual CPU utilization metric (i.e.,
the dependent variable controlled by the feedback loop) is thus not influenced
by the presence of the placeholder process (which only opportunistically con-
sumes the idle virtual CPU cycles). Therefore, in the case of traffic spikes, the
proposed feedback control loop still works as in previous work [111]. In the
case of physical CPU contention, the placeholder avoids the interaction be-
tween the feedback control loop (that frees the virtual CPU) and the hypervi-
sor (that preempts the freed virtual CPU), thus allowing the feedback control
loop to work correctly in this additional case.
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Since CPU contention is a relatively rare event, we designed the place-
holder process not to execute when there cannot be physical CPU contention.
Since CPU steal time is a necessary condition (even if not sufficient, as dis-
cussed in Section 4.4.1) for physical CPU contention, the placeholder process
remains idle if there is no accounted CPU steal time (CASE 1 in Figure 4.12).
The placeholder process becomes active (i.e., it consumes virtual CPU cycles)
once it detects that the CPU steal time has peaked (which denotes that the
virtual CPU is trying to exceed a limit), and runs for a fixed amount of time
Tactive. Once Tactive has elapsed, the placeholder process returns in the idle
state. Then, the placeholder process inspects again the CPU steal time to
check whether the VNF is not anymore saturating its virtual CPU. If there is
still either a traffic spike or CPU contention, the placeholder process contin-
ues to be active, repeating the check later. The Tactive should be chosen ac-
cording to the expected duration of the recovery actions, such as for scaling
out, hot-fixing a bug, or migrating the services to another host machine. Even-
tually, the virtual CPU executes again on a non-overloaded physical CPU.
4.4.3 Experimental evaluation
We performed experiments on an NFV IMS system to reproduce the prob-
lem of physical CPU contention, and to evaluate the effectiveness of over-
load control solutions, including both the basic and the enhanced feedback
control-based approaches.
We executed experiments on a testbed based on the Clearwater open-
source IMS system [46].
Our experimental testbed runs these components on three Dell PowerEdge
servers, equipped with two 8-core 2.6 GHz Intel Xeon CPUs, connected by two
Gigabit Ethernet networks, and attached to a Fiber Channel storage area net-
work. The physical machines are managed using OpenStack (version Juno)
and the KVM hypervisor (based on the Linux kernel version 3.10). Each Clear-
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water service is replicated in two VMs, configured with 1 virtual CPU and 4GB
of RAM; each VM runs one VNF instance, and Ubuntu Linux 14.04 as guest
OS. We use the SIPp workload generator [94] to exercise the IMS with register
and call-setup requests. The IMS workload reproduces the typical message
flows between subscribers, according to the SIP protocol. These flows are also
adopted to test the Clearwater IMS, and the complete scenario used in our
tests is available online [118].
Therefore, our workload reproduces a stressful traffic profile of 5 BHCA
(i.e., Busy Hour Call Attempt) per user and 60 BHRA (i.e., Busy Hour Regis-
tration Attempt) per user. We regulate the workload intensity by varying the
number of subscribers in order to reach the engineered level of the system.
The engineered capacity of the experimental testbed is 40,000 subscribers,
which can perform on average 660 registration requests and 55 call requests
per second without SLA violations. The engineered level for the virtual CPU
utilization is 75% under this reference workload.
We reproduce physical CPU contention by pinning an additional VM run-
ning a CPU-bound workload on the same physical CPU core running a critical
component of the IMS. CPU pinning and CPU scheduling affinities are often
considered best-practies to optimize latency-sensitive application [119]. In-
deed, the scheduling affinities, can optimize memory access times in NUMA
architectures and reduce the hypervisor scheduling latency. However those
practies can end to increase the risk of physical CPU contention due to non
optimal load balancing in case of vCPU oversubscription. Moreover setting
manual CPU affinities increase the risk of contention problems due to mis-
configuration by the infrastructure administrators. [120]. Thus the scenario
we reproduce is representative of typical issues occurring in time-critical ap-
plication running in virtual environments.
In the following, we present and discuss two groups of experiments. In the
first group (Section 4.4.4), we consider a basic overload control solution, using
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the feedback control loop and heuristic that was introduced in Section 4.4.2.
On this configuration, we reproduce overload conditions both due to traffic
spikes and to physical CPU contention, in order to show that the feedback
control loop can degenerate because of the vicious cycle. In the second group
of experiments (Section 4.4.5), we enhance the feedback control loop with the
mechanism for breaking the vicious cycle, and reproduce the same overload
conditions to evaluate the proposed solution.
During the following failure scenarios, we analyze the registration attempts
and the registration throughput. These quantities include both new users and
retries of failed attempts. After a failure, a user starts a back-off period (uni-
form between 0 and 2 min) before making a new registration attempt.
4.4.4 Basic feedback control-based overload control
We deployed the basic feedback overload control in the two Clearwater
VMs running the IMS P-CSCF network function, since this component is a ca-
pacity bottleneck for our deployment configuration. In a first experiment we
reproduce a workload surge which is 2.5 times higher than the engineered ca-
pacity level. The experiment lasts 15 minutes and it consists of two phases: in
the first phase, we gradually introduce 40,000 subscribers and wait until the
workload reaches the steady state at engineered level; in the second phase,
starting at second 450s, we introduce in the system 100,000 additional sub-
scribers, causing a workload surge and the overload of P-CSCF components.
Figure 4.15 shows the registration request rate and throughput of the IMS
during the experiment. Before the overload phase, the average registration
throughput at steady state is 624 registrations per second; during the overload
phase the average throughput is 634 registrations per second, with an aver-
age CPU utilization of 73.32%. The basic overload control solution described
in Section 4.4.2 (eqs. (4.6) and (4.7)) has been able to successfully protect the
IMS system: it avoids service failures for already-established sessions, by cor-
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rectly estimating the capacity of the system and rejecting the requests in ex-
cess with respect to the capacity, which would saturate resources and cause
failures both for the initial and the new subscribers. As a result, the through-
put is constant despite the traffic spike.
Figure 4.15. Performance of the IMS registrations during a 2.5x traffic spike (450-
900s), using the basic feedback control loop.
In a second experiment, we consider again the basic control loop ap-
proach, and we reproduce an overload condition due to physical CPU con-
tention. To this purpose, we pin the virtual CPU of the VMs running the IMS
P-CSCF functions to a separate, reserved physical CPU. Then, we introduce a
new VM running a CPU-bound workload (generated using the cpuburn tool 1 )
and we pin its virtual CPU to the same physical CPU core of the IMS P-CSCF, in
order to cause the contention. The experiment lasts 15 minutes (900s) and it is
organized in three phases: during the first 5 minutes we generate a workload
up to the engineered level; then, we activate the CPU-bound workload in the
second VM to cause physical CPU contention for additional 5 minutes; finally,
in the last 5 minutes of the experiment, we simulate the resolution of the CPU
contention (e.g., as an effect of scaling out or migration of VMs to relieve the
contention), by unpinning the virtual CPU of the CPU-bound VM. Figure 4.16
shows the registration request rate and the throughput of the system during
the experiment with CPU contention.
1The tool can be downloaded at https://patrickmn.com/projects/cpuburn/
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Figure 4.16. Performance of the IMS registrations during CPU contention (300-
600s), using the basic feedback control loop.
Figure 4.17. Virtual CPU utilization during CPU contention (300-600s), using the
basic feedback control loop.
During the contention in the middle of the experiment, the throughput is
affected by a high variability, which is a symptom that the basic control loop is
unable to stabilize the load at the actual capacity of the VM. By looking at the
virtual CPU usage during the experiment, showed in Figure 4.17, we noticed
that as soon as we inject the CPU contention at min 5, the virtual CPU uti-
lization raises to 100% since the hypervisor scheduler preempts physical CPU
time from the virtual CPU, causing involuntary waits of the VM. As a conse-
quence, the basic feedback control loop starts dropping part of incoming re-
quests to reduce the virtual CPU utilization to the reference value of 75%. The
Clearwater VM reduces its load and enters the vicious loop, since the CPU-
bound VM takes advantage of the idle CPU time freed by the overload control
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mechanism. As a result, the virtual CPU utilization gradually drops down to
about 20%. We also observed that the virtual CPU utilization saturates again
to 100% after a period of approximately 10 seconds. This pattern is repeated
periodically until the physical CPU contention is removed at minute 10, caus-
ing the high variability of CPU utilization. We found that this behavior is a
side effect of the overload control mechanism, which sporadically resets the
drop rate to 0 when the virtual CPU utilization becomes much lower than the
reference value, thus admitting a high amount of input traffic and saturating
again the virtual CPU. This high variability has a strong impact on the service
latency, as further discussed in the next subsection.
4.4.5 Enhanced feedback control-based overload control
We deployed the enhanced feedback overload control strategy, and vali-
dated it by reproducing the same scenarios described in the previous subsec-
tion.
In the first experiment, after 450s, we caused a workload surge 2.5 times
higher than the engineered capacity, and we evaluate the throughput of the
IMS. As shown in Figure 4.18, in absence of physical CPU contention, the en-
hanced approach exhibits the same performance of the basic approach. Be-
fore the overload phase, the average registration throughput at steady state
is 620 registrations per second while; during the overload phase the average
throughput is 645 registrations per second with an average virtual CPU uti-
lization of 74.55%. Therefore, our extension to the feedback loop does not
cause any negative effect in the case of traffic spikes.
In the second experiment, we reproduced the scenario with physical CPU
contention, under the same conditions of Section 4.4.4. The time series in
Figure 4.19 shows the throughput of the IMS. At 5 min, we enable the CPU-
bound VM. The enhanced heuristic described in Section 4.4.2 timely detected
a change in the system capacity. The during the contention the average through-
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Figure 4.18. Performance of the IMS registrations during a 2.5x workload spike
(450-900s), using the enhanced feedback control enabled.
put is reduced by about 32% and the system is able to complete 380 registra-
tion per second, with an average CPU consumption of 68%. Moreover, the
throughput during the contention is more stable than the case with the basic
feedback approach: since the placeholder process avoids the preemption of
CPU time from the hypervisor, since the reference value of CPU utilization is
not anymore a “moving target”, thus avoiding the variations of the heuristic
for capacity estimation.
If CPU contention is not properly managed, the system accepts more re-
quests that it can actually handle with the available CPU. However, many of
the accepted requests are served with a poor quality of service, and many oth-
ers fail in the middle of a session (therefore, the “goodput” of the system is
actually lower than the throughput). A key goal of service providers is to en-
sure an appropriate QoS for users that are admitted into the system, and to
gracefully handle users that cannot be admitted (e.g., to notify an overload
status without starting a session that cannot be assured).
It is worth noting that the throughput only appears to be higher without
our enhanced control. Figure 4.21 compares the IMS throughput under CPU
contention, with the basic and the enhanced feedback control loop. By look-
ing at the throughput of the two approaches, the differences of the throughput
are not significant. However, the variance of the enhanced control approach is
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Figure 4.19. Performance of the IMS registrations during CPU contention (300-
600s), using the enhanced feedback control loop.
Figure 4.20. Virtual CPU utilization during CPU contention (300-600s), using the
enhanced feedback control enabled.
slightly lower, for both the registration workload (Figure 4.21a) and call-setup
workload (Figure 4.21b).
(a) Registration Throughput (b) Call-setup Throughput
Figure 4.21. IMS Registration (4.21a) and IMS Call-setup (4.21b) throughput dur-
ing CPU contention, with the basic and the enhanced feedback control.
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A more accurate capacity estimation has also a strong positive impact on
the quality of service perceived by the IMS users in terms of service latency,
which is a key performance indicator considered by SLAs for telecommunica-
tion systems. In particular, SLAs typically mandate latency requirements for
the average (e.g., the median latency) and the worst cases (e.g., the 90th per-
centile of latency) [22]. In Figure 4.22, we compare the CDFs of the latency
of the successful registrations, respectively under the basic and the enhanced
overload control strategies, during the contention phase of the experiments.
The median latency (i.e., the average case, represented by the 50th-percentile
of the CDF) is up to 118.6ms for the basic approach. In the worst case, repre-
sented by the 90th-percentile, the IMS with the basic approach exhibits laten-
cies up to 369.9ms. These latency values are close, and even exceed the SLA
objectives typically adopted for IMS systems (e.g., 150ms and 250ms respec-
tively for the 50th and 90th percentiles) [5, 121]. Instead, the proposed ap-
proach significantly improves the quality of service, by achieving a service la-
tency up to 28.5ms and 106.2ms respectively for the 50th and 90th percentiles.
Figure 4.22. Cumulative distribution of registration latency, with the basic (red
line) and the enhanced (blue line) feedback control.
4.4.6 Performance evaluation under different contention patterns
In the following, we present another group of experiments, to assess the
performance of the basic and the enhanced feedback loops in response to dif-
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ferent CPU contention patterns. The purpose of this analysis is to identify
which scenarios will benefit the most from the proposed solution. We vary the
intensity of the CPU contention, and the duration of CPU contention periods.
• Intensity. The intensity of contention is determined by the amount
of competing virtual machines that are deployed on the same physical
machine. The intensity of contention can impact on the variability of
CPU utilization by the virtual machine (e.g., the amplitude of swings in
CPU utilization metrics), with side effects on the overload control loops.
Therefore, we performed additional experiments where we vary the in-
tensity of contention between 1x (i.e., 50% available CPU time due to
the CPU contention with one additional VM) and 3x (i.e., 25% available
CPU time due to the CPU contention with three other VMs).
• Duration. The duration of contention is determined by the overlap over
time of CPU-bound activities on several virtual machines. If contention
periods are long (e.g., due to a configuration error with persistent ef-
fects), then the overload control algorithm can eventually converge to
a stable condition; instead, if contention periods are short and inter-
mittent (e.g., due to transient high CPU usage by background tasks in
the VMs), the overload control algorithm may exhibit unstable behav-
ior and poor performance. Therefore, in addition to the previous ex-
periments (where the CPU contention is constant for a relatively long
period), we perform more experiments with short, periodic contention
periods, where the periods last respectively for 5s and 10s.
We applied these conditions both on the basic and on the enhanced feed-
back loop solutions. Each experiment lasts 15 minutes (900s) and it is orga-
nized in three phases: during the first 5 minutes we generate a workload up
to the engineered level; then, for 5 more minutes, we force physical CPU con-
tention (either periodically or constantly, depending on the duration as dis-
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(a) IMS Latency
(b) IMS Throughput
Figure 4.23. IMS Throughput (4.23b) and IMS Latency (4.23a) under different
CPU contention patterns, with the basic and the enhanced feedback control.
cussed above), by activating the CPU-bound workload in the additional VMs
(between one and three VMs, depending on the intensity as discussed above);
finally, in the last 5 minutes of the experiment, we simulate the resolution of
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the CPU contention, by unpinning the virtual CPU of the CPU-bound VMs, as
an effect of scaling out or migration of VMs to relieve the contention.
Figure 4.23 summarizes the performance of the IMS (latency and through-
put) during these additional scenarios, with both the basic (blue boxes) and
the enhanced (red boxes) feedback loop strategies. When the contention pe-
riod is very short (5s) there are no significant differences between the two so-
lutions. This scenario represents the most unfavourable condition for our en-
hanced solution, since the control feedback is based on a sampling window of
5 seconds, and thus the proposed solution is unable to provide any improve-
ment. The percentage of requests violating the latency goal of 250ms is 9.6%
for the basic approach and 9.8% with the other. In both cases, the SLA goal of
90%-percentile is not violated.
Starting with a period of 10s up to constant patterns, the enhanced feed-
back loop shows a significant improvement of latency compared to the basic
feedback loop. In the case of a periodic contention of 10s, only the 0.1% of
the requests experiences latency higher than 250ms, in contrast to the basic
approach in which the 20.1% of the requests were served with a latency higher
than the requirement, thus violating the SLA goal.
With a constant contention pattern at 1x intensity, the average available
CPU capacity is reduced to 50%, since the CPU is contended between 2 VMs.
As discussed in the previous section, there are no significant differences in
the IMS throughput between the two approaches, but the proposed approach
shows significant reduction in latency: by using the enhanced approach the
percentage of requests violating the 90%-percentile requirement decreases
from 17.9% to 0.2%.
This behavior is exacerbated by higher contention intensities (2x, 3x). In
these cases, the basic overload control solution is unable to accurately esti-
mate the available CPU capacity, due to the wider swings in CPU utilization
metrics; therefore, it degenerates by accepting more requests than the actual
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capacity of the IMS system. The result is a significant increase of IMS latency
in the basic feedback loop. With a constant CPU contention at 2x intensity,
the available CPU capacity of the VNF is reduced to 33% on average, since the
CPU time is contended with 2 additional VMs. In this case, more than the 42%
of the requests violates the 90%-percentile latency requirement, in contrast to
the 8.1%, when using the enhanced approach. With CPU contention at 3x in-
tensity, with only 25% of the CPU time is available to the VNF. By using the en-
hanced solution, the number of requests violating the 90%-percentile latency
requirement drops from 48% to 9%, thus achieving the SLA requirement.
It is interesting to note that, under the higher intensities of CPU con-
tention, the average throughput with the basic approach is higher than the
enhanced approach (e.g., 380 req/s versus 270 req/s in the case of 2x inten-
sity). The (apparently) better throughput comes at the cost of a poor quality
of service, since the IMS is processing a volume of requests which is higher
than its capacity. The result is that the IMS takes a long time to serve many of
these requests, thus violating the latency requirement. Instead, the enhanced
solution only lets in the IMS the subset of requests than can be processed
with adequate quality of service: this is a desirable effect of throttling, which
is intended to drop the traffic in excess to the system. This result points out
that the proposed feedback solution is best suited for those applications (such
as the IMS, and NFV in general) where latency and throughput are both im-
portant SLA goals. If the proposed solution is not deployed, the throttling
mechanism degenerates and lets in the IMS too much traffic, thus favoring
throughput at the expense of latency.
Chapter5
Managing the overload of stateful
multi-tier network functions
Modern multi-tier architectures achieve massive scalability by balancing
the load on thousand stateless application nodes, and leveraging highly dis-
tributed NoSQL datastores as persistence tier, in order to achieve the required
levels of performance and reliability. This Chapter revisits overload problems
that affect these architectures, and it proposes DRACO, a novel autonomic so-
lution that addresses overloads arising in any tier of the system. When over-
load occurs in the inner tiers, overload control must be aware of the depen-
dencies between the application and the storage resources, and, in the case of
unbalanced overload conditions (such as hot-spot resources), it should only
drop application requests that map to resources on overloaded storage nodes.
DRACO is a fine-grained admission control solution, which has been designed
to dynamically discover such resource dependencies and assess the current
capacity of individual nodes, in order to mitigate overloads while achieving
a high resource utilization. DRACO is evaluated on two case studies: a Dis-
tributed Fileserver, which is very sensitive to problems of data consistency and
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hot-spots, and a virtualized IP Multimedia Subsystem, which requires carrier-
grade levels of performance and availability.
5.1 The problem of unbalanced overloads in multi-tier
systems
At a higher level, a modern multi-tier architecture is composed by two
kinds of tiers: stateless, such as application ones, and stateful, such as data-
stores. A typical interaction between these elements is showed in Figure 5.1.
Clients interact with the system by issuing service requests towards one of the
nodes of the application tier. These service requests are uniformly distributed
to application nodes according to a load balancing mechanism (e.g., round-
robin selection from a pool of IP addresses, using DNS). Since application
nodes are stateless, they will forward data requests to a datastore cluster in
order to retrieve data needed to process the service request; moreover, they
will issue data requests to update the datastore to reflect the state of the dis-
tributed application. For example, the storage tier can be used to hold data
records for user authentication, billing, tracking long-term sessions, etc., and
even to hold large binary blobs, such as for multimedia and file sharing appli-
cations.
In general, a single service request causes one or more data requests to the
datastore tier, either sequentially or concurrently. Differently from the service
requests, data requests need to be directed to the specific storage nodes that
manage the resources required by the user. The location of resources is typ-
ically identified using consistent hashing [34], which computes a lightweight,
deterministic function to map a service request to storage nodes. With this
approach, the dependencies among application nodes and datastore nodes
are dynamically generated based on the content of service requests from the
clients and, thus, they are not known a-priori.
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Figure 5.1. The typical multi-cluster architecture
An overload condition occurs when a system has insufficient resources to
serve the incoming requests. This condition happens when the current work-
load hits a bottleneck in one of its components, which limits the capacity of
the whole system. In principle, overloads can be avoided with an appropriate
capacity planning, by identifying the potential bottlenecks and characterizing
their performance. Unfortunately, in a multi-tier architecture, a bottleneck
can dynamically shift from a tier to another according to changes in workload
patterns. Moreover, especially in large-scale systems, new (and unexpected)
bottlenecks can arise from specific nodes of a tier due to server heterogeneity,
software bugs, maintenance tasks and misconfigurations. As result, in prac-
tice, preventing overloads in such systems is a challenging task.
A bottleneck in the application tier is the easiest case to manage. Appli-
cation nodes are stateless and independent from each other by design, and
requests can be dispatched to any node without restrictions. These properties
make possible a uniform load balancing among nodes in the tier. Therefore,
an overload occurs when the available capacity of the tier as a whole is not
enough to serve the incoming requests. In this case, the existing solutions,
such as throttling and scaling out the tier, can efficiently mitigate the overload.
Throttling performed in the application tier can reject requests that go beyond
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the available capacity of the tier, while admitted requests can be served at peak
performance; moreover, since nodes are independent from each other, scal-
ing out the tier is relatively easy and, thanks to load balancing, leads to an
increase of the available capacity of the tier as a whole. In a similar way, the
communication between two or more stateless application tiers follows the
same principles.
Overload conditions are more challenging when caused by the interaction
between stateless and stateful tiers. Indeed, when some components of the
application architecture are stateful (e.g., a datastore), a typical problem is
represented by hot-spots: when users access a subset of resources much more
frequently than others (for example, multimedia content or application that
suddenly becomes popular on the web), the load on the stateful nodes that
manage these resources will be higher. When the load on this subset of nodes
exceeds their capacity, the application services also become prone to failures.
A symptom of an hot-spot is a highly skewed distribution of the requests to the
nodes. Figure 5.2 shows an example of skewed request distribution, causing
an overload in a group of storage nodes.
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Figure 5.2. Distribution of the request rate and the CPU utilization across the
data-tier nodes
The effect of the hot-spot is an unbalanced load among the storage nodes.
This problem is difficult to address since it is not simply caused by the con-
figuration of the nodes or by the scale of the tier, but it depends on which
services and resources are requested by the external users. Since the workload
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profile is not known a-priori, it is difficult to manage the capacity of the state-
ful tier. Due to the hot-spot problem, every stateful node can be a potential
bottleneck for the entire cluster, even when there is available capacity in the
remaining nodes.
Figure 5.3 shows two external clients that make requests to the application
tier. In order to complete these requests, the two application nodes (i.e., S1
and S4) need to access the same resource in the node M3. Thus, the node M3
has less resources available for subsequent requests, and can become over-
loaded more quickly than the other nodes in the storage tier.
Redistributing the resources and scaling the stateful tiers can alleviate the
problem as a long-term solution, but they are not effective in the short-term.
Since these strategies require time and resources (e.g., scaling-out with new
virtual machines can take up to several minutes [23, 24]), the system can re-
main prone to service failures (e.g., SLA violations) for a significant amount of
time. Therefore, in order to mitigate the unbalanced overload in the short
term, the system needs to reduce the volume of requests for hot-spot re-
sources.
However, the storage tier cannot simply discard the requests, since this
would either violate data consistency (e.g., ACID properties for transactions
that span over several storage nodes); or, it would trigger a complex and waste-
ful roll-back of the transaction. For example, in Figure 5.3 the Client 2 makes
a service request that updates resources in the datastore nodes M3 and M4.
If the node M3 rejects the update while the node M4 completes the update,
the datastore may be left in an inconsistent state. For the above reasons, an
overload control mechanism should prevent the hot-spot by rejecting service
requests at the application tier, before they enter into the multi-tier system.
It is worth noting that even if the load from external users is balanced,
overloads can still affect the stateful nodes. The use of hashing schemes (such
as consistent hashing) ensures a uniform distribution of the resources among
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Figure 5.3. The overload scenario caused by hot-spot resources
the datastore nodes. However, these nodes may have different configurations;
they can be deployed on physical machines with different characteristics; or
they can be shared among several services from different tenants. As a conse-
quence, the nodes of the distributed datastore can exhibit a different capacity.
This means that some nodes can become overloaded more quickly than the
others.
Figure 5.4 shows an example in which the requests to the stateful tier are
balanced across the M1, M2 and M3 nodes. However, if the node M3 is mis-
configured with less capacity than the other nodes, it becomes overloaded,
and the application tier experiences service failures even though the nodes
M1 and M2 still have available capacity.
As discussed for the case of hot-spots, redistributing resources can miti-
gate the problem only on the long-term, since resource migration is an slow
operation. In order to avoid service failures, the load on the storage tier should
not be balanced uniformly across nodes, but an overload control mechanism
should block new requests that would put more load on the saturated storage
nodes. Moreover, to maintain the consistency of the datastore, the overload
control should reject requests at the application tier, before they enter into
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Figure 5.4. The overload scenario caused by unequal node configurations.
the system.
Finally, even when the nodes have the same resources, overloads can still
occur due to variations of the capacity. These variations can be due to overlaps
with background or periodic tasks, or due to resource “hogs” caused by soft-
ware bugs. The effect of this scenario is that a storage node can be temporarily
overloaded even though it has enough resources to handle the requests.
Figure 5.5 shows an example of this problem. In this scenario, all nodes
are configured with the same capacity and the datastore is configured to dis-
tributed resources uniformly across its nodes. The requests from the two
clients are balanced across the nodes. However, part of the requests on behalf
of the Client 2 fail since the node M3 is temporary overloaded by a competing
task that consumes its available capacity.
Since these capacity variations are unexpected, the multi-tier system should
be able to dynamically adapt. However, even in this scenario redistributing the
resources cannot solve the problem in the short term. Therefore, an overload
control should mitigate the unbalanced overload by rejecting user requests
before they reach the overloaded storage node.
In summary, overload control should meet the following requirements in
order to mitigate unbalanced overloads in all of the scenarios discussed above:
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Figure 5.5. The overload scenario caused by a transient reduced capacity
1. The capacity of storage nodes must be dynamically monitored, to detect
hot-spots and transient capacity variations that may be caused by re-
source hogs.
2. The application requests in excess should be rejected before they are pro-
cessed by the application, in order not to perform partial operations on
the storage tier, which would violate data consistency or cause a waste of
resources.
3. In order to use resources efficiently, the overload control solution should
only reject service requests that access to overloaded storage nodes. In-
stead, service requests that do not access these nodes should be allowed in
the system.
5.2 The proposed solution
The proposed solution is an enhanced overload control approach that is
aware of data dependencies in multi-tier systems. The main novel feature of
DRACO is the ability to mitigate unbalanced overload conditions that arise
from a subset of nodes in the storage tier, and at the same time to achieve a
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high utilization of the non-overloaded parts of the storage tier. The driving
idea to achieve this goal is to opportunistically take advantage of knowledge
of the application logic, in order to map service requests to the storage nodes
needed to serve that request; and to only admit into the system a selected
subset of service requests, by rejecting the ones that would attempt to get data
from storage nodes that are already overloaded.
The solution adopts a distributed architecture, in order to scale well with
the size of the tiers. Moreover, the solution is designed to filter traffic at the
application tier; that is, it avoids to filter the traffic at the storage tier, which
would cause inconsistencies between the application and storage tiers, and
among the nodes of the storage tier. In the following, we present the solu-
tion by introducing its general architecture and components (Figure 5.6). In
sections 5.3 and 5.4, we will discuss more in detail the implementation of this
general architecture in the context of two case studies.
The main part of the solution is the Distributed Memory block. This com-
ponent keeps track of the location of resources across storage nodes, and of
the residual capacity of the storage nodes. The residual capacity is an esti-
mate of the number of data requests that a storage node can serve, which is
computed by algorithm (described more in detail later) according to the num-
ber of data requests previously served by storage nodes, and the correspond-
ing utilization of critical resources (in particular, the CPU consumption) when
these data requests were served. This information is periodically collected by
a Capacity Monitoring component distributed on the nodes of the datastore
cluster.
The residual capacity gives indication of how many data requests are in ex-
cess in the storage tier, and it used to identify which service requests should be
rejected at the application tier by the Distributed Admission Control compo-
nent. The admission decision is done by inspecting the service request, and by
checking if there is enough residual capacity in the current application node
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and in all of the storage nodes that are needed to process the service request.
In summary, the components of the DRACO are:
• The Distributed Memory, which stores the information about the loca-
tion of resources and the residual capacity of the storage nodes.
• The Distributed Admission Control, which acts as a tunnel between the
users and the application processes, and which decides if an incoming
service request should be accepted or rejected, according to the infor-
mation produced by a Resource Location Discovery phase aimed to iden-
tify the required datastore resources and their locations.
• The Distributed Capacity Monitoring, which is in charge of collecting
resource consumption metrics from storage nodes. These metrics are
used to dynamically estimate the residual capacity of storage nodes
(e.g., in terms of number of read/write accesses that can be performed
on the storage node).
5.2.1 The Distributed Memory component
The Distributed Memory is an additional datastore that handles the fol-
lowing two kinds of data (Figure 5.6):
• Node Capacity Status: The residual capacity of every storage node, in
terms of number of requests the node can accept in current time win-
dow. This information is periodically updated by the Capacity Monitor-
ing block. At the beginning of a new time window, this block estimates
the residual capacity according to the load of the storage nodes in the
previous windows. Moreover, this information is read by the Admission
Control block in order to check if there is enough available capacity in
the required nodes, and will be also decremented upon the acceptance
of a service request.
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Figure 5.6. Overview of DRACO architecture (red blocks).
• Data Location Cache: The location of the resources accessed by service
requests. This information is added, retrieved and updated during the
Resource Location Discovery phase of the Distributed Admission Con-
trol.
The Distributed Memory stores this information as key-value pairs. The
value for the Node Capacity data is an integer representing the number of re-
quests that can be served by the storage node in the current time window. This
number is associated to a key that represents the node (e.g., using its host-
name or IP address). The Data Location Cache stores a key-value pair for each
service request. The value of an entry is an array of integer values, with one
element for each storage node. These values represent the number of requests
to perform on each storage node in order to process the service request. This
information is associated with a key, which is application-dependent, that
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represents a specific service request.
We leverage existing datastore technology for this part of the overload con-
trol solution. In particular, using a distributed datastore (such as Memcached)
allows the solution to handle data from a large number of nodes in the clus-
ters, and simplifies the collection and the distribution of capacity monitoring
data across the nodes. The Distributed Memory can be deployed either on any
of the existing tiers, or in a dedicated tier, for example by introducing a stand
alone group of VMs running the datastore. To avoid performance bottlenecks
and to achieve scalability, we create a fixed pool of persistent connections be-
tween each node and the Distributed Memory. Thus, the number of connec-
tions to the cache only grows linearly with the amount of nodes in the cluster.
The solution avoids any direct communication between pairs of nodes in the
tiers. Moreover, the capacity of the Distributed Memory can scale linearly with
the number of its nodes, by splitting the information about resources across
several nodes. In section 5.5 we discuss in detail about the capacity planning
and scalability of the Distributed Memory.
The Distributed Memory block stores the location of the resources ac-
cessed by previous service requests. The use of such distributed cache im-
proves the performance of the overload control solution, especially in the case
of hot-spot resources, since the information on hot-spot resources (which are
repeatedly accessed in a short amount of time) is likely already cached by this
block. However, this cache is not always necessary. When the application can
retrieve the location of resources solely from the request message (e.g., by ap-
plying consistent hashing on the fields of a service request), the Admission
Control block can perform the same computation and find the location of the
resources. In this way, caching resource locations is not strictly needed. It
is useful to still have a distributed cache if the application needs to access to
a large number of resources per service request, and when the computation
is expensive. On the contrary, if service requests involve only few resources
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and there are no hot-spot resources (e.g., as in the case of an IMS scenario
discussed in Section 5.4), it can be advantageous to compute the location di-
rectly, avoiding to use the cache.
5.2.2 The Distributed Capacity Monitoring
The Distributed Capacity Monitoring component (Figure 5.7) is deployed
within every storage node, and it is in charge of dynamically estimating the
available capacity of the storage node. This block will collect information
about resource utilization from the OS or from the hypervisor on the storage
node. In particular, we focus the discussion on the case where each moni-
toring block estimates the capacity of a storage nodes with respect to its CPU
utilization (i.e., in terms of percentage of busy CPU cycles per unit of time),
since the CPU is often the resource most prone to become a bottleneck [122]:
for example, in the context of NFV [123], industry-standard COTS CPUs are
adopted to process high volumes of network traffic. In addition to CPU uti-
lization, the proposed approach can be easily generalized to be applied on
memory, network, and disk bandwidth utilization.
Distributed Memory
performed periodically 
by each storage node
Storage Node
Capacity Monitoring
capacity info
update
Datastore node
Figure 5.7. The Capacity Monitoring block
This block periodically estimates the residual capacity, in terms of num-
ber of requests that the node can serve in a time window. The time window is
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meant to be short (e.g., in the order of few seconds), in order to quickly adapt
the solution to variations of the load condition of the storage node. In addition
to the CPU utilization, the Capacity Monitoring block uses the number of data
requests that have been served by the storage node in the last time window,
which is recorded by the Admission Control block when a service request is
accepted. The residual capacity is estimated according to the following equa-
tion:
residual capacity= # data requests
CPUused%
·CPUreference% . (5.1)
In this equation, the first factor estimates the cost of an individual data
request, in terms of CPU cycles, by dividing the number of data requests in
the last time window with the average CPU utilization during the same period.
This approximation is simple but still accurate enough in the context of multi-
tier systems, since the complexity of an individual data request is relatively low
in the case modern datastores. In the case of older types of storage systems
(e.g., based on a traditional SQL DBMS), the cost of an individual data request
would depend on the types of SQL queries performed by the application, and
it should be estimated using a more complex cost model [124]. Since we focus
this work on modern datastores, we leave out of scope the analysis of other
cost models.
The second factor in the equation represents the reference CPU budget,
beyond which the storage node is considered saturated. This value represents
a “factor of safety” for CPU utilization, within which the storage server is de-
signed to perform well (e.g., without performance disruptions), while leaving
a small amount of residual CPU bandwidth to handle occasional load fluctu-
ations. We base our algorithm around a reference value since setting a refer-
ence is a frequent practice among system administrators (e.g., for monitoring
and troubleshooting purposes). For example, when testing the capacity of a
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system (e.g., by imposing a representative workload), the system administra-
tor may want to check that the CPU utilization is below a reference value (e.g.,
90%), and that a good quality of service can be provided under these condi-
tions.
In Eqn. (5.1), these two factors are multiplied to get the total amount of
data requests that can be correctly served by the storage node. The capacity
value is then updated in the distributed cache. The Algorithm4 is executed
periodically within the Capacity Monitoring block deployed in each datastore
node. It updates the available capacity budget for the local storage node in
the Distributed Memory component, according to the request rate and the
corresponding CPU utilization measured during the last period.
Algorithm 4: Capacity Monitoring algorithm
// Periodically on the "node capacity status" block
begin
// Get CPU utilization and the number of storage
requests // that arrived since the previous update
C PUi = get_CPU_utilization(nodei )
#r equest si = get_served_storage_requests(nodei )
// Compute the capacity budget of the storage node
(see eq. (5.1))
C (i ) = compute_capacity_budget(nodei ,C PUi ,#r equest si )
node_capacity_status.update_capacity_budget(nodei , C(i))
5.2.3 The Distributed Admission Control
Figure 5.8 shows the internal organization of the Distributed Admission
Control. A Data Location Discovery step is performed when a service request
is received by the application tier, and before it is processed by the applica-
tion tier. This component produces a list of the resources needed by an ap-
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plication request, and of the storage nodes where these resources are located.
The Admission Logic uses this list in the decision process. The implementa-
tion of this component depends on the specific application, and it is meant to
be tailored by the application programmer. From a general point of view, the
Data Location Discovery parses service requests by looking for information
that uniquely identifies the data needed by service requests, such as the user
identity, the session identifier, the name of the resource(s) involved in the ser-
vice request (such as, the identifier of application records, or the name of mul-
timedia content), the type of operation to be performed on the resource, and
similar information. This information is then used to query the distributed
cache to find the location of resources in the storage tier. The main assump-
tion of the proposed solution is that service requests hold such information,
and that it allows to establish the mapping with storage nodes. This assump-
tion holds in practice for many applications: since application nodes are state-
less, the service request message includes all the information needed by the
application logic to access the datastore. We will further discuss this aspect in
the context of two case studies (sections 5.3 and 5.4).
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Figure 5.8. The Admission Control process
If the service request involves resources that may have already been ac-
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cessed in the past (such as, a request to retrieve a resource for the user), the
Data Location Discovery block checks if there is an entry for the service re-
quest in a distributed cache, and retrieves information on the resources from
there. It is possible that an entry does not exist yet (for example, the service re-
quest comes from a new user); in this case, the Data Location Discovery block
uses the information extracted from the request to find the location of the re-
quired resources in the storage tier, then it updates the cache.
More specifically, in the case of a storage tier with a NoSQL datastore, the
Data Location Discovery block computes the same hash function that is com-
puted by the application to resolve the location of a resource on the datastore,
according to the technique of consistent hashing (as previously discussed in
section 5.1). In other cases, the Data Location Discovery block obtains the lo-
cation of a resource by retrieving resource metadata. In Figure 5.9, we refer to
this computation as the location function, which maps the information from
a request (i.e., the “key” of an entry in the datastore) with the corresponding
resource. The figure provides two examples of location functions in the con-
text of the two case studies that will be presented in sections 5.3 and 5.4. In
the first example, the resource is represented by a file block; the key is rep-
resented by the combination of the filename and of the numeric identifier of
the block; and the output of the function is the storage node with the block.
In the second example, the resource is represented by a record with user in-
formation; the key is represented by a combination of the username and the
SIP URI; and the output is the storage node with the record. In general, the
output of this computation is the set of nodes that need to be accessed by the
service request (e.g., several nodes in the case that a service request involves
several resources, or that the resources are replicated across several nodes for
fault-tolerance).
One approach to implement the Data Location Discovery block is to inte-
grate it in the Admission Control block, and to execute it in a separate process
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Figure 5.9. The location function maps application requests to their location in
the storage tier
that tunnels the traffic from clients to the application tier. In this case, appli-
cation developers have to supply a small module (to be linked with the data lo-
cation discovery block before deployment) that implements the location func-
tion. The Data Location Discovery block calls this module, by passing in in-
put a incoming service request. In the module, the developers provide code
to parse the service request and to extract information for mapping the re-
quest to storage nodes. Then, the information is used to query the distributed
cache, or to compute the location function as discussed above. Since both the
information extraction and the location function are simple operations, their
overhead on service requests is expected to be negligible; this overhead is fur-
ther analyzed in the experimental part of this work. An alternate approach is
to implement these blocks as a library linked to the application, in the case
that developers need to further reduce this overhead and are willing to intro-
duce small modifications to their application. The application would call the
library API when there is an incoming service request, by querying the Dis-
tributed Admission Control component to check if the request should be pro-
cessed; since the application already computes the location function to locate
the resources, it is possible to reuse the results of this computation in the Ad-
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mission Control and Data Location Discovery blocks.
The Algorithm 5 describes the steps performed by the Distributed Admis-
sion Control on every service request, before it is processed by the applica-
tion, in cooperation with the other components. The Admission Control block
first checks if local application nodes has enough available capacity to process
the service request. The local capacity budget Cl ocal is computed similarly to
the Distributed Capacity Monitoring discussed in Section 5.1 for the storage
nodes: The available capacity is periodically estimated according Eqn. 5.1 by
considering the number of service requests accepted in the last period and the
CPU consumption of the local node. Differently from the Capacity Monitoring
in storage tier, this information is not exported to the other nodes through the
Distributed Memory component, since it will be used to prevent the overload
of the local application node.
If the local node has enough available capacity to process the incoming
service request, the Algorithm 5 gets the location array L(1..n) from the Data
Location Discovery process: the i -th component of this array represents the
number of data requests that will be directed to the storage node i . Moreover,
the Admission Control block retrieves from the distributed cache the capacity
array C (1..n): the i -th element of this array represents the number of data re-
quests that the storage node i can accept in the current time window without
saturating its capacity. This node capacity status is updated on the distributed
cache by the Capacity Monitoring block.
The algorithm compares, for each storage node i , the residual capacity of
the node with the number of data requests for the node. When L(i )> 0, there
is at least one resource on the i -th data node required to complete the current
service request. If there is at least one storage node in which the residual ca-
pacity is not sufficient to process the data requests (i.e., C (i )−L(i ) < 0), the
algorithm decides to reject the service request. Otherwise, it will accept the
service request. In this case, the Algorithm 5 discounts the number of data
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requests towards node i from the residual capacity of the node i , and it will
update the residual capacity of the node in the distributed cache. Moreover,
the algorithm updates the residual capacity for the local application node to
reserve a capacity budget (i.e., 1) for the accepted service request. Since in
many applications, some service requests may require more capacity than the
others, the algorithm can be easily adapted to account a weighed local budget
capacity, by subtracting to Cl ocal a quantity Br eqt y pe > 0, depending on the re-
quest type. For example, in the IMS case study, a SIP Register service request
requires less application tier CPU resources than a SIP Invite request. More-
over, this approach is robust due to a control loop feedback: if the estimated
capacity is lower (or greater) than the actual capacity of the node, the CPU
consumption of the node will decrease (or increase) respectively. When this
happens, in the next control period the estimated capacity will be higher (or
lower) according to the heuristic in eq. (5.1) to compensate the error of the
previous control period.
5.3 The Distributed Fileserver Case Study
We analyze the overload control solution in the context of a distributed
file system service, based on the Memcached datastore. This service includes
three tiers: a frontend tier, based on HAproxy, which performs load balancing
among applications nodes; an application tier, composed of a cluster of web
application nodes, which accepts users’ requests, and translates them to re-
quests towards the data tier; the datastore tier, which is composed of a pool
of Memcached nodes. Figure 5.10 shows how these tiers are related. The web
application has been developed by us in order to reflect the architecture of
a proprietary distributed fileserver from our industrial project partners, and
to reproduce the unbalanced overload scenarios that they experienced in the
context of this application.
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Algorithm 5: Admission control algorithm
// Part 1: Arrival of an incoming service request (to
be accepted or rejected)
Data: app_r equest : the incoming service request
begin
// Check if there is enough capacity on the current
node
Clocal = get_local_capacity_budget()
if Clocal = 0 then
REJECT the request
M = get_metadata(app_r equest )
L = data_location_cache.get_location(M)
foreach storage node i in L do
// Get the current capacity of the i-th node
C (i ) = node_capacity_status.get_capacity_budget(nodei )
// Check if there is enough capacity to perform
// L(i ) accesses to the storage node
if C (i )−L(i )< 0 then
REJECT the request
// Decrement the capacity budget for all storage
nodes
foreach storage node i in L do
node_capacity_status.update_capacity_budget(nodei , C(i) -
L(i))
// Decrement the local capacity budget
update_local_capacity_budget(Cl ocal - 1)
ACCEPT the request
The user can request 4 types of operations on the system: (1) registration,
(2) upload of a file, (3) download of a file, and (4) de-registration. Clients can
select any instance of the HAproxy by querying a DNS server (bind9 in our
5.3. THE DISTRIBUTED FILESERVER CASE STUDY 133
S1
S2
S3
S4
M3
Fileserver Cluster Memcached Pool
S4
M4
M1
Jmeter
client 
requests
H1
H2
H3
HAproxy LB
Round robin
node selection
Direct (by hash)
node selection
M2
Figure 5.10. The architecture of the distributed fileserver casestudy
setup). The application cluster is stateless: no session state is stored in the web
server. For example, it is possible to send a register request to the server S1 and
an upload request to the server S2. The stateless web application stores the
data in the nodes of Memcached key-value store cluster. The four operations
that a client can perform are implemented in a C application based on libevent
library to perform asynchronous networking communication with the clients,
and libmemcached to communicate with the datastore tier.
The register is a “set” operation that stores user account information on
a Memcached server (such as the username and the last access time) un-
der a specific key, while the unregister is a “delete” operation that removes
the key-value pair from the server. To perform an upload request, the client
sends a file through an HTTP POST request message that includes the “user-
name”, the “filename” and the file content. Then, the application divides
the file content into chunks of equal size (1MB) and stores the chunks into
data nodes. The application uses the string key "username$filename$1"
to identify the first chunk, and the string "username$filename$n" to iden-
tify the chunk n. Then, sequentially for each chunk, the application com-
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putes the hash on the key MD5("username$filename$1) to identify the loca-
tion of a data node and send the chunk to that node. Finally, the application
uses the key "username$filename" to store the entire file size, which is ob-
tained from the Content-Length HTTP header. The upload function takes
the username, the filename and the content as parameters, and uses a set-
Multi function to store an array of key-value pairs on the servers. To serve
a download request, the application uses the same strategy: it extracts the
“username” and the “filename” from the request message. Then, it gets the
current file length by querying the key "username$filename", and generates
the hash for ("username$filename$1" . . . "username$filename$n"). The
download uses a getMulti function to concurrently retrieve multiple items
from the Memcached server pool.
5.3.1 Integration of the overload control solution
To apply the overload control solution in the Distributed Fileserver, we
deploy two agents within the nodes of the case study:
• A capacity monitoring agent: This component runs within the datas-
tore nodes, and implements the Distributed Capacity Monitoring com-
ponent of the solution (see Section 5.2.2).
• An admission control agent: This component runs within the appli-
cation nodes and implements the Distributed Admission Control Algo-
rithm (see Algorithm 5, Section 5.2.3) with a specialized Resource Loca-
tion Discovery phase).
The Overload Control Distributed Memory can be implemented either by a
new set of standalone nodes, or by the existing tiers. During the evaluation of
the solution, we will use the first option (i.e., the distributed cache is managed
by a standalone pool of Memcached nodes) in order to assess the overhead
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of this component (as further discussed in Section 5.5). As we discussed in
Section 5.2, the Data Location block implementation depends upon the ap-
plication type. For this case study (see Figure 5.11), the location algorithm
parses the HTTP Request message, to extract information such as the request
type, the Username, the Filename and the content-length. Then, with this in-
formation it builds the same group of hash-keys generated by the application
(e.g., user8, user8$file.txt, user8$file.txt$chunk1, . . . ).
Using the request identifier (i.e., username for the register and the unreg-
ister operations, and username$filename for the upload and the download
operations) the agent performs a lookup to retrieve the location of all the re-
sources required to complete the user request. In case of cache miss, the agent
finds these location by applying the hash function (MD5) to all the hash-keys,
and creates a new entry in the Data Location Cache. Once the locations have
been computed, it returns to the Admission Control Algorithm an array with
the number of storage requests that are going to be performed on each stor-
age node (denoted with L in the previous section). In this context, the i − th
position of the array represents the number of file blocks to be accessed on
the storage node i .
5.3.2 Experimental evaluation
The experimental testbed infrastructure consists of eight host machines
SUPERMICRO (high density), equipped with two 8-Core 3.3Ghz Intel XEON
CPUs (32 logic cores in total), 128GB RAM, two 500GB SATA HDD, four 1-Gbps
Intel Ethernet NICs, and a NetApp Network Storage Array equipped with 32TB
of storage space and 4GB of storage SSD cache. The hosts are connected to
three 1-Gbps Ethernet network switches, designed for management, storage
and VM network traffic respectively. The infrastructure is managed by Open-
Stack Mitaka and the hosts are equipped with VMware ESXi 6.0 hypervisor.
In order to reproduce representative unbalanced overload conditions, we
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Figure 5.11. Resource Location Discovery logic for the distributed fileserver case
study
setup a testbed with a large number of nodes. In detail, we scaled both the
application and the datastore tiers up to 50 independent VMs. The application
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Table 5.1. Configuration of the experimental Fileserver testbed
Node Type # of nodes VM configuration
HAProxy (fron-
tend)
10 1 vCPU, 4GB RAM, 20 GB HDD
Fileserver (appli-
cation)
50 1 vCPU, 4 GB RAM, 20 GB HDD
Memcached
(datastore)
50 1 vCPU, 2 GB RAM, 20 GB HDD
JMeter runner
(workload genera-
tor)
10 4 vCPU, 8 GB RAM, 40 GB HDD
JMeter master
(workload con-
troller)
1 4 vCPU, 16 GB RAM, 40 GB HDD,
Total 140 154 vCPU, 436 GB RAM, 2.6 TB HDD
requests are balanced to the application nodes by a front-end tier composed
by 10 VMs running the HAProxy load balancer. The details of the resources
allocated to each VM is given in Table 5.1, in which we indicate the number of
node replicas in each tier, and the resources of the VM (virtual CPU, memory
and storage).
The workload is generated by Apache JMeter through a distributed setup.
To this purpose, we deployed ten additional VMs that submit requests to the
system, and a controller VM to set-up the experiment and collect performance
data, such as application latency, throughput and service failures. Each JMe-
ter VM submits requests on a specific load balancer instance, at frontend tier.
The requests are then balanced in round-robin fashion to the nodes of the
application tier. The JMeter scenario reproduces a set of clients that initially
register on the system, and that then perform a session of uploads and down-
loads of random files. The size of a file is randomly distributed between 8Kb
and 4Mb. With the above configuration, the system can handle up to 700 con-
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current users with no failures, corresponding to an average throughput of 175
uploads/s and 175 downloads/s.
Each experiment lasts 9 minutes and it is divided in three phases, as ex-
emplified in Figure 5.12:
1. Initial ramp-up phase (2 min): In this phase, we gradually introduce
new clients in the system, up to the engineered capacity, and we wait
for a steady state. We then use this condition as starting point for the
evaluation.
2. Hot-spot generation (5 min): In this phase, we vary the workload by in-
troducing groups of users accessing shared file resources, with the pur-
pose of generating an hot-spot in the storage tier.
3. Final ramp-down phase (2 min): In this phase, we gradually reduce the
unbalanced workload until we remove the effects of phase 2.
time
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engineered level
Hotspot workload 
up to 10x or 100x 
causing overload
Final ramp-down to 
the engineered 
level
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3
start
Injecting
hotspots
Removing
hotspots end
Figure 5.12. Phases of the evaluation experiments.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed overload control solution,
we designed an experiment plan with unbalanced overload conditions in the
storage tier caused by the client workload (hot-spots). Initially, we apply a
workload with a balanced request mix at a rate within the engineered capac-
ity, in which each user requests its own random files; then, we apply a skewed
workload, in which groups of users repeatedly access a shared set of files, at
a rate 4, 10 and 100 times the engineered capacity. We reproduced the same
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scenarios with and without our solution, by varying the number of hot-spot
clients injected during the phase 2 between 0 (i.e., balanced workload) and
70K (100x skewed workload). We performed in total 8 experiments, lasting
9 min each. We first present the balanced case at the engineered capacity;
then, we discuss the effect of the hot-spot injection, with reference to a repre-
sentative case at 10x the engineered capacity; finally, we compare the overall
throughput across all the experiments, with and without our solution enabled.
The experiment with the workload at the engineered level (1x) confirms
that our solution works as expected under normal conditions (Figure 5.13a),
since the upload throughput of the system is still at the engineered capacity,
and no failures are experienced. Similarly, the throughput of the downloads at
steady state is the same of uploads (Figure 5.13b), with no failures.
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Figure 5.13. Fileserver performance at the engineered capacity (1x)
To reproduce the hotspot scenario, we consider a workload that exceeds
the engineered capacity, by applying workload surges about 10x the engi-
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neered level. To this purpose we add a new group of users accessing shared
files, causing hot-spots on 7 out of 50 datastore nodes. Without the overload
control solution, both the upload (Figure 5.14a) and download (Figure 5.14b)
throughput degrade significantly. Since the two operations are not indepen-
dent, the download throughput is degraded because of both the growth of the
latency and failures of upload operations. At the 10x overload, the hotspot
users (min 4-7) also affect normal users. During the initial peak, the system
tries to process all hot-spot requests, but failing at completing most of them.
This behavior is also visible by looking at the CPU utilization of a hotspot node
during a 10x overload (Figure 5.14c). In the case of no overload control, the
CPU utilization pathologically saturates to 100%; instead, with overload con-
trol, the CPU utilization stabilizes at 85%, which is the target CPU utilization
that we configured in the Admission Control Agent to avoid excessive resource
competition. Finally, after the hot-spot phase, the CPU utilization reduces as
expected in both cases (min 7-9). Our solution ensures that the performance
matches the engineered level both for the upload throughput and download
throughput. By preventing the admission of the requests that are going to
require hot-spot datastore nodes, the overload control solution leaves the sys-
tem with enough available capacity to serve all the other requests, even during
a workload surge of ten times the capacity. We found that the system exhibits
the same behavior under the other levels of skewed workload surges (i.e., from
4x to 100x).
In the Figure 5.15, we summarize all of the results obtained with the File-
server case-study. When the overload mitigation is not deployed (without mit-
igation), the fileserver exhibits a noticeable throughput degradation. In the
worst case (100x overload), the throughput reduces to about one half on av-
erage for uploads, and to about one third on average for downloads. Instead,
with the overload mitigation enabled, the throughput is always close (i.e., it is
higher than 90%) to the engineered throughput, even in the worst case of the
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Figure 5.14. Fileserver performance at 10x engineered capacity
100x overload condition.
5.4 The IP Multimedia Subsystem Case Study
The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is an architectural framework for de-
livering multimedia services over internet. The current vision of telecom op-
erators, and the focus of research, is to adopt cloud computing technologies
in the telecommunication industry [125]. As a matter of fact, many telco oper-
ators are migrating and upgrading their systems to benefit from the emerging
cloud paradigm. The key enabling technology for the cloud is virtualization:
the telecom operators are thus attempting to virtualize the IMS infrastructure
to optimize costs, performance and management of services and equipments.
In this section, we will analyze the impact of unbalanced overload condi-
tions in the context of the Clearwater project [46]. We deployed the proposed
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Figure 5.15. Summary of the results on the distributed fileserver, with and with-
out the overload control solution
solution on top of the Clearwater IMS. In particular, we consider the commu-
nication between Sprout (S-CSCF) and Memcached nodes since reflects the
view of a modern multi-tier architecture. The IMS users (subscribers) access
its own data (e.g., authentication and billing information), and user requests
are balanced across the datastore tier through consistent hashing. Thus, there
are no hot-spot resources in this case study; instead, unbalanced overloads
can be caused by resource hogs and by configuration issues.
Since Clearwater is an implementation of IMS, its architecture (showed in
Figure 5.16) reflects the traditional IMS architecture, but with notable differ-
ences. In particular, all components are horizontally scalable using simple,
stateless load-balancing; most long-lived state is stored in back-end nodes
using storage technologies such as Cassandra [126]; interfaces between the
various components use connection pooling.
The Clearwater IMS includes a throttling mechanism, which rejects re-
quests in excess to avoid overloading a node [127, 128]. It uses a token bucket
to control the rate of requests that a node is allowed to process. The token re-
placement rate is tuned by measuring the latency for processing requests, and
by comparing, every twenty requests, this measure with a configured latency
target. Clearwater adopts a variation of the algorithm proposed by Welsh and
Culler [31], by using a smoothed mean latency to compare with the latency tar-
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Figure 5.16. Clearwater IMS Components
get. In our analysis, the experiments labeled as “without mitigation” represent
a standard Clearwater installation inclusive of this overload control mecha-
nism, which we compare to our resource-aware overload control solution.
5.4.1 Integration of the overload control solution
To apply the overload control solution, we deploy two agents:
• A capacity monitoring agent: This component runs within the Mem-
cached nodes and implements the Distributed Capacity Monitoring com-
ponent of the solution.
• An admission control agent: This component runs within the SPROUT
nodes and implements both the Distributed Admission Control Algo-
rithm (see Algorithm 5 with a Resource Location Discovery phase spe-
cialized for the IMS. This agent can also run on BONO VMs (i.e., along
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with the P-CSCF function).
The Overload Control Distributed Memory has been implemented by a
new set of standalone nodes (i.e., a standalone pool of Memcached nodes).
This separation allows us to assess the overhead of this component (Section 5.5).
The Resource Location Discovery block implements the procedure de-
scribed in the flowchart of Figure 5.17. It extracts the user identity
(e.g., 50012345@example.com) and, in case of an INVITE message, the iden-
tity of the callee (e.g., 5001244@example.com) from the incoming SIP mes-
sage.
Figure 5.17. Resource Location Discovery logic for the IMS case study
On each user request, the Sprout node accesses the information about the
user session in JSON format, by performing a single query on Memcached,
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using the key reg\\user_identity (e.g., reg\\50012345@example.com).
The Resource Location Discovery phase finds the right Memcached node
by applying the hash function to the key (e.g., MD5(reg\\50012345@example.com)).
The Data Location Cache here is optional, as the hash function can be com-
puted on every request with a small overhead. The Distributed Admission
Control Algorithm takes into account the type of the request and rejects only
the first REGISTER and the first INVITE messages, in order to give priority to
the already established SIP sessions. Since the data location can be deter-
mined solely from the request, we use the Distributed Memoory component
to store and update only the capacity information about the datastore nodes.
After an REGISTER or an INVITE message, the IMS and the user agent gen-
erate a flow of messages that is pre-defined by the SIP protocol. We can rely
on the fact that the SIP protocol generates the same flow of messages (e.g.,
INVITE - 100 Trying - 180 Ringing - 200 OK - ACK). In all these messages,
the server will request the same key and thus the same node. Thus, in order to
accept a first INVITE message, we check to have enough capacity to satisfy all
the subsequent messages. We apply the admission control at the first message
of a SIP session, in order to avoid user-perceived errors in the middle of a SIP
session.
5.4.2 Experimental evaluation
The experimental testbed consists of the same hardware and software of
the previous case study (Section 5.3). In order to reproduce unbalanced over-
load conditions, we defined a large IMS installation, which includes 50 nodes
in the Sprout application tier, 50 nodes in the Memcached storage tier, and 10
nodes in the Bono front-end tier. We configured the number of nodes for the
other components of Clearwater proportionally to the capacity of the Sprout,
Bono, and Memcached nodes, such that to have an average CPU utilization
in each component of 80% and no request failures. Moreover, we deployed a
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Table 5.2. Configuration of the experimental IMS testbed
Node Type (component) # of nodes VM configuration
Bono (P-CSCF) 10 1 vCPU, 4GB RAM, 20 GB HDD
Sprout (S-CSCF + astaire) 50 1 vCPU, 2 GB RAM, 20 GB HDD
Memcached (DB) 50 1 vCPU, 2 GB RAM, 20 GB HDD
Homer (MMtel XDBMS) 10 1 vCPU, 8 GB RAM, 40 GB HDD
Homestead (HSS) 10 4 vCPU, 8 GB RAM, 40 GB HDD,
SIPp (workload gen.) 10 1 vCPU, 2 GB RAM, 20 GB HDD
Total 140 170 vCPU, 420 GB RAM, 2.2 TB
HDD
cluster of 10 SIPp workload generators to generate the IMS workload to the
system. The workload reproduces the typical message flows between sub-
scribers, according to the SIP protocol. These flows are also adopted to test
the Clearwater IMS, and the complete scenario used in our tests is available
online [118]. The details of the resources allocated to each VM are given in
Table 5.2, in which we indicate the number of node replicas (one VM for each
replica) in each tier, and the resources of the VM (vCPU, memory, storage).
Each SIPp instance generates SIP traffic towards a specific P-CSCF in-
stance. The IMS scenario reproduced with the workload generator is the fol-
lowing: every subscriber registers and periodically renews the registration ev-
ery minute, on average. After a successful registration, a subscriber attempts
to set up a call with another subscriber (with 16% of probability) or remains
idle until the next registration renewal (with 84% of probability). The call hold
time is, by default, 60 seconds. Thus, the scenario reproduces 60 Busy Hour
Register Attempts (BHRA) per user and 5 Busy Hour Call Attempts (BHCA) per
user. Then, we vary the number of subscribers to soliciting the system with
different levels of load. As this work has been conducted in the context of
a R&D cooperation with an industrial organization (a major vendor of cloud
and NFV products and services), we tuned the parameters of this workload
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(e.g., the rate of busy-hour call attempts) according to the experience of our
industrial partner with overload conditions [80].
With the above workload configuration, our deployment can handle up to
110k subscribers without exhibiting any failure, corresponding to 1,833 REG-
ISTER/s and 153 INVITE/s on average, with an average CPU consumption
(measured in the application nodes) of 80%. In the following, we refer to this
load level as engineered capacity.
Each experiment lasts 16 minutes and it is divided in three phases, as ex-
emplified in Figure 5.18:
1. Initial ramp-up phase (4 min): In this phase, we gradually introduce
new subscribers in the system, up to the engineered capacity and we
wait for a steady state. We then use this condition as a starting point for
the evaluation.
2. Workload surge (6 min): In this phase, we vary the number of sub-
scribers, e.g. to reproduce a workload surge (up to 10 or 100 times the
engineered capacity) causing the overload of the application tier.
3. Hog injection (6 min): In this phase, we inject in a subset of storage
nodes a busy wait in the Memcached request handling code to simulate
unbalanced overload conditions, such as reduced capacity due to back-
ground tasks (hogs) or an incorrect capacity planning or configuration
of a subset of machines.
time
Initial ramp-up to the 
engineered level
Workload surge up 
to 10x or 100x 
causing overload
Reduced capacity 
in the storage tier 
during overload
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3
start
Injecting
Overload
Injecting
Hogs end
Figure 5.18. Phases of the evaluation experiments.
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To evaluate the performance of the overload control solution we designed
an experiment plan to evaluate the following scenarios:
• During a normal workload (at 70% and 100% the engineered capacity),
we emulate reduced capacity in 5 out of 50 storage nodes causing un-
balanced load. We evaluate the ability of the solution to prevent request
failures in the storage tier due to the CPU saturation of the slower Mem-
cached nodes, ensuring the success of user session requiring the faster
storage nodes.
• During a workload surge (at 4, 10 and 100 times the engineered capac-
ity), we emulate reduced capacity in 5 out of 50 storage nodes causing
unbalanced load. We evaluate the ability of the solution to protect ap-
plication nodes from the workload surge by discarding the excess of the
requests and, at the same time, ensuring the engineered throughput de-
spite the load unbalance in the storage tier.
We reproduced these scenarios with and without our solution enabled by
varying the number of subscribers in phase 2 of the experiment according to
the above 5 levels, ranging from 0.7x (i.e., 80k subscribers) to 100x (i.e., 11M
subscribers). Thus, we performed in total 10 experiments, lasting 16 min each.
We first present the details of a representative experiment of the first group
(at 1x load), discussing the effect of the unbalanced load on the storage; then,
we discuss the combined effect of a workload surge, by presenting the detail of
a representative experiment of the second group (at 10x load); then, we com-
pare the overall IMS throughput through all the experiments, with and without
our solution enabled.
Figures 5.19a and 5.19b show the performance of the IMS system for reg-
istration requests, with a workload at the engineered level (i.e., 1x), by gener-
ating 110k subscribers during the first 2 minutes.
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During the steady state of phase 2 (starting at minute 4), after all the sub-
scribers performed an initial registration, the system is able to process 1800
registrations/s and 150 call-setup/s on average. The throughput with the over-
load control solution matches the throughput without the solution: thus, the
solution does not interfere with the system under normal conditions.
When the hog is enabled (at minute 10), the registration throughput de-
creases by 12% (both in the cases with and without mitigation). Our solution
detects and discards these requests before they enter in the system, avoiding
the overload of the storage tier. Instead, without our solution, most of the re-
quests experience failures due to the overloaded storage nodes. This situation
should be avoided since it might cause consistency issues across the storage
tier (i.e., some storage nodes are updated while other storage nodes cannot
be updated). Thus, the overload control solution can prevent these consis-
tency issues. The effect of overload mitigation is more evident in Figure 5.19c,
showing the CPU consumption with and without the overload control enabled
of one of the five Memcached nodes slowed down during the experiment (i.e.,
with a CPU hog injected in the memcached code). The traffic throttling per-
formed in the application tier prevents the saturation of the CPU in the Mem-
cached instances with the CPU hog enabled, and stabilizes the average CPU
utilization at 75%.
In Figures 5.20a and 5.20b, we show the performance of the IMS under
a workload that exceeds the engineered capacity. After the first phase, at
minute 4, we generate the workload surge by about 10 times the engineered
level, by provisioning up to 1.1M subscribers. Without mitigation, the regis-
tration throughput is very low (about 20 registrations per second), while none
of the registered users is able to make a call. With the mitigation enabled, the
throughput is always above the engineered throughput, for both registration
and call-setup operations.
It is worth noting that during the intermediate phase of the experiment
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Figure 5.19. Timeseries IMS at the engeenered capacity
(workload surge), the registration throughput is even higher than the engi-
neered level (close to 2000 regs/s). In this phase, most of the new registra-
tion requests are discarded. However, re-registration requests of the previous
sessions require fewer datastore requests than new registrations (a new reg-
istration requires 6 database accesses, a renewal requires only two accesses).
Since the load on the datastore is lower, our solution can accept some new
users. With the hog injected, our solution quickly discards requests that re-
quire the slower nodes, and it is able to preserve the registration throughput
for the already registered requests (Figure 5.20a).
Even in the last phase of the experiment (during the hog injection) the
throughput is still above the engineered level. The reason is that each ses-
sion makes some requests to several storage nodes, and if any of these storage
nodes is overloaded, the entire session is not admitted. In this way, we are able
to prevent the requests to the overloaded storage nodes, and also to prevent
5.4. THE IP MULTIMEDIA SUBSYSTEM CASE STUDY 151
some of the requests to the non-overloaded storage nodes. For this reason, it
could be possible that some storage nodes become less loaded, so other ses-
sions (i.e., the ones that do not use the overloaded nodes) are gradually ad-
mitted in place of the rejected ones. The CPU utilization of Memcached node
(shown in Figures 5.20c) is stable at 50% during the phase 2. At beginning
of phase 3, the hog slows down also all the requests currently being served
by the node. This causes the saturation of the CPU for 1 minute, both with
and without the solution. During this time, with our solution, the admission
control does not accept any new request that requires resources on the over-
loaded Memcached nodes. Thus, when this effect ends, part of the requests
are admitted to the system and the CPU utilization becomes stable at 80%.
Vice versa, without our solution, the application nodes keep submitting new
requests to the storage nodes causing the exhaustion of the socket pool, since
all the requests are waiting for a response. This, in turn, causes some applica-
tion nodes to fail.
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Figure 5.20. Timeseries IMS at 10x the engeenered capacity
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In the Figure 5.21 we summarize the performance of the IMS, for all the
considered load levels, both with and without the overload control solution
during the phase 3. The Figures 5.21a and 5.21b provide the average through-
put for the IMS registrations and the IMS call-setups, respectively. The er-
ror bars indicate the standard deviation of the throughput. Without workload
surges (i.e., levels 0.7x-1x) there are no significant differences between the ex-
periments with and without mitigation. However, as discussed before for the
1x case, without mitigation the excess of the requests exhibit failures at the
storage tier, while with mitigation enabled, those requests are discarded by the
admission control, before they enter in the system, thus preventing the over-
load of the storage tier nodes. Under high load conditions (i.e., 4x, 10x, 100x
load levels), the Clearwater IMS components experience software crashes due
to resource exhaustion (especially in the frontend Bono nodes). When we en-
able the overload control solution, the IMS does not experience any crash, and
it can reach a stable throughput above the 90% of the engineered capacity.
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Figure 5.21. Summary of the results with and without the overload control solu-
tion, during unbalanced datastore overload
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5.5 Overhead and scalability of the overload control so-
lution
The solution requires an agent deployed on each VM of the application tier
to perform a fine-grained admission control. This agent has a small memory
footprint (less than 10 MB during the 100x overload case). The request inspec-
tion and admission requires some CPU resources, depending on the volume
of the incoming load; in our experiments, the CPU overhead was always small
(less than 8% during the 100x overload case).
In the overload control solution, we used a distributed memory as a shared
memory among all the nodes, to store the state of the overload control algo-
rithm and the state of the nodes. Since the solution is meant to be deployed
in systems with a big number of nodes in each cluster (with 10k nodes in pro-
duction systems of our industrial partners), we designed this component to
achieve a high scalability and low overhead.
The complexity of the control algorithm does not depend on the number
of application nodes, nor storage nodes. Indeed, the algorithm finds the lo-
cation of the required nodes by extracting the metadata from the user request
message. Then it retrieves the current available capacity of these nodes to
check if there is enough available capacity in all of them. If the request can be
accepted, then it updates the capacity. Therefore, the number of operations
does not increase by scaling up the storage tier.
In detail, for the Clearwater case study, the solution requires to query (get)
the capacity of:
• 4 storage nodes for an initial registration
• 2 storage nodes for a registration renewal
• 1 storage node for a call setup
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In Figure 5.22 we show the average CPU consumption of the control agent
component across all experiments in the IMS case study.
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Figure 5.22. Overhead of the mitigation agent at each load level for the IMS Case
Study
For the Distributed Fileserver case study, the number of accesses depends
on the number of blocks in which the file is divided, but is the same for an up-
load and a download request. According to our test configuration, the average
number of blocks per file is 8. In detail:
• 1 set request to update the Distributed Memory and B requests accord-
ing to the locations of the file blocks in case of a upload request.
• 1 get request to check the Distributed Memory and B requests according
to the locations of the file blocks in case of a download request.
In Figure 5.23 we show the average CPU consumption of the control agent
component during all of the analyzed cases, for the Distributed Fileserver sce-
narios.
To achieve scalability, the Distributed Memory creates a fixed pool of per-
sistent connections per-node; thus, the number of connections to the Dis-
tributed Memory only grows linearly with the amount of nodes in the clus-
ter. We avoid any direct communication between pairs of nodes in the tiers.
5.5. OVERHEAD AND SCALABILITY OF THE OVERLOAD CONTROL SOLUTION 155
1x 4x 10x 100x
Load levels
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
CP
U 
O
ve
rh
ea
d 
(%
)
Figure 5.23. Overhead of the mitigation agent at each hotspot scenario for the
Fileserver Case Study
Moreover, the Distributed Memory is based on a separate Memcached datas-
tore. In this way, the Distributed Memory can benefit from the scalability fea-
tures of Memcached. In particular, Memcached can distribute the datastore
of the Distributed Memory across several nodes, thus increasing the capac-
ity and avoiding that the Distributed Memory becomes a performance bot-
tleneck. Moreover, Memcached can transparently manage the distribution of
key-value pairs, and can optimize the memory consumption of the datastore.
5.5.1 Sizing the Distributed Memory
In this Section we derive analytic relationships to describe the expected
load on the Distributed Memory component at different scales. The objective
of this analysis is to obtain a practical formula to quantify the number of nodes
to deploy, in the worst case.
Let it TA , the engineered throughput of a single application node. Let it
NA and NC the number of application and distributed memory nodes, re-
spectively. Let it R the average number of accesses per service request.
Each application node maintains a pool of p connections to each of the
NC storage nodes (this avoid opening TCP connections on-demand, since it
is a costly operation). Therefore, the total number P of connections to each
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node is constant (P =NA ∗p).
the maximum number of requests performed to the Distributed Memory
is limited by the engineered capacity of the application tier. If requests exceed
the capacity of the application node, they are rejected without any further in-
spection. The maximum number of requests inspected by an agent is equal to
the engineered capacity of the application node.
We denote the maximum throughput of a Distributed Memory node at
concurrency level P as T (P )C . This throughput can be obtained by performing a
simple experiment with a synthetic workload generator (such as the memtier-
benchmark tool), by reproducing a workload with P concurrent connections
and measuring the corresponding throughput (see Section 5.5.2 for the exper-
imental results).
The maximum number of requests that the whole Distributed Memory
can handle is NC ∗T (P )C . The average number of requests performed by the ap-
plication tier at the engineered level is NA ∗TA ∗R. To ensure a correct sizing
of the system, the number of requests that the Distributed Memory should be
handle needs to be at least equal to the average number of requests performed
by the whole application tier (at the engineered level):
NATAR =NC T (P )C
Therefore, we can find the minimum number of required Distributed
Memory nodes as:
NC =
⌈
NATAR
T (P )C
⌉
5.5.2 Example: scaling the solution up to 10K nodes
We performed a simulation in order to estimate the maximum throughput
of a Distributed Memory node at different contention level. We used the open-
5.5. OVERHEAD AND SCALABILITY OF THE OVERLOAD CONTROL SOLUTION 157
source memtier-benchmark tool to generate a Memcached synthetic work-
load. We configured the workload to be an equal mix of “set” and “get” re-
quests, since the admission control solution performs updates (a “get” fol-
lowed by a “set” on the same key).
Figure 5.24 shows the values of the throughput T (P )C for increasing values
of the number of concurrent connection P , ranging from 50 to 50k.
Figure 5.24. Performance of a Distributed Memory server at increasing level of
concurrent connections (up to 50K)
In the following we show how to use the model described in Section 5.5.1
and the simulation results, to figure out the minimum number of datastore
nodes required to scale to 10k nodes.
A) Our testbed configuration (up to 50 nodes). The number of application
nodes is NA = 50. The average number of requests to the Distributed Memory
per service request is R = 4. The engineered throughput of a single application
node is TA = 40 req/s at the steady state (the whole throughput is 2,000 req/s).
The connection pool size in each application node is p = 5 connections. The
concurrency level at Memcached server is P = NA p = 250 connections. Each
server is configured with 1 vCPU and 4GB RAM. The performance of a single
Memcached server at this concurrency level is T (250)C = 203,349 req/s.
Therefore, the minimum number of nodes to deploy is:
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NC =
⌈
NATAR
T (P )C
⌉
=
⌈
50∗40∗4
203,349
⌉
=
⌈
8,000
203,349
⌉
= 1
B) Scaling the system up to 10k agents. Under the same conditions, if we
scale the application tier up to 10k nodes (NA = 10,000), we obtain a Mem-
cached concurrency level P = NA p = 50,000 connections. Considering that a
single TCP connection requires up to 1 kb of RAM in a Linux system, the mem-
ory overhead will be less than 50 MB per node. However, the performance of a
Memcached server under this level of contention will drop to T (50K )C = 130,579
req/s. Therefore, the minimum number of Memcached nodes that are re-
quired to handle 10,000 agents will be:
NC =
⌈
NATAR
T (P )C
⌉
=
⌈
10,000∗40∗4
130,579
⌉
=
⌈
1,600,000
130,579
⌉
= 13
This is a worst-case result. On average a big part of the 50,000 connections
are idle most of the time: the concurrency level is lower than the number of
active connection, since the connection pools can have spare connections.
Figure 5.25 shows the required number of nodes for increasing number
of application nodes (NA) and for different values of R, assuming that each
application nodes has the same engineered throughput as the previous exam-
ples (i.e., TA = 40 req/s). All the configurations below 200 application nodes
can correctly work with a single Memcached node. In the extreme case with
a deploy with 10,000 application nodes, in which a single application request
accesses 20 different storage nodes on average, the solution requires 62 Mem-
cached nodes, assuming the performance of our test machine, reported in Fig-
ure 5.24.
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Figure 5.25. Minimum number of Distributed Memory nodes required by the
solution, for different scale of application servers (NA), by varying the average
number of storage operations per each user request (R)
5.5.3 Further optimizations
There are more strategies to improve the performance of Memcached at
this extreme scale. These strategies can improve the throughput of each Mem-
cached server, and at the same time reduce the level of resource contention.
1. Use of a TCP concentrator proxy, such as Twitter Twemproxy [129].
This middleware is a fast and lightweight proxy for Memcached and
Redis protocols. It was built primarily to reduce the number of con-
nections to the caching servers. It accepts requests coming from mul-
tiple connections and forwards them in pipeline on a smaller number
of connections in order to achieve a lower concurrency and a higher
throughput.
2. Use of the UDP protocol. Memcached can work on both TCP and UDP.
The last is not very used, since it provides lower performance in case of
a small number of concurrent connections. However, at the scale of 10K
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agents, we expect a significant reduction of the system overhead and
better performance than the TCP protocol.
The first strategy allows very a high throughput improvement, and it is
widely used in production systems (e.g., by Twitter Twemproxy [129], Face-
book [130] and Flickr [131]). However, it has the disadvantage that requires
to deploy an additional component (the proxy). On the other side, the second
strategy is simpler, it does not require additional resources and it is built in the
Memcached code, but is not widely tested in production.
Chapter6
Conclusion
A key challenge for telecom operators and service providers is to efficiently
deploy rich network services, and to optimize network resources to improve
customer’s quality of experience. NFV solutions are expected to support ex-
tremely large scale architectures, providing high performance and high de-
pendability. Overload management is a critical aspect of VNF systems that is
affected by these concerns: if the system attempts to serve more traffic than its
capacity, then each traffic unit will not be served with enough computing re-
sources to meet Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, as specified in Service
Level Agreements (SLAs); high-priority requests may experience failures; user
sessions that were already admitted in the system may be disrupted, causing
avalanche restarts and cascade failures due to retries and traffic handover; and
the software becomes prone to failures due to resource unavailability, time-
outs, and race conditions.
Therefore, to react timely to bottlenecks undermining the performance
and the availability of the network services it is necessary optimizing the per-
formance at very large scale without human intervention in response to both
service configuration and workload variations and detecting the occurrences
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of network problems to mitigate their symptoms within few seconds. The the-
sis has contributed to these issues with a threefold proposal.
First, It presented an approach to ease the adoption of anomaly detection
systems in production NFV services. I showed that, by taking into account
the VNF service chain topology, it is possible correlating performance met-
rics from different VNFs to infer the health of the service chain (e.g., service
performance anomalies caused by the occurrence of bottlenecks and com-
ponent failures). I propose an algorithm to combine the correlations across
multiple VNF replicas, to improve the accuracy of the detection. I validated
the approach using an opensource NFV-oriented IP Multimedia Subsystem
(IMS), namely Clearwater. I selected a set of scenarios including overload,
contention on physical resources and crash of the VNF instances, and stud-
ied the impact on the quality of service. I evaluated the detection coverage
(i.e., the percentage of the scenarios where the detection outcome is detected)
and the detection latency (i.e., the time between the occurrence of a failure
and the detection of the anomaly). The experimental results show that the
approach performs well across several conditions when using the Running
Moving Median (RMM) smoothing function and a window of 10 samples with
a sampling period of 2s. With these parameters, an anomalous condition is
detected within half minute on average, with a very high detection coverage
and no false positives. The insensitivity of the algorithm against false posi-
tives, along with the freedom from thresholds that depend on the system (that
would need to be calibrated with training samples, and to be tuned when the
system is upgraded or reconfigured), are two key concerns that I took into ac-
count in the design of the algorithm, in order to make easier its adoption in
production environments.
Second, the thesis proposed a novel framework, NFV-Throttle, for overload
control in NFV services. This framework has been designed to support the ser-
vice models of NFV (in particular, NVFIaaS and VNFaaS), by providing a set of
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overload detection and mitigation agents to be deployed either on VMs or on
the physical hosts. These agents adopt simple and robust rules to control traf-
fic drop and reject, by analyzing CPU utilization and the network traffic vol-
ume. Moreover, the proposed framework addresses not only workload peaks,
but also physical resource contention, which can occur because of oversub-
scription of NFV services on the physical infrastructure, or because of faults
that reduce the available resources. The contention is mitigated by tuning the
priority of services that share the physical infrastructure. Moreover, I analyzed
the problem of overload conditions caused by physical CPU contention within
the guest VMs: this form of overload conditions have a different behavior (e.g.,
in terms of CPU utilization metrics) than the case of traffic spikes; and that the
overload control solutions for traffic spikes can be ineffective, or even coun-
terproductive, in the case of physical CPU contention. Therefore, I proposed
an extention to the existing feedback control-based approach at guest-level
to also address physical CPU contention to support VNFs deployed on IaaS,
where the VNF has little visibility or control of the underlying infrastructure.
This solution introduces a mechanism inside the VNF to occupy the CPU cy-
cles freed by traffic throttling, in order to protect the feedback control loop
from the opportunistic behavior of the hypervisor that may reclaim the CPU
cycles. As done for the anomaly detection, I evaluated the proposed frame-
work in the context of Clearwater. In the experiments, I considered stressful
overload conditions with high workloads (up to 1000% of the nominal capacity
of the system), and with resource hogs competing with the IMS for the physi-
cal resources. In all the scenarios, the proposed framework is able to achieve
a high throughput, comparable to the maximum throughput under normal
conditions, with a negligible memory and CPU overhead. Moreover, the over-
load control framework avoids failures of the NFV software that are triggered
by stress and resource exhaustion. I also analyzed the relative benefits and the
complementarity of VNF-level, host-level, and network-level overload con-
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trol. The host-level control achieves the best performance, since it avoids the
overhead of forwarding the traffic in excess to the VMs; however, the VNF-level
control achieves comparable results, and can be applied in scenarios in which
the physical infrastructure cannot be modified; finally, the network-level con-
trol allows to reject traffic at the boundaries of the NFV network, thus enabling
the network to send notifications to clients and to neighbours about overload
conditions, in order to gradually reduce the traffic in excess.
Last, the thesis analyzed the overload condition problems in modern large-
scale architectures, especially when uniform load balancing among the nodes
is not possible. In fact, during the interaction between stateless and stateful
tiers typical problems are represented by hot-spot resources, unequal node
configurations and unpredictable capacity variations due to background tasks
or hogs. I propose DRACO, a distributed overload control solution for large
multi-tier architectures, that dynamically monitors the capacity of the nodes
to detect hot-spots and capacity variations that may be caused by resource
hogs. Moreover, DRACO is designed to perform a fine-grained admission con-
trol by discovering the resources that will be required by a user request before
its admission in the system. This will prevent unbalanced load conditions to
cause overload in specific nodes when there is still available capacity in the
tiers. The key innovative aspects of DRACO are:
• The solution is suitable to be applied to multi-tier systems, in which the
traffic can only be filtered in the front-end tier (i.e., the application tier).
In these multi-tier systems, an internal tier (in particular, the storage
tier) should not drop any traffic; otherwise, it would cause inconsisten-
cies between the application and storage tier, and among nodes in the
storage tier. The solution has been designed to map the application re-
quests to storage resources and to only drop requests at the application
tier, without loss of consistency.
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• The solution mitigates overload conditions that are unbalanced, that is,
the overload only affects specific nodes in the system. The solution has
been designed to make the most efficient use of the capacity of the stor-
age tier, by admitting user requests that only use non-overloaded stor-
age nodes.
• The solution can be applied without making any change to the storage
tier (thus, it is suitable to be applied even if the system uses “off-the-
shelf” key-value data store technologies).
• The solution uses simple and robust heuristics to estimate the number
of requests that can be accepted by the multi-tier system. The heuristics
are easy to deploy in production since they only require generic metrics
for CPU utilization and network bandwidth utilization.
I evaluated DRACO by means of two case studies: a Distributed Fileserver,
which is very sensitive to problems of data consistency and hot-spots, and
the Clearwater IMS, which require carrier-grade levels of performance and
availability. For both the case studies I performed two groups of experiments:
The first group is with a load up to the capacity and an unbalanced condition
among the nodes of the tiers, in order to evaluate the performance of the con-
trol system in absence of overload. The second group is with a load up to 100
times higher than the engineered capacity of the system, in order to evalu-
ate the performance (and the overhead) of the control system during extreme
overload conditions. Results show that the solution quickly reacts to bottle-
neck changes, and preserves more than the 90% of the throughput during the
most severe overload conditions and prevents service failures due to resource
exhaustion in the nodes.
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